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Abstract
This dissertation aims to revise conventional wisdom regarding Canada’s contribution to
international peacekeeping through an examination of peacekeeping-specific training in the
Canadian Forces from 1945 to 2000. There is a need to study training to understand how
Canada’s peacekeepers have been prepared for peacekeeping missions since the creation of
the United Nations Emergency Force in 1956. Peacekeeping training was long neglected, not
only in the historiography of Canadian participation in international peacekeeping, but also in
the operations of the Department of National Defence and other government bodies. This
topic deserves more attention given the important role that peacekeeping has played as a
primary task of the Canadian Forces. A survey of historical literature dealing with Canadian
peacekeeping shows that the academic interest in peacekeeping over the last thirty-odd years
has failed to address the critical issue of training until very recently, and rarely from a
historical perspective. Scholars have not examined Canadian peacekeeping at its most basic
level to determine how Canada’s soldiers are prepared for peacekeeping.
This dissertation uses scholarly sources, government of Canada documents, and the
testimony of Canadian soldiers as its sources of information. An integral part of my research
is the testimony of former peacekeepers. The recollection of their experiences prior to,
during, and post-deployment can illustrate the impact that the presence or lack of specialized
training for peacekeeping had on their experiences as peacekeepers in a multinational force.
The objective of this study is to gain a comprehensive picture of the evolution of specialized
training for peacekeeping in the Canadian Forces since the 1950s.
Keywords: Peacekeeping, Training, Canadian Forces, United Nations, Military, Canada
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1

Introduction
The national Peacekeeping Monument, dedicated in 1992 on Confederation Boulevard in
Ottawa, is physical testimony to the significance that Canada’s contribution to
international peacekeeping took on in the decades following the Second World War.
Titled “Reconciliation,” this statue of three members of the Canadian Forces (CF)1, two
men and a woman, indicates the hopeful conclusion to a peacekeeping mission: that of
conflict resolved, and peace restored. Drawing on Canada’s peacekeeping mythology,
the monument features a quotation from the “father” of United Nations peacekeeping,
Canada’s own Lester B. Pearson: “We need action not only to end the fighting but to
make the peace... My own government would be glad to recommend Canadian
participation in such a United Nations force, a truly international peace and police
force.”2 This allusion to the Nobel Prize won by Pearson for his part in the creation of
the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), formed to quell the 1956 Suez Crisis,
illuminates the leading role that Canada has played in international peacekeeping from its
conception. Built on the foundation of this eminent birth story, Canada’s reputation for
being a peacekeeper par excellence grew in the decades following the creation of UNEF.

1

Canadian military forces were called the “Canadian Armed Forces” (CAF) until the unification of the
three armed services (army, navy, and air force) in 1968, at which point the name changed to the “Canadian
Forces” (CF).
2

Veterans Affairs Canada, “Remembrance - Reconciliation: The Peacekeeping Monument,” In the Service
of Canada (Ottawa: Veterans Affairs Canada, 23 July 2012),
http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/feature/peacekeeper/remembrance/reconciliation.

2

In the second half of the twentieth century, the Canadian military participated in
peacekeeping missions under the authority of the United Nations (UN) and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to a degree rivaled by few other nations until the
1990s. From the contribution of a single person for a United Nations observer group to
thousands of soldiers for UN-led peacekeeping forces, Canada was part of almost every
UN-sanctioned peacekeeping operation from 1945 to the turn of the century. With UNEF
I, Canada found its enthusiasm for peacekeeping, and the country quickly incorporated
the concept into its national image. Peacekeeping, at least initially, provided a low-cost
method of exerting Canada’s influence in international relations, gave its military and
foreign policy a centerpiece around which to build its reputation, and afforded Canada’s
armed forces a way to gain operational experience during peacetime. In tandem with the
spread of peacekeeping missions around the globe, a mythology grew up around the
Canadian Forces’ fifty-plus years of peacekeeping which engaged Lester B. Pearson’s
“creation” of the concept of peacekeeping, Canada’s high level of participation in the
various forms of peacekeeping missions that had evolved since the 1950s, and the pride
that Canadians take in their peacekeeping heritage. This mythology has been scrutinized
by academics, politicians, and journalists, and still it persists in public discourse.
This mythology obscures the critical issue of training in the ability of a soldier to
function effectively as a peacekeeper. An examination of the evolution of training in the
Canadian Forces since 1956 promises to not only clarify why Canadians were thought to
be naturally good peacekeepers, but whether, in fact, Canadian soldiers were wellprepared to do the job tasked to them in international peacekeeping operations. In the

3

multi-disciplinary and complex world of international peacekeeping, what and how a
Canadian soldier is taught would have a significant impact on his or her ability to carry
out the specific requirements of a peacekeeping mission, carry out its mandate, and
follow its rules of engagement. The difficulty of training soldiers for peacekeeping has
been compounded by the fact that peacekeeping itself changed drastically between 1956
and 2000, and peacekeeping operations were far from homogenous in this time period
given differing mandates, the critical issue of regulations governing the use of force, and
the composition of the peacekeeping forces themselves, to name just a few variables.
Additionally, peacekeeping has taken place against a shifting backdrop of geopolitical
realities, and these have affected the form and function of peacekeeping missions.
From its inception, peacekeeping has had a causal relationship with world events.
As an increasing number of international situations in the late 1950s and 1960s were
perceived as posing a threat to international peace and security, peacekeeping operations
were often proposed to deal with these problems in the hope that a wider war could be
averted, particularly in the context of Cold War superpower tensions. Canada willingly
participated in these new missions as excitement for this novel activity gained momentum
in the country. By the 1970s, however, some disillusionment had set in as peacekeeping
did not always render the quick results expected from international military intervention
under the UN, and the pace of new missions slowed. There were no new UN missions
mounted between 1978 and 1988, and this status quo suited Canadian governments
oriented towards fiscal restraint and a focus on the missions to which Canada was already
committed. With the end of the Cold War, intra-state conflicts arose that threatened to

4

destabilize entire regions of Europe and Africa. Peacekeeping was seen as a low-cost
way to handle these potential powder keg conflicts, thus the number of peacekeeping
mission increased accordingly. The Canadian government pledged military support to
many of these operations, resulting in an increased operational tempo for Canadian
Forces personnel. By 1999, Canada had participated in over forty missions and
contributed thousands of troops to peacekeeping operations, at the cost of 100 lives,
according to Veterans Affairs Canada.3 While concrete numbers are difficult to come by,
another Canadian estimate indicated that 120,000 Canadians had served on over fifty
peacekeeping operations by 2010, and at least 108 had been killed in the service of
peace.4 The UN’s statistics place the death toll at 121 deaths occurring over 16 missions
between 1948 and 31 January 2014.

5

The evolution of peacekeeping missions over time has meant that the
nomenclature used to describe the activity has undergone change as well. An explosion
of terms used to describe peacekeeping occurred after the Cold War, as the activity
became more complex and was no longer adequately described by the term
“peacekeeping.” With the transition from classic “Chapter VI” peacekeeping to, more
and more often, “Chapter VI ½” or “Chapter VII” peace enforcement missions, new

3

Veterans Affairs Canada, “Canada and Peacekeeping,” (Canada: Veterans Affairs Canada, 1999),
http://www.vac-acc.gc.ca/general/sub.cfm?source=teach_resources/peacefact.
4

United Nations Association in Canada, “The Canadian Contribution to United Nations Peacekeeping,”
(Canada: United Nations Association in Canada with Heritage Canada and National Defence, 2010), 11.

5

United Nations, “Fatalities by Nations and Missions” (New York: United Nations, 2014),
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/fatalities/documents/stats_2.pdf.

5

language had to be developed to describe an activity that sometimes contained an element
of coercion or more robust rules of engagement. Where once “peacekeeping” was
commonly understood to mean any third-party intervention in a conflict that was
sanctioned by the UN, the term “peace support operations” has been adopted to describe
peacekeeping and peace enforcement, humanitarian aid, election monitoring, and police
action, to name a few of the activities now undertaken under that rubric. This signaled the
growing complexity of peacekeeping and international security in the 1990s and the
alarming rise of violent intra-state conflict around the world. For the purpose of this
study, “peacekeeping” will be used in the same loose sense that Harold P. Klepak defined
it in his article “Education and Training for Peacekeeping Forces”: “operations aiming to
reduce tensions between two opposing states, or factions within a state, undertaken by a
multinational organization and structured to facilitate the growth of confidence between
6

the sides in the dispute.” This style of peacekeeping is generally third-party impartial
military interventions undertaken by the United Nations or the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization. “Peace support operations” will be used in the context of the broader,
multi-disciplinary missions undertaken in the 1990s.
The 1990s was a difficult decade for Canada and peacekeeping. Challenging, and
at times disastrous, missions to the Former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda, coupled
with force reductions, meant that the Canadian Forces were stretched and their training

6

Harold P. Klepak, “Education and Training for Peacekeeping Forces,” in Peacekeeping
Challenges to Euro-Atlantic Security, Ernest Gilam and Detlef E. Herold, eds. (Rome: NATO Defense
College, 1994), 111.

6

sorely tested. The nadir of Canadian peacekeeping, the mission to Somalia, resulted in
embarrassment for the Canadian government and the Canadian Forces, an extensive
review and some re-structuring of the Canadian Forces itself as well as the training
employed to prepare soldiers to keep the peace, and a questioning of Canada’s long-held
reputation, and self-image, as peacekeeper par excellence. The self-examination caused
by Canada’s role in the 1993 mission to Somalia and the resulting Commission of Inquiry
into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, as well as Canada’s part in the
missions to the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, resulted in initiatives in the late 1990s to
improve Canada’s training system for peacekeeping; however, these efforts were
complicated by world events. The terrorist attacks that took place on American soil on
11 September 2001 drew Canada into an international War on Terror that occupied a
great deal of the Canadian Forces’ dwindled resources in the new millennium. It was
estimated that by the end of 2011 approximately 41,000 Canadian Forces personnel had
served in Afghanistan over the ten-year span the mission had been in existence.7 The
dedication of this many people to a single mission reinforced the trend that was already
occurring in the Canadian Forces: that of scaling back the commitment to international
peacekeeping operations. The CF’s population had been undergoing reductions for some
time, culminating with the Force Reduction Plan of the early 1990s which encouraged
members to take early retirement, and regular force strength stood at about 61,469 in

7

Martin Auger, “Canadian International Military Operations in the 21st Century,” Current and Emerging
Issues (Canada: Library of Parliament, 2011), www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/cei-17e.htm.
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2004.8 Even when the Reserve population was taken into account, for a military of this
size to field a large commitment to the War on Terror meant that the decline in
contributions to peacekeeping seemed permanent after 2001.
Canada’s ranking among troop-contributing countries had been decreasing, and
by 2006 it ranked 55th out of 108 troop-contributing countries, fielding a mere 126
people, only 55 of which were military personnel, to UN peacekeeping operations.9 As of
31 March 2013 Canada was providing 100 UN police, 10 military experts, and a mere 20
troops to UN peacekeeping operations, at a time when the UN was fielding
approximately 92,541 personnel to peacekeeping operations worldwide.10 Both Canada’s
participation in and enthusiasm for UN peacekeeping seemed to wane in the context of a
late-1990s military less able to contribute, and an early 2000s world overtly threatened by
international acts of terrorism, especially ones that occurred so close to home. This
reduction in participation levels and the reality of an uncertain future for Canadian
peacekeeping provided a natural end-point for this study. It is still unclear how
peacekeeping operations will fit into the new international security context. Perhaps
peacekeeping’s day has past, in particular for Canada, but it is also possible that, with the

8

This statistic was provided by the Directorate of Human Resources Research and Evaluation, Department
of National Defence, to the researcher in 2004.
9

The United Nations Association in Canada, “Canada and UN Peacekeeping,” UN Peacekeeping (Ottawa:
The United Nations Association in Canada, 2007), http://www.unac.org/peacekeeping/en/unpeacekeeping/fact-sheets/canada-and-un-peacekeeping/.
10

United Nations, “Monthly Summary of Contributors (Police, UN Military Experts on Mission and
Troops) as of 31 March 2013,” Contributors to United Nations peacekeeping operations (New York: The
United Nations, March 2013), https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2013/mar13_1.pdf.

8

necessity of rebuilding failed states and addressing humanitarian crises and natural
disasters, peacekeeping, and modern peace support operations, will find a niche in which
to remain relevant in the new century. Whatever the outcome, Canada’s long-standing
contributions to UN and NATO peacekeeping operations from 1956 to 2000 form a
significant portion of Canadian Forces history, and the role that training played in the
CF’s ability to carry out its peacekeeping role requires study.
Canada’s historic commitment to peacekeeping has been well publicized, and a
point that has received significant attention, particularly since the end of the Cold War, is
the strain that this level of participation placed on the personnel and resources of the
Canadian Forces, and whether peacekeeping duties affected the ability of the CF to fight
wars and, if necessary, defend Canada. Canada’s long history of participation has
allowed the Canadian Army, as the body primarily responsible for the operational aspect
of a peacekeeping mission, to learn from past peacekeeping experiences. Since Canada
first embarked upon peacekeeping missions, the nature and scope of those missions has
evolved, sometimes in an unpredictable fashion. The Canadian Forces has been accused
of failing to change and adapt to new circumstances, of being a stronghold of tradition
and bureaucracy that is slow to learn but quick to cover up its own mistakes.11 The
nature of peacekeeping, with its rapidly changing and ad hoc conditions that are often
mission-specific, creates an environment that makes management by large organizations
difficult.

11

This opinion is a central theme in Scott Taylor and Brian Nolan’s Tested Mettle – Canada’s
Peacekeepers at War (Ottawa: Esprit de Corps Books, 1998).

9

One aspect of peacekeeping that the military has directly controlled is the training
and preparation of its soldiers and personnel, and the Canadian Forces has consistently
held to the belief that the best training to meet the demands of peacekeeping operations is
general purpose military training with an emphasis on basic combat and occupational
skills. This stance has been somewhat borne out by the CF’s peacekeeping experiences.
However, these decades of peacekeeping experience brought the organization to the
realization that additional training for peacekeeping must be carried out in the form of
extended training periods prior to deployment, and the acquisition of additional skills that
were not typically included in military training. This analysis, therefore, aims to
document the evolution of Canadian peacekeeping-specific training over time. Training
is important to peacekeeping, as it is to other endeavours that employ military forces,
because it imparts skills, discipline, leadership abilities and professionalism and plays a
role in performance. Through an examination of documentary evidence and secondary
sources related to training in the Canadian Forces, as well as the testimony of CF
members who have served on peacekeeping operations, it is evident that the CF has
maintained a “soldiers first” stance in regard to peacekeeping, but has, over time and with
some reluctance, incorporated add-on training for peacekeeping into its pre-deployment
training to enhance its soldiers’ abilities in peacekeeping situations. Although Canadians
have been instrumental in popularizing the concept of peacekeeping and ensuring the
success of many peacekeeping operations, even incorporating the concept into its national
image, few attempts have been made to determine why Canadians seemed to wear the
blue beret so well. This study aims to demystify that perception through the examination

10

of the preparation and training received by Canadian military personnel for service in
peacekeeping operations.
The central question of peacekeeping-specific training hinges on the idea that
there are “soldierly” skills that form the foundation of every CF member’s core training
and then there are “peacekeeping” skills that are considered add-on or missions-specific
training that may be necessary for deployment on international peacekeeping operations.
These concepts are elaborated in “Combat and Contact skills in Peacekeeping: Surveying
Recent Canadian Experience in UNPROFOR,” by Major David Last and Dr. Ken Eyre.
Last and Eyre define combat experiences as “those in which basic military skills and
physical force predominate.” Contact experiences, on the other hand, are “those in which
interpersonal communications and personal contact are dominant.” 12 Historically, the
military contingent of a peacekeeping operation was often forced to grapple with
unexpected situations that the planners never imagined, and soldiers dealt with these
situations by relying on their “soldiers first” or combat training. Refresher training for
peacekeeping duties often included driving skills, weapons training, first aid, and a
multitude of other topics, but additional skills came into focus in the post-Cold War
peacekeeping environment with missions that required personnel to encounter new
conditions in-theatre. These new conditions included a large civilian component; the
conduct and organization of elections; an information component; a police component; a

12

Major David Last and Dr. Ken Eyre, “Combat and Contact Skills in Peacekeeping: Surveying Recent
Canadian Experience in UNPROFOR,” Peacekeeping and International Relations 26, No. 4-5
(July/October 1997), 8.
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human rights dimension; time limitations; and the fact that many conflicts were intrastate conflicts.13 Development and post-conflict peace-building also became integrated
components of post-Cold War peacekeeping, and as a result peacekeepers encountered
humanitarian tasks and interaction with non-governmental organizations at an increasing
rate. These new dimensions meant that peacekeepers were often involved more directly
with local populations, rather than maintaining distance while manning operation posts or
conducting patrols along a demilitarized zone. This necessitated an unprecedented
expertise in “contact” skills. The CF is now required to train for such duties as exchange
and liaison, interviews and public relations, negotiations, civil-military cooperation, and
inter-agency cooperation, as well as training in mission specific-knowledge such as local
customs, culture, and language. The expanded menu of training required for
peacekeeping complicated the task of military trainers, and none of these requirements
abated with the focus on the mission in Afghanistan, which shared some features with
post-Cold War peacekeeping.
In an increasingly complex world, peacekeepers need their military and combat
skills more than ever before, but additional skills must complement traditional military
training. From the 1950s to the 1990s, the Canadian Forces realized that its
peacekeepers, in addition to being combat-capable, multi-purpose soldiers, needed
“contact skills” in the areas of negotiation and mediation techniques, general knowledge
of the workings and mandate of the United Nations (or the equivalent international body),

13

Joseph T. Jockel, Canada & International Peacekeeping (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic
Studies, 1994), 3.

12

a thorough knowledge of the Rules of Engagement (ROE), familiarity with civil-military
cooperation and humanitarian aid issues, as well as mission specific-knowledge such as
local customs, culture and language.14 Both combat and non-combat skills are important,
as Canadian peacekeepers have drawn on both in equal measure in past peacekeeping
operations.
International peacekeeping has been through many incarnations and has had its
share of supporters and detractors since its birth in the aftermath of the Second World
War.15 The challenge for the Canadian Forces since 1956 has been two-fold: to
adequately train to meet the rigorous demands of peacekeeping, particularly its mandated
limits on use of force, and to maintain its traditional war-fighting stance to ensure that
combat skills were not eroded in favour of “contact skills.” An examination of the
evolution of the CF’s training doctrine and practices sheds light on the CF’s priorities, its
degree of emphasis on peacekeeping versus traditional combat roles, the appropriateness
of the training offered to peacekeeping roles, and the level of responsiveness displayed by
CF leadership who have dealt with peacekeeping missions that require contact skills but
place peacekeepers in theatres of operations that are effectively war zones.

14

Last and Eyre, “Combat and Contact Skills,” 8. The author has slightly broadened the definition of
contact skills to include extra-military skills beyond the interpersonal and communication skills that Last
and Eyre outline, to include non-combat subject areas the CF has deemed necessary to peacekeeping
training.
15

Alan James, Peacekeeping in International Politics (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan
in association with the International Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1990),
passim.
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There have been a multitude of books and articles published over the past forty
years that deal with “international peacekeeping” or peacekeeping from a broad
perspective. Canada figures in varying degrees in analyses of this kind, and its training
programs figure to an even lesser degree. The secondary sources selected for discussion
below are noteworthy because they are significant contributions to the scholarship on
international peacekeeping, make key points in regard to Canada’s contributions to
peacekeeping, or represent important studies on the issue of peacekeeping training, of
which there are few.
Much of the scholarship, at least indirectly, alludes to a central feature of
peacekeeping that has persisted over time and confounded the most organized planners:
that of the ad hoc nature of peacekeeping operations. In the 1973 political science work
International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads. National Support – Experience and
Prospects, David Wainhouse, Frederick P. Bohannon, James E. Knott and Anne P.
Simons provide an early example of the examination of peacekeeping through case
studies. Wainhouse et al conclude that, while demands for peacekeeping were likely to
increase, there were a number of measures to be taken to improve the efficiency and
likelihood for success of peacekeeping operations mounted by the United Nations.
Wainhouse et al asserted that “[m]ost of the problems that peacekeeping operations have
encountered in the past will recur and will, as in the past, be handled on a largely ad hoc

14

basis.”16 The ad hoc nature of peacekeeping operations is a theme that is repeated in
peacekeeping literature, and highlights the importance of the training of peacekeepers and
the difficulty in knowing how to prepare a peacekeeper for an unpredictable environment.
Wainhouse et al point out that to carry out a peacekeeping operation participating
countries were asked to provide a wide variety of services, equipment, supplies, and
financial support. Probably most crucial, however, is the request that countries provide
personnel. After all,
peacekeeping forces require practically the whole panoply of military expertise.
The greatest number involved are, of course, the contingents of line troops but
there must also be considerable elements of support troops, including air units.
There is a great need for skilled staff officers and with few exceptions these have
been provided by the same countries that supply the contingents.17
In recognition of these demands, many countries have developed training, organizational,
and residual expertise appropriate for peacekeeping. Wainhouse et al cites Canada as one
of these countries, but fails to elaborate.
Journalist Anthony Verrier’s 1981 pro-United Nations International
Peacekeeping – United Nations Forces in a Troubled World points out that often the
operations themselves give “soldiers and airmen plenty of operational experience in the
midst of two heavily-armed nations, who undoubtedly use [the peacekeeping mission] as

16

David W. Wainhouse, Frederick P. Bohannon, James E. Knott and Anne P. Simons, International
Peacekeeping at the Crossroads. National Support – Experience and Prospects (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1973), 603.
17

Wainhouse et al., International Peacekeeping at a Crossroads, 571.

15

a large-scale training ground.”18 The sentiment that peacekeeping missions are effective
training for soldiers stands the problem of operational requirements on its head. Instead
of training soldiers for peacekeeping duty, Verrier implies that the missions themselves
are the training ground. There is little discussion here, as elsewhere, of any specialized
training that soldiers have received or should have received prior to deployment.
International Peacekeeping by political scientist Paul F. Diehl focuses on themes
in peacekeeping rather than taking the case-by-case approach so popular in peacekeeping
literature. He points out that the concept of neutrality in peacekeeping goes beyond the
purpose of the operation to the “composition and activity” of the troops.19 Nonalignment, the idea that the peacekeepers themselves should have no enemies and be
partisan to no belligerent, enhances the reputation of Canadians as “honest brokers” in the
peacekeeping process. However, Diehl falls into convention when he discusses the ad
hoc nature of peacekeeping operations, and mentions in passing Canada’s efforts to
identify and train troops specifically for peacekeeping duty. Because operations are
organized on an ad hoc basis on the voluntary contributions of member states of the UN,
the mode of organization changes each time, and this causes discontinuity and
improvisation.20
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One impact that such a process has on the mission itself is the speed with which
an operation can get underway. A popular argument for a permanent UN peacekeeping
force is the possibility of rapid reaction capabilities. Although under the present
organization rapid deployment is possible, such as when the United Nations Force in
Cyprus was on the ground within twenty-four hours of approval by the UN, it seldom
occurs.21 By the late 1990s peacekeeping literature had firmly established that there were
problems with the United Nations’ ability to plan, execute, and sustain international
peacekeeping.22 The UN itself had sought a solution through a number of studies aimed
at smoothing out this process.23 Training is a notable element in making rapid
deployment possible, a factor noted by former UN Under-Secretary General Brian
Urquhart in his 1994 article, “Keeping the Peace: The Argument for a United Nations
Military Force.” Although Urquhart makes an argument for standing UN peace
enforcement units, “trained in the techniques of peacekeeping and negotiation as well as
the more bloody business of fighting,” his reasoning can be applied to conventional
peacekeeping operations as well.24 Urquhart argues that
the capacity to deploy credible and effective peace enforcement units, at short
notice and at an early stage in a crisis, and with the strength and moral support of
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the world community behind them, would be a major step in this direction.
Clearly, a timely intervention by a relatively small but highly trained force,
willing and authorized to take combat risks and representing the will of the
international community, could make a decisive difference in the early stages of a
crisis.25
Out of this realization came an ambitious study commissioned by the Canadian
government designed to improve the UN’s rapid reaction capability. Former foreign
service officer and current academic Louis Delvoie evaluated the resulting 1995
Canadian discussion paper, “Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United
Nations,” as a sound piece of work, and its recommendations as judicious. The areas
covered included recommendations for the political level; the strategic level; the
operational level, “in which there is a virtual vacuum in terms of UN capabilities”; and
the tactical level (the operation on the ground).26 A survey of historical analysis shows
that these recommendations were far from original. In fact they simply drew together, in
a single volume, ideas for improvement that had been circulating since the 1970s. In
addition to exploring the idea of a standing peacekeeping force, and establishing a
permanent UN headquarters for peacekeeping, the discussion paper urged that the UN
“encourage greater standardization of peacekeeping training through a system of training
visits to enhance understanding of international standards in this area.”27 While this was a
logical recommendation, Delvoie does not discuss existing peacekeeping training.
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Canada’s contributions to international peacekeeping have attracted the attention
of Canadian scholars. Peacekeeping meant more to Canada than a simple donation of
soldiers, equipment, funds, and know-how. Peacekeeping has somehow become
entwined with the idea of Canadian national identity, and it is accepted wisdom that
peacekeeping participation has had ramifications for Canadian national security and
foreign and defence policy. In addition, the activity has bred discussion about the role of
the Canadian Forces, and the impact peacekeeping has had upon a shrinking force.28 All
of these factors have combined to provide academics with a complex problem, and some
historians have responded by pursuing an answer to the question, “What has
peacekeeping meant to Canada?”
There are a number of sources that deal exclusively with Canadian peacekeeping
from a national perspective. None includes an in-depth analysis of training, but most
engage the question of peacekeeping’s impact on Canada’s international reputation and
on the Canadian Forces. In his 1968 article “Peacekeeping: The Canadian Experience,”
author David Cox outlined the elements of Canadian peacekeeping. He believed that
Canada was unlikely to have national interests in areas where it participated in
peacekeeping, thus allowing Canadian soldiers to retain their neutrality. He asserted that,
in order for a peacekeeping mission to be successful, advance organization and planning
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are required.29 Because this type of planning was not always possible, UN forces had to
rely on the short-notice availability of various kinds of military units with the necessary
mobility and logistical support. According to Cox, this was where the Canadians came in
because they were better equipped to provide transport and specialized military units than
any other power.30 Chief of the Defence Staff General Paul D. Manson reiterated this
claim twenty years later. He cited these abilities as a reason why Canada’s participation
in peacekeeping was valued, stating that
Canadian soldiers are trained as “soldiers first”; that means that Canadian
contingents can be deployed in peacekeeping roles as integrated, self-sustaining
units capable of dealing with the widest range of potential military contingencies.
The determination to deploy only fully-trained military personnel in what can be,
potentially, a very dangerous role, bears witness to Canada’s unwillingness to put
the lives of those who serve in Canadian peacekeeping contingents at unnecessary
risk.31
Cox adds extra insight into the components of training that make Canadian soldiers more
suitable for peacekeeping than those of other nations’ forces. By the 1960s the “soldiers
first” attitude towards training meant that troops designated as peacekeeping standby
forces received not only conventional military training refresher courses, but also training
in counter-insurgency and para-military operations.32 It can be assumed that extra
elements of military training, including police duties, support to law and order, and
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counter-guerrilla activities, were designed to combat the presumed ad hoc nature of
peacekeeping missions. However, Cox does not discuss additional skills outside the
scope of general or specialized military training that can be vital to the success of
Canada’s peacekeepers.
As previously stated, most literature that deals with Canadian peacekeeping takes
two conclusions for granted: first, that peacekeeping is an ad hoc operation, and
secondly, that Canadian soldiers are well qualified for this aspect of peacekeeping
because of their conventional military training. These assumptions are often present in a
literature that focuses on peacekeeping in the context of the impact it has on the Canadian
military and national security. Historian Jack Granatstein’s 1974 article, “Canada and
Peacekeeping: Image and Reality” is one such source. In this critical analysis,
Granatstein treated peacekeeping as an entity whose life-span has expired, and whose
only worth was to “provide symbols and images for a nation that needed them.”33 Cyprus
was the last peacekeeping victory for Canada and Granatstein predicted that
peacekeeping would stagnate in the future because it was ineffective. He claimed that the
popularity of peacekeeping in Canada rose and fell with international trends, and he
further attacked peacekeeping by attempting to explode the myth that Canada was often
the backbone of peacekeeping operations. As Granatstein stated, “Canada’s role,
however creditable, was usually a minor one and one that was mainly confined to the
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military side of the operation.”34 This statement ignored the fact that the role of military
forces was often crucial to peacekeeping operations. The military contingent was the
group forced to grapple with unexpected situations that the planners never imagined, and
soldiers dealt with these situations by relying on their training, whether combat or
otherwise.
Historian R.B. Byers effectively tied together the impact peacekeeping has had on
the Canadian Forces with peacekeeping’s role in foreign relations and defence policy in
“Defence and Foreign Policy in the 1970s: the demise of the Trudeau doctrine.” Byers
said that the “Pearson government argued that peacekeeping contributed to international
stability and gave the CAF a useful role to perform, one in which it developed
internationally renowned expertise.”35 Scholars were thus identifying two elements that
would play major roles in Canadian peacekeeping literature and practice: peacekeeping
enhanced Canada’s international prestige, and it gave the CF something to do.
Byers also addressed the unpopularity of peacekeeping that Granatstein noted was
evident by 1968, the year after UNEF I was summarily dismissed from Egypt by
President Gamel Abdel Nasser. Byers concurred, but claimed that by the mid-1970s
peacekeeping had been fully resurrected as a major aspect of foreign and defence
policy.36 It is not surprising, then, that by the early 1980s historians and scholars were
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predicting that peacekeeping, despite some controversy that still existed over how much
of an obligation Canada should assume, was a permanent feature of Canadian foreign
policy and would remain so for the foreseeable future. For example, by 1982 scholars
were making statements such as: “it does not appear too risky to forecast a general
stability in Canada’s underlying defence orientation which is characterized by a
multiplicity of roles and the preference for collective undertaking.”37 This preference,
according to political scientist Harald von Riekhoff, was bound to include continued
participation in peacekeeping, as
[p]eacekeeping has fitted Canadian defence preparations and also has fitted
Canada’s aspired role as a responsible, major international actor, operating
independently from the US, though generally in harmony with US security
interests. The peacekeeping role has found international acclaim; it has been
domestically popular.38
Von Riekhoff also identified the cost-effectiveness and general satisfaction with the
outcome of peacekeeping missions as factors in Canada’s continued participation.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s many books and articles were published solely
to praise Canada’s peacekeeping efforts, while others urged caution and a measured
examination of Canada’s past and present commitments before agreeing to any increase
in existing missions or participation in future operations.39 The end of the Cold War,
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with its attendant conflicts, brought new challenges to peacekeeping and forced scholars
to re-evaluate the merits and costs of peacekeeping. Historians J.L. Granatstein and
David J. Bercuson pinpoint the early 1980s as the turning point in the Canadian military’s
opinion of peacekeeping. They claim that “without a believable Soviet threat, it becomes
difficult to justify well-equipped armed forces – unless a new role can be found.
Peacekeeping fills the bill neatly, and the Canadian Forces have now become
peacekeeping’s biggest supporters in Ottawa.”40 It is interesting to note, as will be shown
later, that training for peacekeeping did not come under close scrutiny by the CF until
almost a decade later.
This enthusiasm for peacekeeping was tempered, however, by the realization that
capabilities change over time. Granatstein and Bercuson state it best when they argue for
“[p]eacekeeping, yes; but peacekeeping only when it has a chance to succeed and when it
does not expose our service personnel to unacceptable risks.”41 This attitude is expressed
in a number of recent articles and books which explore the ever more complex and
dangerous aspect of peacekeeping in the 1990s.
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Canadian Studies professor Joseph T. Jockel’s book Canada & International
Peacekeeping questions whether peacekeeping can retain its former popularity in Canada
in the face of mounting fear about the danger level of newer peacekeeping operations.
He cites several new elements in peacekeeping as reasons for the increasing complexity
of operations: a large civilian component; the conduct and organization of elections; an
information component; a police component; a human rights dimension; time limitations;
and intra-state conflicts.42 According to Jockel, these new dimensions, and the increased
risk to the safety of peacekeepers, led the federal government to reconsider putting
Canadian peacekeepers at risk in UN operations, and to call for improved peacekeeping
training.
General Lewis MacKenzie’s “Peacekeeping in the New World Disorder” reflects
the attitude explained above, but from a soldier’s perspective. MacKenzie played a major
role in the initial organization and deployment of Canadian peacekeeping troops in
Bosnia. He discussed many of the same problems with organizing and doing
peacekeeping that have been identified by scholars over the last thirty-odd years. As late
as 1994, he complained, the United Nations still had no permanent protocol for
organizing peacekeeping organizations.43
Journalist Ann H. Medina emphasized this problem with leadership and
organization by citing the fact that, in peacekeeping situations, leaders (and she pinpoints
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diplomats and generals among the offenders) who are often not “plugged in” to the
specifics of the theatre of operations and regional conflict are too afraid of appearing
ignorant to ask basic questions, compounding the climate of ignorance that can sabotage
a peacekeeping mission.44 Also damaging is the possibility that average soldiers, often
the biggest presence in a theatre of operations, are party to this uninformed approach. It
is difficult to imagine that one’s nationality or lack of partisanship can take the place of
information or training under these circumstances.
General MacKenzie also echoed the popular reasoning that Canadians are good
peacekeepers because they are Canadians. He stated that
Canadians are really good at this business, but not for the reason you might think.
Not because we're the best soldiers in the world, we’re probably not…maybe once a
month we’re the best, who knows. There are lots of good soldiers around. We’re
good at this business because of things that are, for most of us anyways, totally and
absolutely out of our control and that’s our nationality. We’re good at it because
we’re Canadian…You get a synergistic effect when you mix our national reputation
45
with good soldiers.
In all of this there is scant mention of training or qualifications that Canadian soldiers
might possess to enable them to cope in a capable manner with any situation that may
arise in a peacekeeping context. Training or qualifications of this kind might be the key
to explaining Canada’s self-perceived peacekeeping reputation, or at least to defining
better Canada’s role in peacekeeping operations.
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Historians’ interest in peacekeeping has not waned, and new studies have
emerged in recent years that take a microscope to some of Canada’s most significant
contributions to international peacekeeping efforts. Three notable recent works aim to
uncover the inner workings of the decision-making process involved in Canada’s
deployments to early peacekeeping operations, and the challenges faced in the wake of
these decisions. Grant Dawson’s Here is Hell: Canada’s Engagement in Somalia is an
analysis of the political, diplomatic, and military decision-making involved in the
decision to deploy Canadian soldiers to Somalia.46 Michael K. Carroll, in his Pearson’s
Peacekeepers: Canada and the United Nations Emergency Force, 1956-1967, provides a
detailed account of Canada’s involvement in UNEF I from a political and military
perspective. It deftly reveals some of the difficult challenges faced during this first
peacekeeping mission.47 Finally, Kevin A. Spooner, in Canada, the Congo Crisis, and
UN Peacekeeping, 1960-64 reveals the misgivings that the Diefenbaker government had
about engagement in Africa and the decisions taken to participate in the mission to the
Congo.48 None of these detailed studies address training for these early missions.
Canada has a long history of peacekeeping all over the globe. Historians have
changed their evaluation of this history over the past few decades, yet it seems that
scholars have finally come to rest on the point that peacekeeping was and is a useful
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endeavour, but that risks must be assessed for each situation to judge whether the
operation is worthy of Canadian participation. What seems to have gone unnoticed, or
unremarked upon, is the issue of precisely how Canadian soldiers are trained to be
effective peacekeepers. There is a perception that Canadian soldiers are trained in some
manner that, when coupled with their distinct national identity, enables them to cope with
almost any situation. And, as ever, they are expected to do more with less, by employing
their ‘can do’ attitude. Little evidence, however, has been put forth to support these
claims. The gap in historiography that exists around the topic of training for
peacekeeping in the Canadian Forces is a glaring omission. The question of
peacekeeping training is almost always missing from historical discourse.49 Scholars
give reasons of national identity, the professionalism of the CF, and the international
reputation of Canadians to explain why Canadians are considered good peacekeepers.50
Few, however, mention if Canadians receive special training or have particular
qualifications or peacekeeping skills.51 A survey of historical literature that deals with
Canadian peacekeeping from the Canadian perspective illuminates the fact that any
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scholarly treatment of peacekeeping over the last thirty years has failed to address the
critical issue of training. Peacekeeping’s role in defence and national security policy has
been discussed and debated, as well as the impact that increased peacekeeping
obligations have had on Canadian Forces’ capabilities, but academics have not examined
Canadian peacekeeping at its most basic level to determine how the preparation of
Canada’s soldiers transformed them into peacekeepers.
To address this gap, this study has employed a wide variety of primary sources:
interviews and surveys of former peacekeepers, the diary of a peacekeeper, Department
of National Defence (DND) documents that address the topic of training for
peacekeeping, reports by various Canadian government bodies, pamphlets, curriculum
information from Canadian peacekeeping training centres, newspaper articles, UN
documents, and a number of secondary sources that place the Canadian peacekeeping
experience in context.
Documentary sources are somewhat scarce for the pre-1990s era, but can be
found in a few public collections. The most useful for this study was located at the
Directorate of History and Heritage of the Department of National Defence, which
yielded key primary documents on peacekeeping training in the period under
examination. Archival searches at the Library and Archives Canada turned up some
additional primary documents but few directly related to peacekeeping training that were
not already found at the Directorate of History and Heritage. Research at the libraries of
the Peace Support Training Centre in Kingston, Ontario, and the now-defunct Lester B.
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Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Cornwallis, Nova
Scotia, also yielded some results. Additional primary documents were provided by
individuals and found through web searches, with the United Nations website being
particularly fruitful.
The very earliest years of peacekeeping proved to be the richest for documentary
evidence. Following the inauguration of peacekeeping with the creation of UNEF I in
1956 to respond to the threat posed by the Suez Crisis, there was a burst of interest and
activity related to peacekeeping that lasted throughout the 1960s. The United Nations
and the UN member states that participated in the earliest missions attempted to work out
how to mount these missions effectively, and several UN and Canadian documents
related to peacekeeping training were the result. Even non-governmental organizations
were studying training, which produced further documentation. During the first decade
following Canada’s participation in UNEF I, the Canadian government sought to improve
the performance standards of its peacekeepers, and learn lessons from its short history in
peacekeeping operations. There seemed to be recognition that peacekeeping would be an
evolving practice, which perhaps was perfectible through practice and study. However,
by the 1970s this scrutiny seems to have come to an end, in favour of maintaining the
status quo in existing missions, and this is reflected in the dearth of documentary
evidence into the 1980s.
By 1970, documentary evidence related to peacekeeping training, and Canadian
participation in peacekeeping generally, fell off sharply, and there appears to have been

30

little study of peacekeeping or peacekeeping-related training by the Canadian government
in the 1970s and 1980s. This dearth of documentation makes a point: peacekeeping was
not the priority in the 1970s and 1980s that it would become in the 1990s. The gap in
documentary evidence can be explained by the history of Canadian peacekeeping itself.
Following the initial enthusiasm for this new international tool for the maintenance of
peace, the number of new missions fell off drastically in the 1970s and 1980s, but was
followed by a re-birth of peacekeeping after the end of the Cold War, when peacekeeping
was used as a way to deal with new intra-state conflicts. Throughout the lull in the 1970s
and 1980s, there is evidence that the CF continued to prepare its peacekeepers at the Unit
level for peacekeeping duties, and certainly Canadian peacekeeping was discussed at the
political level at the UN throughout these decades. However, it does not appear that there
was any serious consideration of doctrine or any revision of peacekeeping-related
training in this period. For the purposes of this study, this gap in primary evidence was
offset by the survey and interview program described below, which provided first-hand
testimony of CF soldiers who served on peacekeeping duties from as early as the first
Canadian contingent deployed to Suez through to modern peace support operations of the
post-9/11 world.
In the late 1980s the operational tempo of the CF began to increase, and this can
be attributed to the increase in peace support missions worldwide. Canada, as the
“creator” of peacekeeping, was eager to contribute to international peacekeeping
operations. The explosion of peacekeeping activity in the 1990s as well as a rise in the
danger level for soldiers serving as peacekeepers spurred the Canadian Forces to review
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its training methods and standards for peacekeeping. In the period after 1989 the number
of documents pertaining to CF training for peacekeeping grew as the activity took on a
new importance.52
By 1990, DND officials expressed concern in writing over the complexity of
mounting peacekeeping operations, and the sustainability of CF operations at a high
operational tempo.53 This concern among DND officials resulted in large-scale studies
that expressed grave worry over the fate of the CF itself. And in the midst of this
examination of peacekeeping’s role in the CF, training took on more significance for
those who studied peacekeeping, and those who practiced it. Peacekeeping operations
that were initiated in the early 1990s, in particular the missions in the Former Yugoslavia,
Somalia, and Rwanda, were undertaken in violent environments that challenged past
conceptions of peacekeeping. This led to a new introspection in peacekeeping circles,
and studies began to emerge at the United Nations and the national level that sought to
examine these modern, multidisciplinary “peace support operations” and find a way to
ensure their success and minimize casualties among peacekeeping forces. Several key
documents exist from this period, including reports of Senate Standing Committees, the
report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry, reviews of peacekeeping at the UN, and
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various CF training documents and instructions. Training was often highlighted in these
documents as an area that required attention.
In addition to documentary evidence, this examination of peacekeeping training in
the Canadian Forces employs the first-hand testimony of Canadian Forces members who
have served on peacekeeping missions since 1956 to illuminate the actual state of training
for peacekeeping over the past several decades. Gaps in the documentary record of
Canada’s participation in international peacekeeping can often be filled by oral history.
To this end, the recollections and experiences of CF soldiers who participated in
peacekeeping missions between 1956 and 2000 have been used in this study to gather
information about the peacekeeping training Canadian Forces members received. Their
unique insight has also been used to evaluate these soldiers’ opinions of their training for
peacekeeping and what they thought about peacekeeping duties generally.
This evidence was gathered over more than ten years through a series of in-person
and telephone interviews, written surveys, and an extensive DND-sponsored survey
program that was initiated in 2003 and concluded in the spring of 2005. To the author’s
knowledge, this is the most extensive academic survey of CF attitudes towards
peacekeeping and peacekeeping training undertaken to date.
Over a ten-year period from 1997 to 2007 the author conducted a series of oneon-one interviews with members of the CF, officials at DND and CF training centres, and
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senior officials at the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT).54
These twenty-four interviews were conducted using a standard questionnaire aimed at
discovering training methods for peacekeeping missions. The questionnaire used from
1997 to 2000 contained twenty-one questions, and this document was updated in
September 2000 to include twenty-four questions.55 Of the twenty-four interviewees,
twenty-two were current or former CF members of various ranks and representing a wide
variety of peacekeeping experience over time, and two were officials of the Department
of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Of the two senior officials at DFAIT that
were interviewed, one was Head of Peacekeeping in the Regional Security and
Peacekeeping Division, and has had direct peacekeeping experience, while Eric Hoskins
served in a humanitarian capacity providing medical relief in conflict-torn areas where
peacekeepers were present, and was, at the time of the interview, a senior policy advisor
to Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy.
The information obtained through initial interviews with Canadian military
personnel led the author to attempt to gather, on a larger scale, the experiences and
recollections of Canadian Forces members who had been peacekeepers during the period
under investigation. With the assistance of the Department of National Defence, a largescale mail-out of 750 surveys was accomplished between 2003 and 2005, and a total of
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108 responses were returned to the investigator.
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A further six surveys not related to the

DND mailing were gathered in the same time period, using the same questionnaire. In
total, the oral history component of this dissertation is based on 138 surveys and
interviews conducted between 1997 and 2007. These interviews and surveys were
carried out under the authority of the University of Ottawa, the University of Western
Ontario, and the Department of National Defence.
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For the purpose of this study, the

108 DND survey responses will be discussed as a distinct result set apart from the
interviews and six independent surveys, although the methodology used to elicit these
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responses were identical.

The questionnaire used in the interviews and surveys asked the respondent to
provide some demographic details, however all respondents and interviewees had the
option of anonymity, and the survey questionnaires that were mailed out did not request
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support to gather the sample for the survey, and provided material support such as assembling the address
list and providing translation services to the researcher.
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For a complete list of interviewees and survey respondents, please consult the bibliography.
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that respondents give their name. The standard questionnaire used in all cases asked for
the details of the missions on which the CF member had served, and qualitative questions
related to what specialized training, if any, individuals received prior or during
deployment on peacekeeping operations. Further questions touched on subjects related to
the use of force, Rules of Engagement, equipment, and stress-management in the context
of peacekeeping deployments. It also asked “opinion” questions about whether the
respondents thought peacekeeping was a valid use of the resources of the CF, and
whether they thought Canadians made good peacekeepers. This information is used
throughout this dissertation, and was especially useful in filling in gaps in the
documentary record. While memory is subjective, the combined recollections of
Canadian Forces personnel, and in many cases the individual anecdotes provided by
some, were invaluable in completing the picture of what the nature of peacekeeping
training was in the post-Second World War era, and how it changed with the end of the
Cold War. These interviews and surveys also shed light on how CF personnel felt about
serving on UN and NATO peacekeeping operations, whether they felt prepared for their
duties in-theatre, and what support existed for them upon their return.
To conduct a large-scale mail-out of surveys to DND personnel who had served
on two or more peacekeeping operations, the assistance of the Department of National
Defence was enlisted, with the permission and approval of the Research Ethics Board of
the University of Western Ontario. The Directorate of Human Resources Research and
Evaluation (DHRRE) of DND assists external researchers wanting to conduct research on
CF personnel, and assisted in the distribution of surveys to 750 CF personnel. The initial
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work on the surveys began in January 2003. The approval process and assembly of the
survey contents for mail-out was lengthy, and involved several directorates of DND.
Approval was obtained from the University of Western Ontario’s ethics committee to
continue conducting interviews and surveys throughout this period. This project then
had to be approved by DHRRE’s approval process for the Conduct of
Psychological/Sociological Research in the Canadian Forces/Department of National
Defence. The “departmental sponsor” for this work was the Directorate of Peacekeeping
Policy. Preliminary approval was received from DHRRE in March 2004 to survey 750
59

CF members , and the author was authorized to work with the Directorate Human
Resources Information Management (DHRIM) to gather the population of CF members
from which the sample of 750 survey recipients could be drawn. Final approval to
conduct the survey was granted on 5 July 2004.
The Public Service’s human resource management system, Peoplesoft, was used
to gather information about the entire population of the CF and was the database from
which the survey sample was taken. At the time the relevant population was extracted
from Peoplesoft in July/August 2004, the population of the CF was 61, 469.
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A

Peoplesoft search was done for then-serving members of the CF who had served on two
or more peacekeeping missions. It was decided that narrowing the search to people who
had served on two or more missions would make the survey population more manageable
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This survey project was assigned internal project number 262 by DHRRE, once the survey proposal met
DND’s quality control standards for research on CF members.
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This information was provided by DHRRE.
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and provide this inquiry with respondents who might be able to compare training from
one mission to another. The result was a list of 14,584 individuals who had between two
and thirteen deployments. The vast majority of these people had served on between two
and five peacekeeping operations. Using a standard sampling technique, a sample of 750
was taken from the population of 14,584 CF members. DND assisted in distributing the
survey packages. The respondents also had the option of returning the survey by e-mail.
The surveys were mailed out in batches of 250 between October 2004 and January 2005,
and respondents were asked to return the completed surveys within thirty days of receipt.
A total of 108 surveys were completed and returned. The demographic profile of the 108
respondents closely matched that of the 750 people who received surveys, which in turn
matched the overall population from which the sample was drawn.
Below is a breakdown of some key demographic characteristics for the overall
sample of 14,584 CF personnel who had served on two or more peacekeeping
deployments in the time period in question. In terms of the breakdown between services,
11, 192, or seventy-seven percent, were members of the Army; 2831, or nineteen percent,
were members of the Air Force, and 561, or four percent, were members of the Navy.
This breakdown is not surprising in light of the fact that until the 1990s it was often the
Army that provided the bulk of forces for peacekeeping operations.
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In his article “Education and Training for Peacekeeping Forces,” Harold P. Klepak argues that, not only
did the number and scope of peacekeeping operations increase following the end of the Cold War, but that
“all three services are increasingly active as well.” Klepak relates that there was virtually no naval
peacekeeping prior to 1990 but that it has “come into its own” with operations in Central America,
Cambodia, the Balkans, and Haiti. Air forces that were previously limited to peripheral logistic support
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Broken down by gender, 13,883, or ninety-five percent, of the overall population
was male, and 701, or five percent, was female. Everyone in this sample was between
twenty-one and fifty-eight years of age, and 11,984, or eighty-two percent, were noncommissioned members (NCOs), and the remaining were officers. CF members who
listed their first language as English numbered 9452, or sixty-five percent of the sample,
and those who listed their first language as French numbered 5132, or thirty-five percent.
To obtain a sample of 750 people to receive the survey out of the original 14,584,
random selection was used. Every twentieth person in the list was chosen until a total of
729 people was reached, then every 694th person was chosen to reach a total of 750. The
researcher verified that the sample of 750 people closely matched the demographic
characteristics of the larger population of 14,584. For example, in the sample of 750, 482
people (sixty-four percent) reported English as their first language, and 268 people
(thirty-six percent) reported French as their first language.
When it came time to send out the surveys, a package was assembled for each
survey recipient that included an information sheet about the research project being

have their role expanded into fighter intercept, patrolling, surveillance, reconnaissance, and other related
traditional and peacekeeping-specific roles in the 1990s. Despite this, land forces have historically made
up the bulk of peacekeeping personnel and continued to do so throughout the 1990s. In Peacekeeping
Challenges to Euro-Atlantic Security, Ernest Gilam and Detlef E. Herold, eds. (Rome: NATO Defense
College, 1994), 116-117.
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undertaken, a list of health contacts in DND, the survey itself , and a self-addressed and
stamped envelope. The survey was sent out in the official language indicated by each
person as their first language. Respondents were not required to provide any identifying
information and were only asked to provide general demographic characteristics and
some information about their occupation. In the sample of 750, there were no addresses
available for sixteen people, so surveys were actually sent to 734 people over a period of
four months from October 2004 to January 2005. A total of ten survey envelopes were
returned to sender, and one empty response envelope was returned to the researcher. In
all, 108 surveys were completed and returned, mostly by mail but some by e-mail, for a
response rate of 14.4 percent.
The demographic makeup of the survey respondents held some surprises. When
broken down by gender, there were 101 men in the group of respondents, six who did not
specify gender, and only one respondent who identified herself as a woman. Women
only made up five percent of total original population of 14,584 former peacekeepers
drawn from Peoplesoft, so it was expected that fewer women than men would return
surveys, but the low response rate was still surprising. While it was clear that there were
more men than women in the CF, and of those not as many women as men in the CF have
been deployed on peacekeeping operations, the lack of response among the women in the
sample raised the question of whether the response rate was reflective of a lack of interest
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The questionnaire used was based on the 21 question questionnaire employed in MA work in 19981999, and the updated 24-question questionnaire used after September 2000, with the addition of a
demographic section.
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in peacekeeping on the part of women in the CF. It might also indicate that the survey
contained an unintentional bias towards occupations (such as the Infantry) or
peacekeeping roles that are usually occupied by men in the CF.
Women have historically been underrepresented in the CF, although this situation
has been improving and the Canadian military claims that it has sought to remedy the
gender imbalance. At the time the survey was conducted, the most current information
available from the Canadian Forces indicated that, as of 1998, the number of women
serving in the CF had increased from a 1,500 ceiling in 1971 to about 6,800 women,
which represented more than 10.8 percent of the regular force. There were 6,000 women
in the reserve component of the CF, representing about 18.7 percent of the reserve
strength.
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Those numbers apparently grew slowly over the following decade: as of

August 2007 the Regular Force numbered 62,000, and over fifteen percent, or 7900, were
women, and the Reserve force numbered 25,000, with 4800, or 19.2 percent of the force,
being women.
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The language breakdown of the survey respondents closely matched that of the
sample of 750. Of the 108 respondents, sixty-seven, or sixty-two percent, indicated that
English was their first language, and thirty-nine respondents, or 36.1 percent, recorded
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Canadian Forces, “Women in the Canadian Forces, “CF Backgrounder BG-98-002 (Canada: Department
of National Defence, 1 February 1998), http://www.dnd.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=877.
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CBC, “Women in the Canadian Military,” (Canada: Canadian Broadcast Corporation, 30 May 2006),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/cdnmilitary/women-cdnmilitary.html.
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French as their first language.
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Two respondents, or 1.9 percent, did not list their

language preference.
The breakdown of the survey respondents according to service was as follows:
seventy-seven respondents, or 71.3 percent, were members of the Army; twenty-one
respondents, or 19.4 percent, were members of the Air Force; six respondents, or 5.6
percent, were members of the Navy; three respondents did not identify the service they
belonged to, and an additional respondent identified himself as belonging to the Army
and Air Force, which make up the remaining 3.7 percent. Of the 108 respondents,
seventy-nine individuals, or just over seventy-three percent, were non-commissioned
members, which is not surprising in light of the fact that eighty-two percent of the sample
of 750 were NCMs. Of the NCMs, thirty-seven, or 34.3 percent of the total number of
respondents, identified their rank as being in the Private to Master Corporal bracket.
There were forty-two respondents, or thirty-nine percent of the total number of
respondents, who identified themselves as being in the Sergeant to Chief Warrant Officer
bracket. There were no respondents in the Officer Cadet to Second Lieutenant bracket.
Of the remaining respondents, four, or 3.7 percent, did not list their rank; six, or 5.6
percent fell into the Lieutenant to Captain bracket, and the remaining nineteen, or 17.6
percent, listed their rank as being in the Major to Colonel bracket at the time they
completed the survey.
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Any survey responses remitted in French have been translated into English to be used in this study.
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The respondent demographics break down by age as follows: one respondent, or
0.9%, was in the age range 18-24; four respondents, or 3.7 percent, were aged twentyfive to twenty-nine; and nineteen respondents, or 17.6 percent, were thirty to thirty-five
years old. The largest age groups were thirty-six to forty years of age, with twenty-eight
respondents, or 25.9 percent, belonging to this group, and thirty-one respondents, or 28.7
percent, falling in the forty-one to forty-five age range. Thirteen respondents, or twelve
percent, were aged forty-six to fifty years of age; eight respondents, or 7.4 percent, were
fifty-one to fifty-five years of age. There were no respondents in the fifty-six to sixty age
bracket, and only four respondents, or 3.7 percent, failed to indicate their age in their
survey response.
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Overall, the survey respondents were a relatively homogenous group. At least
ninety-four percent of them were male, and sixty-two percent of them were English
speakers. 71.3 percent were members of the Army, and seventy-three percent were
NCMs. Of these NCMs, there was an almost even split in numbers between the rank
brackets of Private to Master Corporal and Sergeant to Chief Warrant Officer. Regarding
age, 72.2 percent of the respondents were between the age of thirty and forty-five.
The breakdown of missions represented among the survey respondents was likely
reflective of the relative young age of most respondents. Their age meant that most had
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All demographic information was taken from the survey results. Surveys #1-108, Survey of Canadian
Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations (Ottawa, Ontario: Conducted
by Trista Grant-Waddell with the assistance of the Directorate of Human Resource Research and
Evaluation, Department of National Defence, under the authority of the University of Western Ontario,
2005).
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served on missions that took place in the 1990s. The number of missions represented
increased exponentially by decade, with the most recent missions being the most
numerous among the results. The lack of diversity in the missions represented in survey
responses is somewhat offset for the purposes of this thesis by the missions represented in
the interviews and independent surveys, and overall, a wide spectrum of missions are
represented in the 138 survey and interview responses collected. The missions
represented include the UN police action in Korea and three additional missions in the
1950s; the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and UNEF I in 1960s;
UNFICYP, UNEF II, the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS),
and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the 1970s;
UNFICYP, the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), the United Nations Transition
Assistance Group (UNTAG), the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
(UNDOF), the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG), Golan
Heights, and UNTAG in 1980s; and UNFICYP, missions to the Former Yugoslavia, the
United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), MFO,
missions to Central and South America, and missions to Africa in 1990s. Although a
wide range of missions is represented among the first-hand testimony, it remains a fact
that there is an uneven distribution of testimony among these missions given that, of the
138 surveys and interviews, four discuss missions in the 1950s; six discuss missions in

44

the 1960s; ten discuss missions in the 1970s; thirty-three discuss missions in the 1980s;
67

and 126 discussed missions that took place between 1990 and 2000.

The concentration of survey and interview information on missions from the
1990s is an unintentional result that was created by two conditions: firstly, that the
sample to which the DND-sponsored survey was sent was taken from then-serving
members of the Canadian Forces, so all survey recipients were under retirement age and
therefore likely to have served on fairly recent missions; and secondly, given the probable
age of individuals who had served on missions in the 1950s and 1960s, it was more
difficult to find living people who had experience on those missions. Despite the uneven
results of this research, the surveys and interviews provide a wealth of knowledge and
primary evidence related to peacekeeping training in the Canadian Forces that is not
available anywhere else.
Harold P. Klepak argued that “[a]rmed forces are nothing if not the expressions of
the particular experience of their own countries, and no two countries are alike in this
regard.”
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Canada’s experience, as former British colony with no colonial aspirations,

and with a democratic system of government, a good standard of living, and a decent

67

It should be noted that a large majority of interview and survey subjects had been deployed on more than
one peacekeeping mission, and some had experience spanning decades, which is why the total number of
survey respondents in this lists totals more than 138 (in other words, if an individual had served on a
mission in the 1970s and again in the 1980s, he or she would appear in this list twice). Also, individuals
who served on peacekeeping missions in the 1990s were more likely than in previous decades to have been
deployed to multiple peacekeeping operations, often within the span of a few years, and often on different
rotations to the same mission, so the missions in the 1990s represent the largest segment of survey and
interview data.
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Klepak, “Education and Training for Peacekeeping Forces,” 111.
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record on human rights, produced an armed forces that is voluntary in nature and, if the
peacekeeping myth is to be believed, made up of “good guys” who want to do “good” in
the world. Canada’s armed forces are apparently a magic mix of individuals who are
resourceful, skilled, and competent. These characteristics, combined with the natural
friendliness and compassion of Canadians, has, the mythology dictates, bred a Canadian
soldier ideally suited to the many tasks of peacekeeping. The perception that Canadian
soldiers make ideal peacekeepers has been challenged over time, but the idea persists,
along with the altruistic motives ascribed to Canada and its peacekeepers. As Eric
Wagner put it, “[t]he peacekeeping myth dominates discussions of Canada’s post-war
military past, and continues to confuse debates over Canada’s military future.”
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Wagner, in refuting the “historical myth” of peacekeeping, argues that “the peacekeeping
myth, in claiming that Canada was motivated to keep the peace primarily by altruism and
moral virtue, is false and misleading.” Humanitarian impulses in peacekeeping compete
with geopolitical ones, and Wagner believes that, right from the creation of UNEF, “the
true reasons behind Canadian involvement in Cold War peacekeeping stemmed, in fact,
from pragmatic Cold War strategic interests. Despite the popular conception of
peacekeeping cherished by the Canadian public, peacekeeping missions served to
advance Canada’s national agenda in a Cold War world,” which, according to Wagner,
primarily consisted of preserving and maintaining its alliances.
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Eric Wagner, “The Peaceable Kingdom? The National Myth of Canadian Peacekeeping and the Cold
War,” Canadian Military Journal (Winter 2006-2007), 48.
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Wagner, “The Peaceable Kingdom?,” 48.
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Despite challenges to the myth, the image of Canadian soldiers as peacekeepers
par excellence has persisted in Canada, even among Canadian soldiers who have been
deployed on peacekeeping operations. Evidence of this can be seen in the responses of
Canadian soldiers to two “opinion” questions in the research survey: Question #22: “In
your opinion, is peacekeeping a valid use of the resources and personnel of the Canadian
Forces?” and Question #23: “Do Canadian soldiers make good peacekeepers?” These
questions relate to the idea of peacekeeping as a “Canadian impulse,” and their purpose
was to determine if and how this impulse played out for a CF member, and whether
Canadian soldiers thought their national characteristics played a role in their ability to
perform as peacekeepers in an international peacekeeping context.
The results of these “opinion” questions often pointed to two pervasive themes:
the conjoining of peacekeeping and national identity, and the existence of the “soldiers
first” mentality among CF members. The “soldiers first” ethos is based on the argument
that
any well-trained soldier, professional and well skilled in normal military activities
and preparation for warfare, will make a good peacekeeper. A soldier, in this
view, has by his very nature (and after the training and education system already
in place have done their job with him) the qualities of a peacekeeping soldier as
well. That is, he is well disciplined, physically fit, honest, hardworking, inured to
hardship, ready for rapid change and constantly new challenges, and accustomed
to hierarchy and obedience.
Being ready for the savagely demanding conditions of the modern
battlefield, this soldier is thus ideally prepared for the generally less demanding
71
operations required for modern peacekeeping.
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Klepak, “Education and Training for Peacekeeping Forces,” 115.
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“Soldiers first” is the idea that Canadian soldiers must be combat-ready first and foremost
and their training for war must not suffer because of peacekeeping-specific training.
Further, there is no need for additional training because the Canadian military training
program produced suitable peacekeepers without add-on or mission-specific training. If
these ideas contain any truth, it may reside in the indoctrination of Canadian soldiers with
Canadian values and priorities that mesh well with the specific demands of peacekeeping
operations, but it is a fact that the perception that Canadians make naturally good
peacekeepers helps to shore up the “soldiers first” idea and has historically undercut the
argument for peacekeeping-specific training in the Canadian military.
The opinions of soldiers who have served on peacekeeping operations have
contributed to the development of a “culture of peacekeeping” in Canada that has grown
up around the idea that not only should Canadians do peacekeeping, but that, in general,
Canadian soldiers have been singularly well-suited to carrying out peacekeeping duties.
To questions #22 and #23, an overwhelming number of respondents responded “yes” to
both. Of the 108 DND survey respondents, ninety-six, or eighty-nine percent, responded
positively to question #22 and thought peacekeeping was a valid use of the resources and
personnel of the Canadian Forces, although many had further comments that qualified
this opinion. Only five respondents disagreed, and a further five respondents were
undecided, with two surveys containing no response to this question.
To question #23, ninety-nine respondents, or ninety-two percent, thought
Canadians made good peacekeepers. Only five respondents thought Canadians did not
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make good peacekeepers, three were unsure, and one respondent did not answer this
question. Those who responded no to either of these questions did so for varying
reasons, but often responded ‘no’ to #22 and ‘yes’ to #23, so even if they thought
peacekeeping was not a valid use of the resources of the CF, they still thought Canadians
made good peacekeepers.
The positive responses to question #22 about peacekeeping being a valid use of
CF resources had several common threads. The answers highlighted such ideas as: “one
has a good feeling when one can contribute to world peace,”
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and “it gives Canada more

of a say on the world stage as well as keeping one’s own soldiering skills current. Too
bad the big heads in Ottawa don’t treat us with more respect.”
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Some also noted that the

CF aids those in need of help, saves lives, and helps halt genocide when it does
peacekeeping.
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However, some of these positive responses were qualified by the

argument that peacekeeping should not be the focus of the CF, and that the CF should do
peacekeeping “as long as it does not become our raison d’être. It should be something
we do, I don’t know, say 10-20% of the time.”
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This idea that peacekeeping should not
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Survey #25, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping
operations.
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Survey # 42, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping
operations.
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Survey #7, 15, 76, 93, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more
peacekeeping operations.
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Survey #27, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping
operations.
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be the primary focus or task of the CF was repeated in several responses.

76

As one

respondent noted, “the military trains for and is prepared to fight a high intensity
conflict,”

77

and another highlighted the fact that the CF should not stay engaged in

peacekeeping operations over a long period of time, such as in Cyprus and SFOR.
highlighted was the fact that there should be a purpose to the operation.
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Also
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Of those who thought that peacekeeping was not a valid use of the resources and
personnel of the Canadian Forces, some of the reasons given for their negative response
were that this evaluation had to be entirely dependent on the situation, mission and
80

mandate ; that, even though it was not a valid use of the CF’s resources the Canadian
81

military had no choice given the state of the world ; that in some cases it is “best just to
82

let them fight it out till someone wins or they are all dead” rather than intervene ; that
83

this is essentially a political decision ; and finally, that “most Canadians think of the CF
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Survey #2, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping
operations.
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Survey #26, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping
operations.
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SFOR was the NATO Stabilization Force in the Former Yugoslavia. Survey #24, Survey of Canadian
Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping operations.
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Survey #31, 53, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping
operations.
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Survey #4, 37, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping
operations.
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Survey #91, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping
operations.
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Survey #39, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping
operations.
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Survey #90, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping
operations.
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as peacekeepers. We are trained to fight. …we should be deployed to fight.”

There

was also concern expressed about the “under strength manning levels, aging work force,
limited budget, our inability to move our equipment and personnel without the assistance
of other nations or leasing of civilian transport.”
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The respondents who thought that Canadians make good peacekeepers often
responded enthusiastically. Many thought that Canadians made the best peacekeepers,
often noting that Canadians were better prepared for peacekeeping than members of other
86

national militaries.

As one respondent noted, “we are probably the best peacekeepers,
87

we are well trained and well respected by all nations.”

This link between training and

success in peacekeeping was explicit in several responses, although the type of training
was not always specified. The professionalism of Canadian soldiers was repeatedly
88

mentioned as was the respect they were given by other nations.

Several respondents

pointed out that Canadians made good peacekeepers because they “still maintain the
basic military skills that make us good soldiers.”
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Challenges to good training were
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Survey #40, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping
operations.
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Survey #6, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping
operations.
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Survey #1, 37, 94, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping
operations.
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Survey #28, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping
operations.
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Survey #29, 32, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping
operations.
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Survey #41, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping
operations.
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identified as low manpower, and being asked “to do more with less.”

90

However,

91

Canadians’ adaptability was seen as an offset to this problem , because “a small group
of Canadian soldiers can accomplish the extraordinary,” presumably as a result of their
training and professionalism.
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And although training was often highlighted, challenges

in equipment were noted, for example in the following observations: “Yes. We take a
back seat to nobody with the quality of training for our troops. It is unfortunate that we
93

don’t have the kit to complement our training” ; and “yes, because we’re well trained,
94

but our equipment leaves something to be desired.”

Neutrality, which is a key principle of classical peacekeeping operations, was
mentioned by several respondents as an important facet of the Canadian character and as
something that played a role in Canadian soldiers’ perceived success as peacekeepers.
The frequency of this opinion implies that the respondents think that the neutrality and
impartiality gained from being raised in Canadian society and trained by the Canadian
military makes them particularly suitable to peacekeeping duties. Canadian soldiers are
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Survey #25, 52, 55, 56, 59,68, 80, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more
peacekeeping operations.
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Survey #81, 85, 103, 107, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more
peacekeeping operations.
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Survey #87, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping
operations.
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Survey #42, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping
operations.
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Survey #93, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping
operations.

52

“highly trained and in most situations Canadians are neutral.”

95

There is a link between

this neutrality and training, which rests on the notion that Canadians do not take sides in
the disputes they mediate, and have been imbued with a sense of fairness in their military
training. As one respondent notes, “[w]e are very neutral and easily understand people’s
96

views without prejudice.”

And another argues that “we make excellent peacekeepers.

We are professionals who focus on accomplishing our mission, we are very well
supported, we operate comfortably in English, we are tolerant and generally more at ease
with differing cultures.”
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And the idea that Canada is “viewed as a peaceful, tolerant

society” is regarded as an asset for peacekeepers.
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Yet, despite the fact that “Canadians

are more tolerant than others,” one respondent cautions that “everyone has their breaking
point. You cannot expect someone who has had no training or little training to do a good
99

job.”

Although characteristics derived from being Canadian may play a role, training

was seen, by some, as a key way in which these characteristics were positively
reinforced.
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Survey #36, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping
operations.
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Survey #24, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping
operations.
97

Survey #27, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping
operations.
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Survey #39, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping
operations.
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Survey #31, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping
operations. Survey #37 also mentions impartiality, but notes the restrictions put in place by mandates that
frustrate attempts to remain impartial.
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Soldiers have digested the “soldiers first” attitude as well, and expressed concern
that the foundation of soldiering skills was being eroded by peacekeeping training. As
one respondent noted, Canadians make good peacekeepers because “we are (or at least
were) trained as soldiers first. That is being changed, and it is showing in the lower
quality of troops and training that we currently have.”
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But there was continued faith

that “because we still maintain the basic military skills that make us good soldiers; [and
the] quality of training,” Canadians make good peacekeepers.
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A common thread

running throughout many of the responses was the idea that soldiers object to soldiering
being equated with peacekeeping, and that this is an idea promoted by the Canadian
government and bought into by the Canadian public.
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The primary objection to the

question about whether Canadians make good peacekeepers centred around the concern
that members of the Canadian Forces were viewed by the general public as
“peacekeepers first,” instead of “soldiers first.”
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There was clearly a concern among

respondents at the time about the CF becoming a peacekeeping-only military, and an
opinion that CF personnel are effective peacekeepers because of their combat training.
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Survey #35, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping
operations. The same sentiment is expressed in Survey #8.
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Survey #41, 42, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping
operations.
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Survey #1, 4, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping
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General survey results, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more
peacekeeping operations.
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The pride that CF members took in their peacekeeping duty, and their roles as
Canadians soldiers, was evident in several responses. As one respondent asserted,
Canadian soldiers in peacekeeping roles were
[t]he best. Attitude, professionalism, training, integrity, dedication. We adapt to
our environment (not create a little piece of America in some other country ),
improvise to overcome obstacles instead of giving excuses, and then swear and
complain the whole way along to ourselves. (complaining in this context while
104
true, is to be taken in jest).
Another thorough answer claimed that
Canadian soldiers generally make excellent peacekeepers for a number of reasons:
1. Training. They are well trained soldiers. 2. Reputation. Canada’s non-colonial
past and international reputation. 3. Attitude. Canadian soldiers tend to reflect
Canadian values & temperament, & they tend to be more mature & better
educated than soldiers from many countries. 4. Experience. Canadian soldiers
105
have had lots of experience at this sort of thing.
And finally, one respondent wanted to make his point clear: “Canadian soldiers make the
best peacekeepers. I’ll repeat myself. We are proud, professional and willing.”

106

The pride that many soldiers who served on peacekeeping duties possessed was
sometimes tempered by frustration over the restrictions under which they were required
to operate. One respondent related that
Canadian soldiers are among the best in the world because as peacekeepers we are
impartial…But impartial or not we are only as good as the mandate we are given.
If our orders are to observe and take notes while the people around us are
murdered, if we receive orders not to feed a starving family because it might upset

104

Survey #3, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping
operations.
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Survey #4, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping
operations.
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Survey #5, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping
operations.
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the bastards who burned their home to the ground or if your friends are being shot
at and your ordered to hold your fire because we don’t want to be seen as taking
sides…then you tell me…how good are we?
This NCO served in Bosnia and clearly stated that he hoped he never works for the UN
again.

107

Of those who thought that Canadians do not make good peacekeepers, they listed
reasons such as not being provided with adequate rules of engagement
109

equipment is not always appropriate to the mission.

108

and that the

One respondent expressed the

belief that “[t]o be a good peacekeeper, you must be respected in the countries in crisis.
In countries in crisis, they respect force. Canada is not strong enough to be respected.”

110

Another related the idea that “Canadian soldiers have become bureaucrats in uniform.
The Canadian Forces are an employer and the soldiers are employees.”

111

One

respondent expressed concern that “[o]ur personnel are near the end of their ropes. Many
have 2 to 5 missions in 15 years of service while others have no missions in 20 years of
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Survey #37, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping
operations.
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Survey #91, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping
operations.
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Survey #92, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping
operations.
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Survey #89, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping
operations.
111

Survey #88, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping
operations.
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service. The quality of personnel will diminish because certain people do not want to
deploy.”

112

When given the opportunity to make any additional comments, the respondents
provided a wide variety of opinions and information related to their experiences with
peacekeeping, and echoed many of the ideas running through the responses to guided
questions in this survey. Some comments were exceptionally positive, such as the
respondent who claimed that “peacekeeping was the highlight of my 36 year career.”

113

And some respondents acknowledged that “[a]ny operational experience for a soldier is
valuable to his effectiveness and his professional development with combat experience
being the most value. Those with that experience are the trainers who ensure that
114

mistakes are not repeated.”

One respondent was extremely concerned about the

perception of peacekeeping among the Canadian public. He stated that he
would just like to emphasize my point about what peacekeeping is. The
“Peacekeeping Myth” is rampant in Canada (my own family and civilian friends
included) and is potentially dangerous. The government perpetuates this myth
because it believes (perhaps correctly) that it is what Canadians want to hear.
There is a big difference between what many people think happens on many of
these missions and the reality. Afghanistan seems to be slowly changing this.
Peacekeeping today is usually very different from the traditional UN Chapter 6
Blue Beret mission. For the most part the CF has always recognized this and thus
ensured the proper training for the troops regardless of what people “think” we
are getting into. If we were to fundamentally change our approach to basic
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Survey #86, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping
operations.
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Survey #25, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping
operations.
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Survey #26, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping
operations.
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soldier training based on the idea of a kinder, gentler world and the predominance
of “soft power” I firmly believe we would be doing our soldiers a grave injustice
115
and be putting their lives in jeopardy needlessly.
Another respondent echoed similar concerns, and bristled at the term “peacekeepers.” He
wished to relate a few thoughts: “1) peacekeeping is one subset of soldiering – not
something different or separate; 2) we hate it when we are referred to as peacekeepers,
we are soldiers; 3) the UN sucks, they should never, ever, ever, get involved in running
116

military operations again.”

Overall, these survey responses agree with the interview responses to similar
questions, and highlighted a number of common ideas. There were concerns among
members of the military that the CF was becoming a peacekeeping-only military, or that
military skills would erode as a result of peacekeeping duties. Canadian soldiers, overall,
believed that they were good at peacekeeping because of two main factors: the character
traits they were imbued with as a result of being Canadian, and the solid foundation of
combat training with which the Canadian military had provided them.
There seems to be a general consensus of opinion among survey respondents that
answer some of these questions: respondents believe that the Canadian military is welltrained; peacekeepers are and should be soldiers first; Canadian soldiers are good at
peacekeeping and should continue to do it but not as its primary task; and there is
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Survey #4, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping
operations.
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Survey #8, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping
operations.
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something in the Canadian national character that makes Canadian soldiers particularly
suitable for peacekeeping duties. The survey responses illuminated the fact that this
belief was based upon perceived national character traits such as neutrality, impartiality,
and peacefulness. Finally, there was a conviction among these soldiers that Canada
should be an actor on the world stage, doing what it can to improve the conditions of
people living in remote areas of the world. These themes will be explored further in later
chapters.
In Chapter 1, the founding of the United Nations is discussed to provide context
for the birth of classical UN peacekeeping and Canada’s role in international relations in
the period following the Second World War. This origin story furnished key elements to
Canada’s “peacekeeping mythology,” and enabled Canada to solidify its middle power
status. The UN’s first peacekeeping operation, the United Nations Emergency Force, as
well as earlier UN-led military observer missions, are discussed in Chapter 2. These
early missions, as well as the UN’s role in the Korean War, were the UN’s first attempts
at conflict resolution on an international scale, and Canada was present and willing to
assist in these initial efforts. This time period was also crucial for setting out the basic
elements and guidelines for a UN peacekeeping operation, and it was apparent that at this
early stage there was an emphasis on financing, logistics and political arrangements, with
little focus on training. Chapter 3 details the efforts in the 1960s to systematize UN
peacekeeping, which had become an important activity for the UN and its contributing
member states. Governments, non-governmental organizations and the United Nations
were issuing documents and hosting conferences to grapple with emerging issues in
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peacekeeping, and Canada was often at the forefront of this burst of activity. Training
emerged as a critical element in the preparation of soldiers for peacekeeping, although at
the national level little credence was given to preparation beyond that in the realm of
combat and occupational training for military personnel. Initial discussion and
arrangements for a UN Standby Force are also discussed in this chapter. The UN
peacekeeping operations that took place in the 1960s, at the same time a degree of
introspection about peacekeeping was occurring in Canada and elsewhere, are discussed
in Chapter 4. This chapter also outlines developments in Canada’s peacekeeping
commitments during the largely status quo decades of the 1970s and 1980s. Chapter 5
starts by explaining the significance of the end of the Cold War to international
peacekeeping, and the changes that were wrought in the activity as a result of a
significantly changed geopolitical climate. This chapter focuses on three key missions,
those to the Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Somalia, as key post-Cold War missions
for Canada. As with earlier chapters, an examination of these operations takes a threepronged approach: a provision of some key details of each mission; the use of testimony
of peacekeepers themselves about their experiences and training for each mission; and a
dissection of government documents related to these missions. The Conclusion reiterates
key points made in the body of this work: that Canadian soldiers were always trained as
“soldiers first”; that Canadian soldiers were often required to be “soldiers plus” in a
peacekeeping operation, employing both their traditional military training and add-on
skills; that the often ad hoc nature of UN peacekeeping made it difficult to prepare for
every eventuality in peacekeeping; and that, although a number of peacekeeping missions
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that took place after the Cold War conformed to the mold of classical peacekeeping, the
three key missions that took place in the Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Somalia were
game-changers for the way in which the Canadian military prepared its soldiers for
peacekeeping duties.
Canada’s contribution to international peacekeeping has been significant. A role
in its birth, decades of peacekeeping experience, the dedication of human, material, and
financial resources, and the cost of dozens of lives support the idea that peacekeeping
was an important feature of Canadian defence and foreign policy for many decades
following the Second World War. Successive Canadian governments sought, to varying
degrees, to ensure that Canada remained engaged in international conflict resolution
through the operations of the UN. Conversely, the impact of peacekeeping deployments
on the Canadian Forces as an institution, and its members as individuals, cannot be
overlooked. Ad hoc arrangements, speedy deployments, a high operational tempo, and
missions that took place under unfamiliar Rules of Engagement were only some of the
stressors encountered by CF personnel who served on peacekeeping missions between
1956 and 2000. While nothing can fully inoculate a person to every situation, the role of
training in this context is an important consideration. By casting a critical eye on the
history of training for peacekeeping in the Canadian Forces, the myth of the Canadian
peacekeeper par excellence can be replaced by something more realistic, and something
more representative of the experiences had by men and women who fulfilled their duties
on behalf of the Canadian military on peacekeeping missions throughout the world.
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Chapter 1
“The League is dead, long live the United Nations.”1
Since the late-1940s Canadian governments have contributed to UN and non-UN
peacekeeping in various ways. The government’s decades-long commitment to
peacekeeping, at least in principle, meant that the Canadian military spent a great deal of
time either doing the job of peacekeeping or preparing for it, and as a result the training
aspect of peacekeeping warrants examination. Additionally, time spent in-theatre during
a peacekeeping mission was often the only operational experience a soldier gained during
his or her career. To understand why successive Canadian governments would, to
varying degrees, make commitments to international conflict resolution efforts that drew
on precious Canadian military resources, the benefits that resulted from these
commitments must be understood. One of the benefits to be reaped from involvement in
the international community was the bestowing of the status of “middle power” on
2

Canada. Throughout its evolution as a “middle power,” Canada has understood the
utility and strength of acting in concert with allies, particularly through international
organizations. The history of Canada’s role in the international system and international

1

Sir Robert Cecil, a founder of the League of Nations, at the dissolution of the League.
William L. Tung, International Organization under the United Nations System (New York: Thomas Y.
Crowell Company, 1969), 26.
2

For a discussion of how Canada transformed itself from a British dominion to a “middle power,” and the
role of the United Nations in this process, see Adam Chapnick, The Middle Power Project: Canada and the
Founding of the United Nations (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005).
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organizations is essential background to Canada’s role in peacekeeping, and the
importance that training holds for that activity.
Many scholars date the rise of international organizations and the solidification of
the notion of collective security to the Versailles Peace Conference of 1919, when
representatives of the victorious powers of the First World War assembled to write a
peace treaty. They did so alongside representatives of national interest groups and
international non-governmental organizations that advocated on behalf of public health,
the condition of workers, the cause of peace, and the laws of war. Drawing on almost a
century of pre-First World War peacetime cooperation between European states, the
victors created the League of Nations to deal with the problems of peace, security, and
3

economic and social questions. Clive Archer argues that the League of Nations was
fashioned by the immediate and recent experience of wartime cooperation rather than
4

idealistic notions of the equality of nations and fraternity of peoples. The devastation of
the war provided compelling evidence that the affected nations had no desire to repeat
such large-scale destruction, and their leaders searched for a way to avert future tragedy.
Discussion of the establishment of an international organization for the
maintenance of peace and security began long before the hostilities of the First World
War ended. Official and unofficial drafts for the future organization were circulated in

3

Clive Archer, International Organizations, Second Edition (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), 34.
4

Archer, International Organizations, 21.
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Great Britain, France, and the United States, and a League of Nations Society was formed
5

in England in 1915. By 1919 countless questions faced the leaders who gathered at
Versailles in 1919. US President Woodrow Wilson, that “great optimist and moralist,”
6

believed he had the answers. The last of the Fourteen Points Wilson presented to
Congress in January 1918 asserted that “[a] general association of nations must be
formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of
7

political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.” Wilson is
considered to be the chief architect of the League, although ultimately the United States
did not participate in the organization. The main support for the League came from the
victims of German aggression, who wanted to ensure that peace would never again be
threatened so boldly. Wilson’s objectives for the League of Nations, which were
embodied in “its biblical ‘Covenant’,” included proposals for collective security, arms
control, and an end to secret diplomatic arrangements.

8

Although the US Senate refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, and the
Covenant of the League of Nations it contained, the League came into existence on
January 10, 1920, with a headquarters in Geneva and Sir Eric Drummond acting as its

5
6

Tung, International Organization under the United Nations System, 17.

Niall Ferguson, The War of the World: Twentieth-Century Conflict and the Descent of the West (New
York: The Penguin Press, 2006), 159.
7

Woodrow Wilson, “Fourteen Points,” January 1918, printed in Margaret Macmillan, Paris, 1919 (New
York: Random House, 2003), 496.
8

Ferguson, War of the World, 160.
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9

first Secretary-General. Echoing Wilson, “the democratic internationalists favouring
international cooperation and the power brokers of Europe”

10

who came together to form

the League identified several key concerns:
•
•

•
•

•

the maintenance of international peace and security through the reduction
of armaments and the free flow of information on such matters;
the settlement of disputes through the conciliatory offices of the League
or the use of military or economic sanctions in defence of the articles of
the League Covenant should peaceful means fail;
the promotion of international cooperation in fields including commerce,
labour, public health and welfare, communications, and transportation;
just treatment of native inhabitants of territories under the control of
members of the League, and the conclusion of general agreements to
these ends; and
respect for justice and international obligations through an observance by
its members of mutual respect for one another’s territorial integrity and
political independence, and through a restriction on secret diplomacy to
11
be achieved by the registration of treaties with the League.

It was, as one author states, “the ultimate purpose of the League of Nations to establish
the rule of law in the community of nations.”

12

The primary aim of the League was to

keep the peace, but it has often been judged a failure in this regard, particularly in light of
the events leading up to the Second World War. Still, whatever the shortcomings of the
institution, the principles outlined above were judged sound by the international
community and many were included in the Charter of the United Nations.

9

Tung, International Organization under the United Nations System, 18.
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Amos Yoder, The Evolution of the United Nations System, Third Edition (Columbus, Ohio: Taylor &
Francis, 1997), 7.
11
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Tung, International Organization under the United Nations System, 19-20.
Tung, International Organization under the United Nations System, 20.
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The League achieved some success in non-political fields, and continued to
perform social and economic functions for a time after it was deemed incapable of
preventing international conflict. However, the lack of wholehearted support of the
major powers, and most specifically the US, seemed to doom it to irrelevancy in the field
of armament regulation and political matters.

13

The League experienced limited success during the 1920s in international
diplomacy. The failure of the United States to join the League proved a major stumbling
block,

14

and in the 1930s the League was unable to resolve the crises in Manchuria and

Ethiopia. Germany’s withdrawal from the League in 1933 signaled the beginning of a
series of aggressive measures on the part of Germany that the League was powerless to
stop. The League is often judged an abysmal failure, and its inability to impose sanctions
against Italy in 1936 signified its demise that year as a collective security organization.
Yet scholars have argued that, given the period in which it operated and the climate of
uncertainty, isolationism, and economic protectionism, it is hardly surprising that
international institutions created to further international cooperation faced severe
challenges in the interwar years.

13
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Tung, International Organization under the United Nations System, 25.

Ralph Stone’s 1970 book, The Irreconcilables. The Fight Against the League of Nations (Kentucky:
The University of Kentucky Press, 1970), recounts the fight against the Treaty of Versailles in the United
States and its surprising defeat in the Senate in November 1919. Stone’s book particularly focuses on the
group of sixteen senators, known as the bitter-enders, who opposed the Treaty and fought to have it
defeated.
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Archer, International Organizations, 23.
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The Council, General Assembly, and the social and economic functions of the
League of Nations continued to operate until December of 1939, when the Assembly met
to expel the Soviet Union. The Assembly met once more, in April 1946, to dissolve the
organization formally.

16

Yet even before the League’s demise, and in spite of being

judged a failure, world leaders began to consider the creation of a new international
organization that would avoid the mistakes of the League and be able to prevent war and
foster international cooperation.
Out of the ashes of the League of Nations rose the United Nations, the postSecond World War effort at international cooperation in the name of peace and stability,
and arguably the most recognized and universal international organization ever to exist.
H. Hume Wrong, the Canadian First Delegate at the final Assembly of the League of
Nations in April 1946, outlined the similarities and differences between the new United
Nations and the defunct League:
The United Nations starts with an enormous advantage that the League never had:
there is no powerful State left outside…All the countries possessing substantial
power to-day are Members of the United Nations. But the question remains
which, with greater justification, haunted the meeting-rooms and corridors of
Geneva: Have they the will to use their power to support the principles and
procedures of the Charter?
The troubles of the world are not, and never have been, at bottom a
question of the nature of the existing international machinery, of the processes
whereby issues are brought forward for discussion and settlement, of the
Covenant or the Charter, of the rule of unanimity or the veto power. What the
League of Nations could do, was and is what the States Members agree should be
done. The League of itself could accomplish nothing. The United Nations of
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Richard Veatch, Canada and the League of Nations (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), 179.
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itself can accomplish nothing. Both are instruments for collective action of their
17
States Members.
The oblique reference to the absence of the United States in the League pointed to the
belief that, in 1946, no organization that hoped to be truly international, and capable of
preventing war, could expect to succeed without the participation of all of the world’s
great powers.
Wrong’s statement also illustrates Inis Claude’s contention that international
organizations are agencies designed by and for their member states, and therefore they
can only accomplish what those states agree to do. “Educated expectations” are arrived
at, according to Claude, by considering what international organizations
are supposed to be or to do [and] should be determined not by our wishes as to
what they might be or do, but by our understanding of the possibilities that appear
in the situation in which they are embedded and of the probabilities that are
revealed by the patterns of utilization established by states, their ultimate owners
18
and operators.
The United Nations has been challenged by the lack of political will among its member
states, yet has managed to survive when the League did not. In light of the failure of the
League, it is relevant to examine briefly how closely the United Nations, from Charter to
Council, resembles the League, and what key alterations were made to the grand design
in the hope of fortifying the new organization against the weaknesses that plagued the
League.
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Veatch, Canada and the League, 178-180.

Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords Into Ploughshares. The Problems and Progress of International
Organizations. Fourth Edition (New York: Random House, 1971),16.
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In the case of both the League and the United Nations, they were political
institutions founded by victorious powers for their own peace and security. The main
objective of the founders of both organizations was to avoid another world war and
furnish nations with the tools to settle disputes without recourse to war.
The League of Nations’ principles and structure were used as a model for the
United Nations organization, with some changes to correct weaknesses detected in the
League’s Covenant.19 Both organizations aimed to achieve international peace and
support international law as the rule of conduct among governments. The United
Nations, like the League, has an assembly, council, and secretariat headed by a SecretaryGeneral. The Security Council, like the League Council, is primarily concerned with
crisis situations, and generally gives the great powers the largest voice. In the case of the
UN, the five permanent members of the Security Council are the United States, France,
the United Kingdom, China, and Russia, and the ten non-permanent Security Council
seats rotate among the rest of the Member States.

20

Member nations of the UN each have

one vote in the General Assembly, and the Secretariat is essentially the bureaucratic arm
charged with organization and arrangements for meetings.

19

Critics of the League of Nations often identify its major shortcoming as its ability to “intervene usefully
only in issues concerning medium-sized and small countries, and only to the extent that the large countries
agreed among themselves to maintain the existing situation and avoid local conflicts which might
deteriorate.” Some argue that another inheritance the UN received from the League was this same inability
to cope with problems among the major powers, especially in the context of the Security Council.
Maurice Bertrand, The Third Generation World Organization (London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
1989), 20.
20

The Security Council initially had six non-permanent members, but in 1965 that number was expanded
to ten.
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The International Court of Justice and the Trusteeship Council were both orphans
of the League that were adopted by the UN. The idea for a body to deal with social and
economic affairs had been circulated before the Second World War; it was brought to life
as one of the UN’s major organs, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).21 In
addition to the General Assembly, Security Council, Secretariat, and the Economic and
Social Council, the United Nations was created with a number of specialized agencies
which are independent but loosely connected to the central organization. The original
specialized agencies were concerned with education, science, and culture (UNESCO),
health (World Health Organization), labour (International Labour Organization), and
agriculture (Food and Agriculture Organization), among other issues.
The flaws of the League were made horrifically apparent by the Second World
War, so the creators of the United Nations, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt and
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill among them, sought to resolve these problems
to give the UN the chance the League never had. The League required unanimity in its
voting procedures, which the UN abandoned. A key difference is also the UN’s focus on
respect for human rights irrespective of race, sex, language, or religion, and its activism
in this area.22 According to one author, the key difference between the League and the
UN is that the UN is fundamentally a political institution and has available to it more
flexible responses for settling disputes or containing a war than the League did. After
some preliminary steps, recourse to war was virtually the only weapon in the League’s
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Yoder, The Evolution of the United Nations System, 11.
Yoder, The Evolution of the United Nations System, 11-12.
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arsenal of dispute resolution techniques. The UN, on the other hand, is well equipped
with a variety of alternatives, which will be discussed further below.23
The foundations of the UN as a collective security organization were laid by the
Atlantic Charter in August 1941, which foretold of the eventual “establishment of a wider
and permanent system of general security.”24 The United Nations Declaration, signed on
1 January 1942 by twenty-six states, reaffirmed this intention. Three years later the
signatories of the Charter of the United Nations, which grew out of the work done by the
United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and later China, at Dumbarton Oaks in 1944,
hoped that the weaknesses of the League of Nations in settling international disputes
would be remedied by the new international organization. The Charter of the United
Nations25 was signed on 26 June 1945 at the United Nations Conference on International
Organization in San Francisco, and came into force on 24 October 1945. The Preamble
to the Charter states:
We, the Peoples of the United Nations
Determined
• to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which
twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and
• to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women
and of nations large and small, and
• to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the
obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international
law can be maintained, and

23
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Yoder, The Evolution of the United Nations System, 12.
Tung, International Organization under the United Nations System, 27.
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•

to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger
freedom,

And for these ends
• to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as
good neighbors, and
• to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security,
and
• to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of
methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common
interest, and
• to employ international machinery for the promotion of the
economic and social advancement of all peoples.
Have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these Aims.26
These were lofty aims, but the formation of the United Nations did not create a world
government. Although the community of nations has been in a continuous process of
integration, especially since the First World War, the United Nations is still a
27

phenomenon of the multi-state system.

International cooperation needed an

institutional framework that incorporated as many state actors as possible because “highminded purposes and effective processes depend ultimately upon institutions through
which states confer, debate, negotiate, reach agreement, and have that agreement
28

implemented through administrative action.”

The United Nations can be interpreted as

an institutionalization and universalization of the tradition of diplomacy between states

26

United Nations Organization, Charter of the United Nations (New York: United Nations, Department of
Public Information, 1945), Preamble.
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by giving all states an equal forum to air grievances,

29

and an attempt to improve upon

the League of Nations. Yet the question remains as to how effective the UN has been in
meeting its stated objectives, and what it realistically could be expected to achieve, given
changing political climates, the cooperation or intransigence of its members, and its
resources, to name a few limitations.
In trying to describe the UN’s creation in the wake of the League, academics have
produced differing accounts of its early years, its most influential members, whether it
has met its original objectives, and what those objectives actually were. Stephen C.
Schlesinger’s 2003 Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations. A Story of
Superpowers, Secret Agents, Wartime Allies, and Enemies and Their Quest for a Peaceful
World, describes what he views as the pivotal role played by American diplomats and
politicians in the founding of the UN. His explanation of where the UN came from, and
why it should be maintained, champions the role of the US. He believes that its role,
without putting too much of a gloss on it, was the most important. For it was the
Americans who designed the body, writing the U.N. Charter within the State
Department, using as their inspiration President Woodrow Wilson’s League of
30
Nations, the U.S. offering to the international community in 1918.

29

The obvious exception to the “equality of states” principle is the five permanent members of the Security
Council.
30

Stephen C. Schlesinger, Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations. A Story of Superpowers,
Secret Agents, Wartime Allies and Enemies and Their Quest for a Peaceful World (Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press, 2003), xvi-xvii.
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He lauds the “heroic” efforts of Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S Truman, as well as
31

the “unusual intellect and honest idealism” of other Americans involved.

The mini-

biographies of key but lesser-known figures in the founding of the UN, the painstaking
reconstruction of the San Francisco Conference, and the description of the extreme
lengths to which some delegations went to gather intelligence, are woven into a narrative
that sustains glowing praise of the American contribution throughout. Schlesinger argues
that this is “the story of thoughtful and courageous representation by the United States,
living up to and embodying its country’s ideals. Whatever the flaws of the United
Nations, it measures up well with the values of that American heritage.”

32

Given his

emphasis on the role of the US, Schlesinger seems to lose focus on his stated objective of
demonstrating why the UN matters.
In his concluding remarks Schlesinger asserts that, in part due to the Security
Council deadlock caused by the Cold War, by 1989 the UN had become primarily a
“service organization” with ninety percent of its resources dedicated to social issues as
33

opposed to security issues.

Post-Cold War, the UN acted as a countervailing force to

US dominance through the power of the Security Council veto, and through it being “the
only global body that could give the imprimatur of legitimacy to the use of armed force”
by forcing “big powers like the United States planning military operations to seek its
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approval first or otherwise risk having to act outside international law.”

34

This,

according to Schlesinger, slowed down decision-making and created an increased space
for discussion, but he seems to struggle to identify a significant role for the UN post-Cold
War as it “has no independent authority and is not a world government. It remains, in
many ways, an undemocratic body.”

35

In matters of international security, the Secretary-

General and the Security Council, under the peace and security provisions of the Charter,
“carved out a whole new range of military options not foreseen in the original document,
including peacekeeping, peace enforcement, cease-fires, disarmament, nuclear
proliferation bans, preventive diplomacy, arms inspections, and military training.”

36

Particularly after the Cold War, the UN was able to mount “military operations of all
sorts on an ad hoc basis through U.N. resolutions” and moved away from its restricted
definition of aggression comprising only cross-border transgressions to include civil
wars, “overcoming the previously sacrosanct presumption in favor of national
sovereignty.”

37

The issue of respect for national sovereignty is a key theme, and is

further explored by another scholar in his work on the founding of the UN that provides a
neat counterpoint to Schlesinger’s analysis.
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The contention that the founding of the UN was “an American affair” is disputed
by Mark Mazower in No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological
Origins of the United Nations. Like Schlesinger, Mazower explains the UN’s
contemporary situation in the international system through an examination of its past.
Mazower does not, however, ascribe such pure motives or American origins to its
founders, and takes issue with those who contend that the UN “rose - like Aphrodite –
from the Second World War, pure and uncontaminated by any significant association
38

with that prewar failure, the League of Nations.”

His central argument is that the UN

was “inaugurated by the League and linked through that to the question of empire and the
visions of global order that emerged out of the British Empire in particular in its final
decades.”

39

Mazower calls the UN a “warmed-up League” and defines the main

difference between the two organizations as the importance of keeping the war-time
alliance of the US, United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union through the UN.

40

From this

trio of allies, Mazower identifies the United Kingdom as the one with the most influence
over the UN’s founding principles. As he argues,
[t]he UN’s later embrace of anticolonialism … has tended to obscure the awkward
fact that like the League it was a product of empire and indeed, at least at the
outset, regarded by those with colonies to keep as a more than adequate
mechanism for its defence. The UN, in short, was a product of evolution not
revolution, and it grew out of existing ideas and institutions, their successes and
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failures as revealed by the challenge of war itself – the Second World War, the
First, and further back still, the Boer War at the turn of the twentieth century. To
understand how the UN started out, then, we need to begin not in Washington,
and certainly not in the early 1940s, but with the debates about international
order, community, and nation that were taking place at the start of the century in
41
the heart of the world’s leading power, the British Empire.
Mazower argues that one of the underpinnings of the original UN was a great respect for
nationality at the expense of collective rights, and as a result the UN became a fierce
defender of national sovereignty. The consequence, according to Mazower, was that
“[t]reating national self-determination as a right was not only liberating it was also a
doctrine that trampled over the rights of others.”

42

More damningly, the UN “promised
43

more about rights than the League, but did less about them.”

As Schlesinger touched

upon, there was a shift in the UN, precipitated by the intra-state conflicts so prevalent
post-Cold War, from classifying breaches of the peace as only those that crossed
international boundaries, to include those that occurred within states. This shift, as well
as the introduction in the mid-1990s of the UN doctrine of “responsibility to protect,”
which included the responsibility of states to protect their own populations, was critical in
expanding the scope of peacekeeping and the criteria for peacekeeping-style
interventions.
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Mazower, like Schlesinger, struggles with defining a legacy, thus far, for the UN.
He believes the UN “has turned into a global club of nation states, devoid of any
substantial strategic purpose beyond the almost forgotten one of preventing another world
war. Freezing intact the power configuration of the last one, it looks – so far in vain – for
a political raison d’être more suited to the needs of the present.”

44

He identifies

peacekeeping as the way in which the UN has inserted itself into international life, and
while this may not qualify as a sufficient raison d’être to justify the UN’s continued
existence, it can be judged a significant factor in the UN’s continuing relevance in the
international peace and security environment.
Given the UN’s multi-faceted activities and evolution over time, it can be difficult
to identify markers of success and failure. Identifying the UN’s stated objectives at the
time of its establishment can lead to the formulation of “educated expectations” that can
be applied to the historical record of achievement. William L. Tung set out a number of
“principles and purposes” of the UN in his 1969 analysis of the organization, and the
main objectives are the primary goals stated in the UN Charter. The first and foremost
principle and purpose is the maintenance of international peace and security. Emerging
from the carnage of the Second World War, Allied nations were desperate to find a
mechanism for pacific settlement of international disputes that would help avoid future
wars. Members of the United Nations are required to resolve disputes by peaceful means,
and to “prevent or suppress threats to peace, breaches of peace, or acts of aggression,”
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using force only in collective measures against a recalcitrant state.

45

Although the UN is

not authorized to intervene in matters falling explicitly within the jurisdiction of a state,
the principle of non-intervention does not apply, and a grey-area is effectively created, if
international peace is endangered, and requires the application of enforcement
measures.

46

Although the objective of international peace and security has been the

stated priority of the UN since its inception, the organization cannot be judged a failure
simply because armed conflict has occurred in various parts of the world since 1945. An
“educated expectation” in this case would be that the UN would intervene to prevent
conflict where it possessed the authorization and capabilities to have a real effect on the
situation. Whether this has occurred over the past fifty-odd years is debatable.
Michael Howard writes that the concept of international security “implies a
common interest in security transcending the particular interests of sovereign states. The
recognition of that common interest carries with it the aspiration to create a communal
framework to replace the need for unilateral national security measures.”

47

This common

interest led to the creation of the League of Nations, and the determination, once the
League had failed, not to abandon the concept but to try again. The United Nations
therefore was founded with the idea of international security achieved through collective
action firmly in mind. In the evaluation of scholars, its results have been mixed.
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Raimo Vayrynen asserts that “the UN is primarily a functional organization on
which the Cold War and the resurgence of power politics in the postwar world have
left…a strong imprint. In security issues the world organization has, with few
exceptions, been an arena that has not been capable of contributing to the peaceful
48

settlement of disputes as effectively as its intellectual forefathers envisaged.”

He sees

the UN as a hegemonic organization in which the permanent members of the Security
Council benefit from an unequal distribution of power and resources, and lesser states
view the UN as an arena for conflict manifestation. In other words, smaller states are led
de facto by more powerful and influential states, and the organization serves as a venue
for the subordinate states to air grievances but one in which they are powerless to resolve
them. This author maps the history of the UN “from the concert run by the winners of
49

World War II through the US hegemony towards a gradual fragmentation.”

This hardly

sounds like an effective organization to maintain international peace and security, yet
other scholars argue that the UN has done just that. The key difference is that the United
Nations Charter, unlike the documents of the League, has “teeth.”
The practical ability of the United Nations to enforce its principles among its
member states is one of the biggest challenges it has faced throughout its history. The
United Nations was endowed with enforcement provisions, mainly in Chapter VI,
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“Pacific Settlement of Disputes,” but there are other means by which parties to a conflict
could be brought to a peaceful resolution:
The agencies of the United Nations system exercise substantial influence and
control – in short, power – over the behavior of states through the exploitation of
a variety of methods: consultation and advice; inquiry, debate, and criticism of
both public and private varieties; examination of reports and conduct of
inspections; granting and withdrawal of subsidies and other forms of assistance;
and recommendation followed by evaluation of response to this sort of pressure
and possibly by insistent reiteration…International institutions provide, above all,
50
opportunities for states, singly and collectively, to influence each other.
Despite these mechanisms, peaceful methods of enforcement do not always prevent or
halt an armed conflict. Should these methods fail, Chapter VII, “Action with Respect to
Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression,” allows for the use
of force in Article 42, providing that measures not involving the use of force have not
been successful.

51

The use of force has manifested itself mainly in the form of

peacekeeping, which has come to be known as a “Chapter 6 ½” action because, although
it is interventionist in nature and sanctions the use of force in specific circumstances,
such as self-defence, it does not usually apply direct military pressure against the
combatants. Key exceptions to this have taken place in Korea, where the US-led, UNsponsored military intervention was termed a “police action,” and Somalia, which
experienced a Chapter VII US-led enforcement action, with disastrous results.
In his article “The Warrior United Nations,” Stephen Schlesinger argues that the
founders of the UN had the singular goal of ending aggression and that “the warrior
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mentality was at the core of the 1945 conclave.”

52

Despite this, and perhaps due to Cold

War conditions, the UN never “acted in its warrior capacity” with the notable exceptions
of Korea in 1950, the Gulf War, and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
in Afghanistan. Instead, the UN sought to resolve conflict through non-military means,
which included “peacekeeping, policing missions, preventive diplomacy, conflict
resolution, troubleshooting, fact-finding, weapons interdiction, drug control,
disarmament, observer missions, arms inspections, and other sundry means to work
toward bringing about peace.”

53

The characterization of peacekeeping as “non-military”

is particularly interesting given that the composition of most peacekeeping forces has
traditionally been military in nature. Schlesinger’s assertion that these three instances of
the UN adopting a “warrior” stance signified a departure from “the UN’s practice of
solely patrolling borders” undercuts the complexity of peacekeeping missions,
particularly those of the post-Cold War era. Many would argue, in fact, that
peacekeeping has never been as simple as “solely patrolling borders” to keep the peace.
The first real test of the UN’s ability to maintain peace came in 1956, during the
Suez Crisis. The British and French invasion of Egypt in response to Gamel Abdel
Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal prompted the United Nations to call for an
immediate cease-fire and withdrawal, to which both countries eventually acquiesced. It
has been argued, however, that they did so “less out of any respect for or fear of the
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united strength of the United Nations than because of the effective economic muscle of
the United States.”

54

The Suez Crisis precipitated the creation of UN peacekeeping,

which involved the insertion of an impartial third party, generally a combat-ready force
made up of the combined personnel of UN member states, to separate combatants and
stabilize a problem area.

55

This proved to be a method of conflict resolution that would

be persistently applied and sorely tested over the succeeding decades.
With the end of the Cold War and its Security Council-imposed inertia, it was
hoped that increased cooperation on the Security Council would lead to capacity- and
confidence-building at the UN.

Yet many of the same problems that plagued the UN

during the Cold War persisted after the fall of the Berlin Wall. In scholar Elizabeth
Riddell-Dixon’s estimation, the UN decision to intervene to preserve peace, whether
through economic or military sanctions or the establishment of peacekeeping operations,
must be based on objective criteria, namely “the needs of the peoples embroiled in a
conflict and on the ability of the United Nations to ameliorate the situation in some
significant way and in line with both its long-term and short-term objectives.” Further,
“it must be recognized that the United Nations cannot respond to all situations and must
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56

target its scarce resources to those situations in which they can do most good.”

In other

words, the United Nations needs, and has always needed, to develop a set of “educated
expectations” for itself in the issue-area of international peace and security, and direct its
effort and resources toward realizing these expectations. Anything more would be asking
the impossible, which is what many argue has historically and is presently expected of
the UN.
One criticism that has been levied against the United Nations is that, in its quest to
pursue world peace, it has not allowed mechanisms like economic sanctions the time to
take effect before upgrading action to include military measures. An example of this can
be seen in the case of the Gulf War, which was the UN’s first post-Cold War era
opportunity to implement its collective security measures. Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon
points out that concern has been raised over the UN’s “willingness to resort to force
57

without assessing the effectiveness and adequacy of non-violent measures.”

The UN

Charter allows force as a last resort, but in this case little time was allowed to evaluate
whether economic sanctions would have been effective in getting Iraq to withdraw from
Kuwait. Riddell-Dixon asserts that, in this case, the UN was in breach of Article 42 of its
own Charter. The multitude of other problems that arose from the Gulf War, including
the perception that the UN’s policies were an extension of United States foreign policy,
contributed significantly to a loss of credibility for the UN. It created doubt that the UN
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action did anything besides extend the principle of humanitarian intervention so that it
took precedence over national sovereignty, and in so doing worried many member states
while exacerbating a grave humanitarian crisis.
Another major criticism of the UN itself is that the democratic principles it
espouses do not apply to the organization itself. The United Nations is notoriously
reluctant to reform its infrastructure, and this is nowhere more evident than in the unequal
distribution of power and influence represented by the five permanent members of the
Security Council and especially obvious in the marginalization of the General Assembly
since the end of the Cold War. Riddell-Dixon asks whether it is “justifiable to retain
vetoes and permanent seats for those states which are already among the most privileged
and powerful in the world in a post-Cold War era in which the rhetorical concern,
especially among the countries of the North, for democratization and justice is all58

pervasive?”

This question, which alludes to the growing North-South divide among

nations in the UN, could have been asked with equal sincerity during the Cold War.
Security Council reform has been sought by many nations since the UN’s inception, and
this desire has increased in recent years as the policies pursued by the Security Council
become more and more closely identified with the foreign policies of its permanent
members, and its decision-making processes are becoming less transparent. Developed
countries of the North that sit on the Security Council are unlikely to give up their seats
of power and allow nations of the South a larger voice in decision-making. Southern
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nations make up seventy-five per cent of the world’s population but have been relegated
to voicing opinions in the General Assembly which carry little weight. The UN as an
organ for democratic international decision-making and cooperation is a failure in that it
does not provide the equal representation for all nations promised in its founding
principles.
The United Nations is not a straightforward organization to evaluate; it is a multifaceted monster with many arms. Its basic objectives are fairly simple: international
peace and security, international cooperation, and respect for justice, human rights, and
international obligations. Yet the means to attain these ends are many and complicated,
and the UN, either due to a lack of resources or political will, is not always up to the task
of meeting the expectations it set for itself in 1945. This poses a very difficult task for
scholars who seek to evaluate the successes and failures of the UN. In setting some
“educated expectations” for the UN in the broad areas listed above, it has been shown
that the UN has had mixed success in achieving its goals, and it does not approach every
problem in the same way, armed with the same tools. Claude argues for a dispassionate
examination of the United Nations, to get away from “Are you for the UN or against it?”
in scholarship, because an ideological dichotomy does not serve an academic purpose.
He argues that
[w]hat the United Nations needs most is not to attract a larger array of avid
supporters, but to begin to be taken for granted – to be regarded not as an
idealistic scheme on trial, but as a political institution within which everyone
expects to suffer defeats as well as to win victories and which no one can
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conceive as a dispensable part of the machinery for the management of
59
international affairs.
In other words, the United Nations should not be condemned for its inability to achieve
success every time, but be evaluated according to reasonable standards and expectations,
taking into account specific circumstances that might affect outcomes. This rational
approach to international organizations is likely the approach that will produce the most
fruitful results. The same criteria could be useful in evaluating the contributions of its
member states, as well as successes and failures in international peacekeeping.
Canada was thrust into the international spotlight a decade after the creation of the
UN with the advent of the Suez Crisis, but had been cultivating its role in international
organizations since the end of the Second World War. At the close of the Second World
War populations around the world were hopeful that the end of hostilities would mean a
period of peace and restoration for their battered nations. To capitalize on this
possibility, and to provide countries with mechanisms to handle conflict through
diplomatic means rather than resorting to armed conflict, a number of international and
regional organizations were created in the post-war period. Canada was an eager
founding member of some of these organizations, including the United Nations and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. And when war loomed in the Middle East a mere
ten years after the end of the Second World War, challenging the short-lived possibility
of peaceable international relations, Canada and other nations developed the concept of
peacekeeping as a way to forestall a regional war that had the potential to ensnare larger
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allies. The UN and NATO, although set up for different purposes, have been the
institutions through which Canada has made its most recognizable contributions to
international relations and the maintenance of peace and stability in the international
context.
The end of the Cold War did not erase the need for international organizations as
the UN still performs key functions in political, social, cultural, and economic realms. It
still attempts to fulfill the role of peacemaker at the political level, and failing that, it acts
as peacekeeper on behalf of its member states.
The United Nations’ mixed record in international peace and security is mirrored
by the development of its best-known undertaking, peacekeeping. An evaluation of UN
peacekeeping often bestows blessings or indictments on the United Nations itself. And
given that the United Nations, like the League before it, is no more or less than a sum of
its Member States, and cannot act or intervene without their willingness and participation,
an evaluation of the fortunes of peacekeeping reveal the political machinations behind
every effort to manage conflict at an international level. Canada has played an integral
role in this effort, either directly at the United Nations or by committing its military to the
activity of peacekeeping, whether mounted by the United Nations or later NATO with the
endorsement of the UN. Canada’s diplomatic and political participation in the birth of
peacekeeping as a tool in the UN’s conflict management kit has led to the commitment of
Canadian troops to dozens of peacekeeping operations since the Second World War.
This activity has had a significant impact on how Canada’s soldiers are trained.

88

However, the focus initially was not on the impact it would have on Canada’s military,
but rather how participation in the UN would allow Canada to play a significant and
noteworthy role on the international stage. This was Canada’s attempt to “punch above
its weight” in matters of international relations and collective security.

89

Chapter 2
Duty and Opportunity:
Early “peacekeeping” and the Creation of UNEF

Canadian officials at the UN, in particular Lester B. Pearson, played a key role in the
creation of peacekeeping as a method of mediating international disputes and also had a
role in defining its formative guiding principles. This early input and subsequent military
contribution to peacekeeping operations over successive decades gave Canada a presence
on the global stage that it might not have otherwise attained. Canada ascended to the
status of “middle power” in part due to its role in international peacekeeping in the 1950s
and 1960s.
Peacekeeping, the activity for which the UN arguably would become best known,
was not addressed in the UN’s Charter, but was rather conceptualized in the mid-1950s as
a response to a crisis that threatened international security. “Classical” United Nations
peacekeeping was created in the 1950s to quell conflict in the Middle East and allow the
time and space for a peace agreement to be negotiated between combating nations.
The Charter of the United Nations does not explicitly describe peacekeeping.
Collective security concerns and obligations for member states of the UN are addressed
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in Chapter VI of the Charter, “Pacific Settlement of Disputes,” and Chapter VII, “Action
with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression.”

1

Article 33 of Chapter VI dictates that “[t]he parties to any dispute, the continuance of
which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall,
first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration,
judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means
of their own choice,” and specifies that the UN can call upon member states to avail
themselves of these options. Under the remaining articles of Chapter VI, the UN has the
power to investigate any situation which it deems a threat to international peace and
security, and can refer such matters to the Security Council for a recommended
settlement. There is a provision for the Security Council to take “action,” but the
emphasis is firmly that recommendations and solutions taken by the UN be peaceful in
2

nature. Chapter VI contains no provisions of any kind for the use of force in the
resolution of international disputes.
Chapter VII of the Charter empowers the Security Council to call upon the parties
to a conflict to comply with its recommendations to “maintain or restore international
peace and security.” It specifies that “[s]uch provisional measures shall be without
prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council
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3

shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.” Should
there be a failure to comply, the Security Council can call upon member states to apply
such measures against the combatants as “complete or partial interruption of economic
relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.” Should these measures not
work, only then, as stated in Article 42, may member states be called upon to “take such
action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international
peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other
operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.” Member states
are requested to “undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in
accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and
facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining
4

international peace and security.” However, in a situation that threatened international
peace and security several steps were to be taken to defuse the situation before the UN
would resort to force.
The November 1950 United Nations’ General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 377
V, known as the “Uniting For Peace” resolution, reiterated this intention. It reaffirmed
that “it remains the primary duty of all Members of the UN, when involved in an
international dispute, to seek settlement of such a dispute by peaceful means through the
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5

procedures laid down in Chapter VI of the Charter.” But, mindful of existing threats to
the peace, the UN affirmed that any collective action taken should be prompt. The UN
was likely also considering the increasingly problematic veto power of the five
permanent members of the Security Council, which often voted or used their veto
according to lines drawn by the intensifying Cold War. Therefore, Section A of the
“Uniting For Peace” resolution resolved that, should a lack of unanimity among the
permanent members of the Security Council prevent it from exercising its obligations in
regard to maintaining peace and security, any matter before it relating to peace, a breach
of the peace, or an act of aggression could be referred to the General Assembly. The
General Assembly could then recommend collective measures, up to and including the
use of armed force when necessary.

6

Section C of this resolution also “invites” each member state to survey its
resources to determine the type and amount of assistance it could offer the Security
Council or General Assembly in the execution of its recommendations for the restoration
of international peace and security. Also key to this discussion was the recommendation
that a member state “maintain within its national armed forces elements so trained,
organized and equipped that they could promptly be made available, in accordance with
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its constitutional processes, for service as a United Nations unit or units, upon
recommendation by the Security Council or the General Assembly.”

7

Thus two notable ideas took root early in United Nations-led international dispute
resolution and shaped the activity for over fifty years: first, it was assumed that military
forces of UN member states would compose the bulk of a UN force used to keep the
peace; and second, there was an assumption that these forces’ national training was
sufficient for the task that they were given by the United Nations. Canadian diplomats at
the UN and bureaucrats and military planners in Canada agreed with this assessment.
These practices, which were initially unquestioned, would impact the participation of
Canada in peacekeeping operations far beyond the 1950s, and play an important role in
the ever-evolving definition of peacekeeping.
Although it was another six years before the arrangements outlined in the Uniting
for Peace resolution were put into practice on a large scale, two modest UN military
observer (UNMO) missions were created in the late 1940s: the United Nations Truce
Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and the United Nations Military Observer Group in
India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP).

8

The UN considers UNTSO, created in May 1948
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following the 1947 partition of Palestine to create separate Arab and Jewish states, to be
9

its first “peacekeeping” mission. UNTSO was tasked to manage hostilities between
Israel, Palestine, and, later, other Arab countries in the area. According to the UN, its job
has been to act “as go-betweens for the hostile parties and as the means by which isolated
10

incidents could be contained and prevented from escalating into major conflicts.”

UNTSO military observers have always been unarmed. Canada’s involvement began in
1954 and Canadian Lieutenant-General E.L.M. Burns was Chief of Staff for UNTSO
from August 1954 to November 1956.

11

The UN’s Department of Peacekeeping

Operations’ statistics indicate that as of 31 January 2013 UNTSO employed 153 military
observers, 94 international civilian personnel, and 139 local staff, and Canada continues

tasks. By 1972 the Canadian delegation to the Commission consisted of only 20 people, and in 1974 the
Commission ended. Gardam, The Canadian Peacekeeper, 19-20.
9
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and welfare services, and later had its mandate renewed throughout the 1950 and 1960s. UNRWA’s
statistics state that by 30 June 1962 1,174,760 refugees were registered with their organization, 877,888 of
them having registered to receive rations in one of the four host countries. Earlier statistics are not
available. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, “A Brief
History of UNRWA, 1950-1962,” UNWRA Reviews: A Background Information Series, Information Paper
No. 1 (Beirut: United Nations, September 1962), 1, 5-6.
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12

to contribute to this mission.

UNTSO has played a pivotal role in peacekeeping

operations in the Middle East for decades, as its trained UNMOs have, at short notice,
formed “the nucleus of some other peacekeeping operations worldwide. The availability
of UNTSO’s military observers for almost immediate deployment after the Security
Council has acted to create a new mission has been an enormous contributory factor to
13

the early deployment and success of those operations.”

Certainly in Burns’ case his

experience with UNTSO, as well as his leadership experience during the Second World
War, provided him with expertise in leading a multinational effort that was easily
applicable to his leadership role during the Suez Crisis.
The United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)
was created in January 1949 to observe the ceasefire in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
Under the Indian Independence Act of 1947 Kashmir chose to accede to India instead of
Pakistan, which caused fighting to break out in the area. The original military observers
who were deployed with UNMOGIP in January 1948 were tasked to assist the Military
Adviser to the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP). They were
to observe, gather information, and report on threats to or breaches of the ceasefire
between India and Pakistan. UNCIP was eventually terminated, and on 30 March 1951
the Security Council decided to continue UNMOGIP through Resolution 91 (1951),
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which affirmed the military observers’ role in the area. UNMOGIP’s task was to
continue to supervise the ceasefire in Jammu and Kashmir, observe and report,
investigate complaints of ceasefire violations, and submit its findings to each party to the
conflict and to the Secretary-General of the UN. The situation was stable until 1965
when hostilities broke out along the ceasefire line, resulting in the creation of the United
Nations India-Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIPOM) to stabilize the situation.

14

Following a resumption of hostilities in 1971, a ceasefire came into effect on 17
December 1971. An agreement defining a Line of Control in Kashmir was reached in
July 1972; this Line of Control was, for the most part, the same as the ceasefire line
established by the Karachi Line in 1949.

15

Canada withdrew its observers in 1949 but

continued to contribute the services of a C130 Hercules.

16

As of November 2009

UNMOGIP continued to operate with the participation of forty-four military observers
from eight countries, supported by local and international civilian staff.

17

The UN’s next foray into international problem-solving came at the behest of the
United States. When the Japanese occupation of Korea ended at the close of the Second
World War, Korea was separated into two zones at the 38th parallel. The United States
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occupied South Korean territory, leaving the area north of the 39th parallel to the Soviets.
As Niall Ferguson argues, “as in Europe, the end of the war in Asia meant an improvised
partition of contested territory.”

18

United Nations involvement in Korea began in 1947

with the UN Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK), of which Canada was a
member.

UNTCOK was created to facilitate free and secret elections and oversee the

withdrawal of American and Soviet occupation forces. Successful UN-sponsored
elections were held in the South in 1948 and the Republic of Korea was created (ROK),
but North Korea refused to participate in the UN process. The Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK) was created in the North under the leadership of the
communist and autocratic Kim Il Sung, who became leader in 1948. By 1950 UNTCOK
was warning of impending civil war, which ultimately broke out on 25 June 1950 when
North Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel into South Korea.

19

Two days after war broke out, in a statement on 27 June 1950, American
President Harry S Truman explained his order to send US air and naval forces under the
auspices of the UN to help defend the Republic of Korea (South Korea) against North
Korea’s full-scale invasion. In Security Council Resolution 82 [S/1501] of 1950, North
20

Korea was called upon to withdraw its forces above the 38th parallel.

When it failed to

do so, the Security Council determined, in Resolution 83 [S/1511], that North Korea’s
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continued aggression constituted a breach of the peace, and called upon its member states
to offer assistance to the Republic of Korea to “repel the armed attack and restore peace
and security to the area.”

21

Truman ordered American air and sea forces to give South

Korean government troops cover and support for very specific reasons. Primarily he was
concerned that “Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer
independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war.”

22

The North Korean

defiance of Security Council Resolution 82 [S/1501], coupled with the fear that a
Communist occupation of the island of Formosa would threaten the Pacific area and US
interests in that region, led Truman to act decisively in response to the call for assistance.
On 27 June Truman laid out the several steps he was directing American forces to
take to assist South Korean forces and restore stability in the area, and expressed his hope
that
all members of the United Nations will consider carefully the consequences of
this latest aggression in Korea in defiance of the Charter of the United Nations. A
return to the rule of force in international affairs would have far reaching effects.
23
The United States will continue to uphold the rule of law.
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The UN was already being touted as a vehicle for the rule of law and justice in
international affairs. UN Command was established in Tokyo under American General
24

Douglas MacArthur on 30 June , and American leadership was formalized in Security
Council Resolution 84 [S/1588] of 7 July 1950, in which the Security Council
recommended that all member states providing assistance to South Korea “make such
forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States of
America.”

25

This resolution called upon the United States to designate a commander of

these forces, authorized the force to use the UN flag in operations against North Korea,
and requested that the United States report to the Security Council on actions taken under
the newly created Unified Command. This Resolution was adopted by seven votes to
none, with three abstentions.

26

By the end of July the Unified Command had also been

put in charge of determining the humanitarian requirements of the Korean population and
27

coordinating relief donations among member states.

Although characterized as a

“police action,” the UN’s role in the Korean War bore many similarities to later
peacekeeping.
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During June and July 1950 Canadian naval and air elements were dispatched to
the UN mission, and on August 7 the Canadian government authorized the creation of the
Canadian Army Special Force (CASF), which recruited on a volunteer basis for a brigade
group to be trained as part of the regular army. Parliament was told that these soldiers
could be used for any UN operation, not only Korea.

28

On 25 November 1950 the 2nd

Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (2 PPCLI) sailed for Korea,
arriving in Pusan in December. 2 PPCLI finally entered battle in mid-February 1951
under the command of the 27th Commonwealth Infantry Brigade, in time to participate in
the second general UN advance towards the 38th parallel.

29

By the time Canadians

entered battle, North Korean forces had been able to penetrate far into South Korea so
that the remnant of South Korean forces, Americans, and a British brigade were pinned
30

down near Pusan , barely holding on when UN contingents from sixteen nations began
to arrive. Canada provided the third largest contingent. Led by 2PPCLI, the rest of the
Canadian Light Infantry Brigade arrived in Pusan in May 1951. During the war, a total
of three different Canadian brigade-sized formations served under UN command. When
the war ended on 27 July 1953 with the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement,
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approximately 26, 000 Canadians had served in Korea, 500 of whom died as a result of
31

the fighting or due to sickness.

Although the action in Korea was an UN-sanctioned “police action” led by the US
and not a peacekeeping mission, this was the first large-scale deployment of troops under
the UN banner, and Canada was a willing participant. Canadian soldiers volunteered to
be part of the CASF for many reasons. One soldier who joined the Canadian military in
1950 to be part of the CASF discovered that it would be two long years before he was
actually deployed to Korea, long after the CASF had been replaced by standard units of
the Canadian military. This retired Chief Warrant Officer applied in 1950 at the age of
20 to be part of the overseas contingent but had to do basic training before being
deployed. He had joined out of a spirit of youth and adventure and intended to be part of
the UN force from the beginning: “we joined and we had to go through our training,
because we thought after our couple weeks training we’d be over there but this was not
true – we had to go through the basics.”

32

While in training he was put on “special

courses” such as the junior and senior NCO courses and advanced trade-related technical
courses, which he was told were important for deployment to Korea. When he was
finally deployed in January 1952 as a replacement, he was a trained Artillery technician
with the rank of Bombardier (the equivalent of a Lance Corporal). In the course of this
training he received little information about Korea, its political situation, or the nature of
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the conflict. When he enlisted he did not know where Korea was or why Canadians were
fighting alongside South Koreans, but there was no confusion about the fact that the UN
force he wished to participate in was fighting a war overseas. He was “going over there
to do whatever had to be necessary to stop what was going on. As far as we were
concerned it was a war.”

33

In this soldier’s estimation the Canadian contingent was not particularly well
equipped for survival, and they had to “scrounge” for items like sleeping bags from the
Americans, often in exchange for Canadian whisky. He returned to Canada as a Sergeant
in January 1953, and in reflecting on his experiences years later he highlighted the value
of “learning on site.” Veterans from the Second World War who were fighting in Korea
were invaluable, he said, as they “taught us how to survive and how to survive in a
hostile environment like that. They helped us a lot.” As part of a force that was often ill34

equipped for the environment, it was considered “lucky” to have these veterans present.

This is an early, informal, example of the Canadian military’s use of veterans to conduct
pre-deployment or in-theatre training and to give briefings about their experiences to
benefit inexperienced soldiers.
The Korean War lasted three years, and while the fighting was still raging the
commitment of soldiers to the conflict was having far-reaching, long-lasting effects on
the regulations that governed the use of the armed forces in the United States. Early in
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1951 Truman issued Executive Order 10206, “Providing for support of United Nations’
activities directed to the peaceful settlement of disputes.” In this Order Truman directed
the Secretary of State,
upon request by the United Nations for cooperative action, and to the extent that
he finds it is consistent with the national interest to comply with such request, is
authorized, in support of such activities of the United Nations as are specifically
directed to the peaceful settlement of disputes and not involving the employment
of armed forces contemplated by Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, to
request the Secretary of Defense to detail personnel of the armed forces to the
United Nations, and to furnish facilities, services, or other assistance and to loan
supplies and equipment to the United Nations in an agreed fair share of the United
35
States.
Although this Order had a provision excluding actions taken under Chapter VII of the
Charter it clearly set out a standard operating procedure for the contribution of armed
forces personnel, facilities, services, supplies, and equipment to a UN force that was
acting to settle international disputes peacefully. The prominent American role in the
UN-authorized Korean intervention, and the US provisions for contributions to future UN
forces, indicated a willing participation in international organizations that was lacking
during the existence of the League of Nations. This better positioned the UN for success
and set an example for other member states, including Canada.
US leadership in the Korean War highlighted what Lester B. Pearson believed to
be the
two greatest factors today bearing on the danger of aggression in all parts of the
world…first the nature and conduct of United States policy because of its position

35

President Harry S Truman, “Executive Order 10206 – Providing for support of United Nations’ activities
directed to the peaceful settlement of disputes,” Executive Orders (United States of America: 19 January
1951), http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/10206.html.

104

of power and leadership, and second the strength of United States arms…United
States strength, military and economic, has been of decisive importance during
the past decade in maintaining peace in Europe, and hence the world. It will be
36
so, I believe, in the years ahead.
Despite this belief in the importance of the US role in maintaining peace, when speaking
of the UN Pearson asserted that “[s]olid unity … is as much a part of our strength as
37

bombs.”

Pearson believed that collective security could only be guaranteed through a

willingness to act collectively, with force if necessary:
While our policy should, of course, be designed and carried out to make the use of
force unnecessary; while tactics should be followed that are neither provocative
nor rash, nevertheless, the maintenance of force in this unhappy world of today
and the clear resolve to use it as a final necessity against aggression is an
indisputable obligation on us all at the present time. The deterrent value of such
force, as I see it, should neither be squandered by bluff not made impotent by loss
of nerve in a genuine crisis.
Our purpose and our policy must be to avoid crises and to solve
international problems. … It is important…that the communist bloc, which we
fear and which we still have cause to fear, should not get the impression that free
peoples in their passion for peace and their desire to secure it by negotiation and
the resolving of differences would, under no circumstances, make use of the
deterrent strength they have built up for the security and defence in accordance
38
with the principles of the United Nations.
While the UN needed to avail itself of all diplomatic and peaceful means at its disposal to
resolve conflict, it also needed to be willing to act as a whole to stop aggression with
force.
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The UN’s strength, “being collective, should be used collectively if it is to be
effective.”

39

The sturdiness of that collective strength was tested by the Suez Crisis,

which required a more robust response than the situations that gave rise to the UN
military observer missions of the 1940s, and had to be handled differently than the
Korean War due to the involvement of two Security Council members and the possibility
of a wider war. It also put Canada at the forefront of discussions about the exercise of
collective security through the UN, and led to the birth of UN peacekeeping operations.
The Suez Crisis was also the genesis for Canada’s reputation as peacekeeper
extraordinaire, and Lester B. Pearson’s christening as the “inventor” of peacekeeping.
Although the peacekeeping response to the Suez Crisis was mainly focused on the
logistics of personnel and deployment it gave rise to the first questions about the
preparation and training that soldiers assigned to UN peacekeeping duty should receive
and the suitability of Canadian soldiers for this “unmilitary” task. The Korean War had
been a test of collective security for the Canadian government, and just a few short years
after its conclusion Pearson, as Canada’s foreign minister, was given the opportunity to
call nations into action to protect international peace and security through a wholly new
type of military activity.
According to the United Nations’ official account of the Suez Crisis, when the
UN-supervised 1949 General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel collapsed
following Egypt’s July 1956 nationalization of the Suez Canal, and Britain and France,
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along with Israel, occupied portions of Egypt, the UN “reacted with speed and firmness
and, to overcome it, conceived a new form of peacekeeping and set up its first
peacekeeping force.” The UN attributes this development, and the avoidance of largescale war, to the vision, resourcefulness, and determination of then-Secretary-General
Dag Hammarskjöld, and Canada’s Secretary of State for External Affairs, Lester B.
Pearson.

40

Throughout 1956 members of the Canadian government issued statements and
gave speeches situating Canada in international relations and identifying its priorities and
willingness to act. The primary concern of Western leaders was the USSR, for they had
learned that “Soviet words differed from Soviet deeds, and that Soviet tactics were not
the same as Soviet policy,” and that they were likely entering a more fluid period of
relations with the Soviets, one of “smiles and scowls, of kicks and carrots” on the part of
41

the Soviets.

As a result of this preoccupation with Cold War tensions, Pearson believed

in January 1956 that Canada should pay close attention to the foreign policy of the United
States and make Canada’s views known to the US, as it was leading the way in the “great
combined effort to maintain peace and freedom.” Pearson cited the US role in the Korean
War as having “saved collective security and probably the United Nations itself.”

42

This

flattery was a reminder that the United Nations, like the League of Nations before it, was
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vulnerable and had to be shored up by its members, but the UN, unlike the League, had
the endorsement of the US.
By the summer of 1956 Egypt and Israel had been engaged in an arms race for
over a year, with the east and west supplying weapons and equipment to opposing sides.
This was a symptom of a larger rift in relations between the two countries. One week
after the withdrawal of American financial aid for the Aswan Dam project on 19 July
1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal and stated his
intention to use Canal dues to pay for the project. By August, the dispute between Egypt
and Israel had resulted in border skirmishes but had not broken out into war. The UN,
through visits to the area by the Secretary-General, had been making efforts to lessen the
tension. In a foreign policy statement to the House of Commons on 1 August 1956,
Lester B. Pearson commended the efforts being made by the United Nations Truce
Supervisory Organization (UNTSO) in Palestine and addressed the deepening Suez
Crisis. At that time UNSTO was led by Canadian Major-General E.L.M. Burns and had
ten Canadian military observers at its disposal.

43

Pearson argued that UNTSO was

operating under the objective, patient and very effective leadership of a Canadian,
General Burns, whose work, I think, deserves the highest commendation on the
part of all those who are genuinely interested in establishing security and a just
peace in that part of the world. Certainly there is no peace there yet, for there has
been no political settlement made between the contending parties. That must
come if there is to be peace, because in the long run such a political settlement
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under the United Nations, rather than arms, will be the foundation of security for
44
Israel and the Arab states.
Regarding the specific question of the nationalization of the Suez Canal, he argued that
the canal was an “essential international artery of trade and communications, a waterway
which was constructed by international agreement and with international cooperation and
is now operated and maintained internationally,” and that the use of it for all nations,
without “arbitrary or unnecessary interference,” was at stake. His preferred solution was
for control of the canal to rest with those countries that had the largest stake in its
operation, perhaps under the umbrella of the UN. For Pearson there could be no peace
without a political settlement, and he believed this settlement should involve the UN.

45

Scholar Michael Fry argues that Canada did not have a Middle East policy in
1956, but that a concern over refugee and relief matters, the armistice agreements, and a
willingness to play a “modest, stabilizing role in arms transfers … complemented a belief
that incremental, confidence-building measures, both political and economic (the mirage
46

of functionalism) would help bring about a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute.”

That settlement would provide Canada not only the opportunity to articulate a Middle
East policy, but would position Canada as a “helpful-fixer” on the world stage.
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By September 1956 the question of Nasser’s actions, and the end of the
international operation of the Canal, had been brought before the UN by Great Britain
and France. Soon after, Egypt requested that the Security Council also consider the
actions of some powers, including Great Britain and France, “which constitute a danger
47

to international peace and security and are serious violations of the Charter.”

The

Security Council passed a resolution taking into account all sides to the disagreement,
and set out the requirements for the settlement of the Suez situation in Resolution 118 of
1956. However, the British, French, and Israeli attack on Egypt in late October 1956
changed the situation dramatically. The 1949 UN-supervised General Armistice between
Egypt and Israel collapsed during that month when Great Britain, France, and Israel
occupied large portions of Egypt.
After Israeli forces crossed into Egypt on 29 October 1956, the Chief of Staff of
UNTSO, Major-General Burns, called for a ceasefire and for Israel to remove its forces to
its side of the border. Britain and France requested that both sides cease hostilities and
withdraw forces to ten miles on each side of the Suez Canal, and that Egypt allow AngloFrench forces to be stationed temporarily on the Canal to separate the two sides and
ensure the safety of shipping lines. This ultimatum was accepted by Israel but not
surprisingly rejected by Egypt, and an attack on Egypt by France and the UK followed
soon after on 31 October.

47
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“Uniting For Peace” resolution, and the first emergency session of the United Nations
General Assembly was convened on 1 November 1956.
On 2 November UNGA adopted Resolution 997 (ES-I), which expressed grave
concern over the disregard of the parties involved for the Israel-Arab armistice
agreements of 1949, the penetration of Israeli forces deep into Egyptian territory, and the
military operations being conducted on Egyptian territory by the armed forces of France
and the United Kingdom. The resolution noted that traffic through the Suez Canal was
disrupted to the detriment of many nations. It called for an immediate cease-fire by all
parties and a halt to the movement of military forces and arms into the area; that all
parties halt moving military goods into the area and generally “refrain from any acts
which would delay or prevent the implementation of the present resolution”; that freedom
of navigation of the Canal be restored once the cease-fire was in place; and that the
Secretary-General report to the General Assembly and Security Council on compliance to
these measures. The UNGA would remain in emergency session until the involved
49

parties complied with the resolution.

Resolution 997 (ES-I) was adopted sixty-four votes to five, with six abstentions.
Canada was among the abstainers. Lester B. Pearson, as Chairman of the Canadian
Delegation, explained Canada’s vote on the resolution, which the Canadian delegation
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believed was insufficient to achieve the purpose of creating peace in the area; far more
than a ceasefire was required. In a statement to UNGA on 2 November, Pearson argued
that the resolution had one great omission: it did not set out any steps to be taken by the
UN for a peace settlement, and did not link the ceasefire with a political settlement for
Suez and Palestine. Once forces withdrew to the demarcation line, he asked, “then
what?” Something needed to be done to resolve the underlying issues of the crisis. He
stated that he
therefore would have liked to see a provision in this resolution … authorising the
Secretary-General to begin to make arrangements with member governments for a
United Nations force large enough to keep these borders at peace while a political
settlement is being worked out. I regret exceedingly that time has not been given
to follow up this idea, which was mentioned also by the representative of the
United Kingdom in his first speech, and I hope that even now, when action on the
resolution has been completed, it may not be too late to give consideration on this
matter. My own government would be glad to recommend Canadian participation
50
in such a United Nations force, a truly international peace and police force.
Pearson believed that the nations of the UN “have a duty here. We also – or, should I
say, we had – an opportunity.”

51

Because of the lack of time afforded for debate of this

resolution, and to seize the opportunity to have “brought some real peace and a decent
existence, or hope for such, to the people of that part of this world,” Canada had no
choice but to abstain.

52

However, Pearson did not stray from his conviction that the UN

could be the instrument for peace. As he had stated in the summer of 1956, “the UN,
with all its disappointments and its weaknesses as well as with all its accomplishments
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and its strengths, remains the basis of our general international policy.”

53

Before the

emergency session of UNGA opened, Pearson had spoken to UN Secretary-General
Hammarskjöld about the possibility of a type of “UN police force” to resolve the crisis.
In the days following Canada’s abstention from 997 (ES-I), Pearson put this plan into
action.
Pearson spoke before the emergency session of UNGA on 3 November 1956,
asserting that “because we have left them unsolved over the years,” the problems
underlying the Suez Crisis needed to be dealt with. In addition to the immediate ceasefire and other measures called for in resolution 997 (ES-I), he suggested that
the Secretary-General be given another and supplementary – not conflicting, but
supplementary – responsibility: to work out at once a plan for an international
force to bring about and supervise the cease-fire visualized in the Assembly
54
resolution which has already been passed.
The purpose of the international force would be to supervise the cease-fire and create a
physical and diplomatic space for further political settlements to be worked out. It would
create the conditions for the question “Then what?” to be answered.
The Canadian delegation submitted a draft resolution on the UN international
force to the emergency session of UNGA. It read, in part:
The General Assembly, bearing in mind the urgent necessity of facilitating
compliance with the Resolution…of November 2, requests, as a matter of priority,
the Secretary-General to submit to it within forty-eight hours a plan for the setting
up, with the consent of the nations concerned, of an emergency international
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United Nations force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in
accordance with the terms of the above resolution.55
The “Canadian proposal” was adopted by UNGA the same day it was submitted, with a
vote of fifty-seven to none with nineteen abstentions, and became Resolution 998 (ES-I)
of 4 November 1956. The wording of the resolution that created the first UN
peacekeeping force was surprisingly short, encompassing little more than the draft
paragraph quoted above.

56

The intention of this resolution was to allow for the creation

of an international force that could provide international supervision of compliance to the
ceasefire and other measures embodied in resolution 997 (ES-I). Resolution 997 (ES-I)
was reaffirmed and elaborated upon in Resolution 999 (ES-I), with the immediate
objective of bringing about an end to the fighting and bloodshed and creating conditions
that would allow a negotiated, lasting peace. Resolution 999 (ES-I) also requested that
the Secretary-General and the members of UNTSO “obtain compliance” from parties to
the hostilities to the directive that they withdraw all forces behind the armistice lines.

57

This provision drew Major-General Burns into an active role in the Suez Crisis, which
presaged his later involvement.
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At this point in the crisis, Canadian Prime Minister Louis St-Laurent gave an
address on the international situation outlining what Canada was doing to contribute to
the restoration of peace. Canada’s position on the Middle East was that Israel should be
allowed to live and prosper but not at the expense of its Arab neighbours, and to this end
Canada was working to secure a fair settlement. Due to the Communist support of Egypt
in the form of offensive weapons, Canada agreed to export twenty-four F-86 jet fighter
planes to Israel.

58

However, in light of Israel’s attack on Egypt while the Security

Council was deliberating the matter, Canada suspended the shipment of jet interceptors to
Israel. Canada’s aim was to have a settlement that guaranteed the sovereign rights of
Egypt while safeguarding the right of vessels of all nations to pass through the Canal and
maintain the Canal’s character as an international waterway. Canada’s leaders realized
that only a permanent settlement worked out by the UN would produce long-term peace,
particularly given the Cold War implications of this conflict. St-Laurent also stressed
that “[t]he present crisis has strained both the Western Alliance and the bonds of the
Commonwealth more than any other event since the Second World War.”

59

Because of

the serious nature of the situation, St-Laurent reiterated Pearson’s promise that Canada
was ready to recommend Canadian participation in this UN force if it was established, as
it was thought that Canada could play a useful role.

60
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Resolution 998 (ES-I), while brief, created conditions that allowed the SecretaryGeneral to begin work immediately on the mechanisms and arrangements necessary to
deploy a UN international force to the Suez area as soon as possible. The SecretaryGeneral’s first report included some basic recommendations for the force, and all of these
were included in Resolution 1000 (ES-I) adopted on 5 November 1956 by fifty-seven
votes to none with nineteen abstentions.

61

This resolution established a UN Command

for the emergency international force, appointed the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, MajorGeneral Burns, as Chief of Command, and authorized the Chief of Command to
immediately recruit from UNTSO a limited number of officers “who shall be nationals of
countries other than those having permanent membership in the Security Council.” He
could also undertake recruitment directly from member states, and the Secretary-General
was authorized to “take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt
62

execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution.”

Hammarskjöld’s “Second and Final Report of the Secretary-General on the Plan
for an Emergency International United Nations Force” was provided to the UN within the
forty-eight-hour time frame requested, and gave some insight into the form the UN
international force would take. Although three models were considered, the General
Assembly chose to develop the emergency international UN force on the basis of the
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principles reflected in the constitution of the UN itself. This meant that its chief
responsible officer would be appointed by the UN and was responsible ultimately to the
General Assembly and/or the Security Council; that his relationship to the SecretaryGeneral should be the same as that of the Chief of Staff of UNTSO; and that the force
would be fully independent of the policies of any one nation. The General Assembly
wanted the force to be set up on an “emergency” and temporary basis, with the length of
its duration being determined by the course of events.

63

Hammarskjöld made it clear

from its terms of reference that there is no intent in the establishment of the Force
to influence the military balance in the present conflict and, thereby, the political
balance affecting efforts to settle the conflict. By the establishment of the Force,
therefore, the General Assembly has not taken a stand in relation to aims other
than those clearly and fully indicated in its resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November
64
1956.
Further, because it would be functioning under the terms of the “Uniting For Peace”
resolution, the Force would be limited in its operations by the consent of the concerned
parties and international law. Although the force would be para-military in nature, it
65

would have no military objectives.

The provisions of Resolution 997 (ES-I) dictated that the objectives of the Force,
once a cease-fire had been established, were to enter Egyptian territory with the consent
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of the Egyptian government, help maintain peace during and after the withdrawal of all
non-Egyptian troops, and secure compliance with the other terms of the 2 November
resolution. Further defining the nature of the UN Force, Hammarskjöld explained that it
would be
more than an observers’ corps, but in no way a military force temporarily
controlling the territory in which it is stationed; nor, moreover, should the Force
have military functions exceeding those necessary to secure peaceful conditions
on the assumption that the parties to the conflict take all necessary steps for
66
compliance with the recommendations of the General Assembly.
Technical studies would be required to determine the size and organization of the force,
and Hammarskjöld called upon Major-General Burns to present his views on these
matters. Hammarskjöld thought that it would be desirable for participating countries to
provide self-contained units, and that a nation providing a unit be responsible for all costs
related to equipment and salaries, with any additional costs paid outside the normal
budget of the UN. He hoped that once the plan was approved, offers of assistance would
come from a variety of member states. He also wanted the General Assembly to vote a
general authorization for the cost of the Force on the basis of the principles he
suggested.

67

Following consideration of the Secretary-General’s report, the General Assembly
adopted Resolution 1001 (ES-I) on 7 November by a vote of sixty-four to none with
twelve abstentions. This vote signaled approval for Hammarskjöld’s guiding principles
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for the establishment of a UN Force. This resolution, together with Resolution 998 (ESI) and Resolution 1000 (ES-I), provided the foundation for the establishment of the
United Nations Emergency Force. Resolution 1001 (ES-I) reaffirmed previous
resolutions that pertained to the Suez Crisis and concurred with the Secretary-General’s
report on the creation of an emergency force. It invited the Secretary-General to continue
discussions with the governments of member states concerning participation in the Force,
and requested that the Chief of Command proceed with the organization of the force.
Hammarskjöld’s suggestion for the financing of the Force’s operations was provisionally
68

adopted and an Advisory Committee with the Secretary-General as its chairman was
established to deal with any aspects of planning or operations that did not fall under the
purview of the Chief of Command or Secretary-General. The Secretary-General was also
authorized to issue any instructions or regulations that might be essential to the
functioning of the force.

69

In this time period Canada sent three military planners to New York to sit on the
Secretary-General’s Military Advisor’s Group, which had been created in response to the
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crisis and the creation of UNEF.

70

They assisted in working out answers to the following

practical questions:
How would troops get to the Middle East? What would they eat and how would
food reach them? How could they communicate with New York and their home
countries? What facilities were needed for transport, for supply, for maintenance?
71
Could the United States be asked to assist in getting UNEF under way?
Historians J.L. Granatstein and David Bercuson argued in a 1988 article “that the
Canadians [in this group] stood out because of their experience; they were accustomed to
sending troops abroad, they had unusually balanced forces, and they were scrupulous in
their administration and staff work. Thus they were taken seriously.”

72

Canadians were

involved in the creation of UNEF not only at the diplomatic level, but at the ground level
when basic arrangements and minutiae were being worked out.
On 7 November 1956 Resolution 1002 (ES-I) was adopted calling for Israel to
withdraw its forces behind the armistice lines and for Great Britain and France to
withdraw all forces from Egyptian territory.

73

The first emergency session of UNGA

came to a close after the passing of Resolution 1003 (ES-I), referring the Suez Crisis for
consideration during the 11th regular session of the General Assembly, which was about
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to convene.

74

Now that the procedural and authorizing arrangements had been made, it

was time to get to the work of organizing and deploying the first United Nations
Emergency Force.
A priority of the Secretary-General was to assemble the UN Force and land it in
Egypt as rapidly as possible, but since this concept had no real precedent it was an
exceedingly complex task. The Secretary-General began making arrangements with UN
member states to contribute personnel to the Force, and negotiated with the Egyptian
government to secure the required consent for the presence of UNEF on Egyptian soil
and to work out a Status of Force agreement to set the parameters for UNEF’s work.

75

The consent of the host nation would become a guiding principle in UN peacekeeping
operations. On the ground, Major-General Burns selected a group of UNTSO military
observers and began to organize the new Force. Burns’ original estimate put manpower
requirements at two combat brigades, or approximately 6000 men. It was decided that
any national contingents contributed to the force should be large enough to be selfcontained and that the Force should have adequate support and air units at its disposal.
The Secretary-General accepted contingents from ten countries, including Canada.
On 7 November 1956 Canada announced that it would provide a battalionstrength contribution with a mobile base and full facilities to operate as a self-contained
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unit.

Canada supplied units for transport, the Provost Marshal and signals, medical

needs, responsibility for the ordnance depot and workshop, the base post office, dental
unit, movement control, and air support, and later, a fully-equipped, light armoured
squadron for mobile reconnaissance.

77

As the immediate need was for infantry, the 1st

Battalion of the Queen’s Own Rifles was made ready, but ultimately could not be sent
due to Egypt’s objections to its British-sounding name and British-looking uniforms.
Canada sent a transport squadron of the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) and
administrative elements of the army instead, and when the HMCS Magnificent arrived in
Egypt on 12 January 1957 the Canadian contribution of over a thousand men represented
78

more than one-sixth of UNEF’s total size.

Burns and his military observers were the first to arrive in Cairo on 12 November
1956 and in February 1957 UNEF reached its target strength of 6000 personnel, a level it
kept until the end of that year. After 1957, force size was gradually reduced due to
financial constraints and because the theatre of operations remained relatively peaceful.
79

The force was withdrawn completely in 1967, when its strength was at about 3378.

The Canadian attitude towards UNEF participation was made clear in a statement
by Prime Minister Louis St-Laurent on 15 November 1956. He acknowledged that
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“independent nationhood bears with it the responsibility of making our own decisions in
international affairs,” and that the request for Canadians to participate in UNEF, as the
fifth time that Canadians had been called on to “take to the field” in the pursuit of peace,
underlined the idea that “we, as an adult nation, have not only been willing to make but,
even more important, have also generally become recognized as capable of making, a
valuable contribution to the cause of peace and moderation in the world community.”

80

Canada intended to prove that it had come of age by playing an important role in
peacekeeping. St-Laurent thought that “through this method, the means have been found
whereby we can all make an active and positive contribution to the cause of peace
together with all our Allies in NATO and so many other members of the United
81

Nations.”

Canada could not shirk this responsibility, nor did it want to.

As Pearson stated, “[i]t was understood that if the Canadian delegation put
82

forward a resolution for a United Nations emergency force, we would contribute to it.”

Canada did not, however, intend to field a fighting force. As St-Laurent made clear, the
“force which we have offered to contribute in the present crisis is not primarily a fighting
force but a police force. As such it is not expected to operate as a military force in armed
combat against the forces of some other state.”
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And overall St-Laurent was right, as
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peacekeepers with UNEF did not face large-scale fighting in the 1950s. Since the
intention of UNEF was to maintain a peaceful backdrop against which a lasting peace
could be negotiated, Canada entered into UNEF believing that it would be “of a
temporary nature…more than an observer corps but it is in no way to be a military force
temporarily controlling the territory in which it will be stationed,” and that it would not
influence the military or political balance of power in the area.

84

St-Laurent was clear on

what the force was not, but the United Nations struggled with what the force would be.
Pearson hoped that the new peacekeeping force would be only a stop-gap until a
peace accord could be signed. Pearson asserted in the fall of 1956 that
the establishment of the UN force should be linked with an effort to reach
political settlements in the area. It was very necessary to keep this two stage
approach in mind because it had a very direct bearing on the contribution which
States might make to the UN force. Canada, for example, would be very reluctant
to participate in the emergency force if we thought it would develop into a longterm commitment which did little more than maintain the unsatisfactory status
quo, perhaps until another explosive situation developed in the future. For this
reason it was most desirable to see that action, linking the political settlement with
85
the emergency steps we were now contemplating, was initiated quickly.
Pearson’s remarks reveal his own ideas for what peacekeeping should be, and
foreshadowed the insidious problem of “mission creep” that so many peacekeeping
missions have faced.
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The operation of UNEF was determined on an ad hoc basis. Other than the much
smaller military observer missions of the 1940s, the United Nations had never undertaken
an endeavour like UNEF. To manage this new undertaking the Secretary-General issued
“Regulations for the United Nations Emergency Force” on 20 February 1957, and these
took effect on 1 March 1957.

86

These regulations were largely intended to formalize and

continue orders, instructions, and practices that were already in use by the UN and
UNEF, and were developed in consultation with the Advisory Committee set up by
Resolution 1001 (ES-I) of November 1956.
These regulations addressed six main areas: general provisions; international
character, uniform, insignia, and privileges and immunities; authority of the commander
of the UN Emergency Force; general administrative, executive, and financial
arrangements; rights and duties of members of the force; and the applicability of
international conventions. In addition to setting out administrative arrangements such as
87

the provision of uniforms , pay, and the food, accommodations, and amenities required
by the Force, this document defined roles and responsibilities within the command
structure of UNEF. These regulations were the template for UN operations for decades
to come. The Secretary-General’s regulations explained that UNEF was a subsidiary
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organ of the UN that consisted of UN Command and all the military personnel placed
under UN Command by member states. The Secretary-General had responsibility for all
administrative, executive, and financial matters affecting the Force, and for negotiating
agreements with governments concerning the Force. The Force Commander had full
command authority over the Force, and direct authority for the operation of the Force and
arrangements for the provision of facilities, supplies, and auxiliary services as well as the
establishment of UN headquarters and other operational centres as necessary. The
Commander was to designate the chain of command for the Force, using officers of the
UN command and commanders and other personnel supplied by national contingents.
The Commander could also recruit local personnel as required.

88

Members of the Force remained in their national service but were, during the
period of their assignment to the Force, international personnel under the authority of the
UN and subject to the instructions of the Commander through the chain of command.
The Force enjoyed the privileges and immunities afforded by the 1946 Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, which protected them and their baggage
from arrest, seizure, or legal process in host nations while on UN duty.

89

Members of the

Force were to be regarded as “agents of the United Nations” for the purpose of providing
them with the legal protection of the UN. Although UN personnel were afforded these
privileges and immunities, they were subject to the criminal and military jurisdiction of
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their respective national states “in accordance with the laws and regulations of those
States.” They were also subject to arrest by the UN military police (MP) attached to the
Force, although perhaps the MPs were not actually used that often.

90

As a Canadian

soldier wrote from Suez in 1959, “Members of UNEF are subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the national state to which they belong in respect of any offence they
commit while in Egypt. … The Military Police cells have been used only once in three
years.”

91

Apart from legal and jurisdictional considerations, a standard of good conduct
was expected of UN personnel. As Hammarskjöld’s regulations stated,
[i]t is the duty of members of the Force to respect the laws and regulations of a
Host State and to refrain from any activity of a political character in a Host State
or other action incompatible with the international nature of their duties. They
shall conduct themselves at all times in a manner befitting their status as members
92
of the United Nations Emergency Force.
This point was further underlined when it was reiterated that “the functions of the Force
are exclusively international and members of the Force shall discharge these functions
and regulate their conduct with the interest of the United Nations only in view.”
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Members of UNEF were required, or at least requested, to behave as responsible
international citizens when posted abroad with the UN.
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Although the UN forces deployed with UNEF were provided with regulations that
made provision for legal, administrative, and financial arrangements, there was no
mention of training in this early document. A certain standard of conduct was expected
of forces deployed with UNEF, but there was no indication given of how personnel in
Egypt were meant to know about local customs or laws, or how to function in a
multinational peacekeeping force. The ad hoc nature of UNEF, and its reliance on
conventional national military forces to supply the bulk of its force, meant that no
training beyond that conducted for national military service was initially given to soldiers
serving in-theatre on UN operations. It was believed that, given the nature of the tasks
required on the ground, military training would be sufficient to carry out the job required
of UN multinational forces. For Canadian troops, this meant a reliance on their “soldiers
first” training for peacekeeping duties. But what exactly did this training entail? An
examination of the foundational training arrangements for the post-Second World War
Canadian military could shed light on the level of preparedness, and nature of skills,
possessed by Canadian soldiers deployed to early peacekeeping operations.
With the reorganization of the Canadian military after the Second World War,
changes were made to the training program of the newly professional Canadian Armed
Forces. The training of Regular Army troops, Reserve Army, and militia improved after
1945 because of the continuation (and presumed improvement) of pre-war summer
training camps, new educational opportunities for officers of the Regular and Reserve
Armies, and the re-opening of the Royal Military College, which had closed during the
Second World War. The Department of National Defence introduced the Regular
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Officers Training Plan, and put emphasis on officer training at all levels to provide
leadership skills to personnel.

94

The staff training effort culminated in the opening of a

National Defence College in January of 1949 for the advanced study of war in relation to
government, politics, and economics. As historian George F.G. Stanley stated,
[t]he object of this institution was to bring together specially selected senior
officers of the three services and officials of the Civil Service for the purpose of
studying the multifarious aspects of defence policy, in order to facilitate better
understanding both by the services and the government of the problems and role
95
of each in war.
Institutionalized academic training was implemented to better acquaint leadership
elements within the military establishment with the tenets of defence policy, but for the
rank and file it meant that little changed.
General military training in the immediate post-Second World War Canadian
armed forces aimed at producing combat-capable, self-sufficient, and competent soldiers
who were comfortable with leadership roles and decision-making, even at junior levels.
The assumption was that this training was sufficient for duty with UNEF and other early
peacekeeping operations, as many, although not all, of the tasks required of members of
the UN Force were ones for which they were trained by the Canadian military.
Typical UNEF duties throughout its ten-year lifespan included patrolling buffer
zones between combatants; investigating, reporting, and protesting violations of buffer
zones and ceasefires; maintaining law and order in some areas, in cooperation with local
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authorities; guard duties for “vulnerable installations during transition periods;
administrative tasks during the withdrawal of forces periods (for example, security and
protection of public and private property), administrative functions with respect to public
services, utilities, provisioning of local populations with food; limited powers of
detention; mine-clearing; arranging for and supervising exchanges of prisoners and
detainees; and generally maintaining the cease-fire.”

96

While some of these tasks, such

as patrolling, reporting, guarding, prisoner exchange, and mine-clearing, are typical
military duties and it can be expected that members of the Canadian contingent would
have been trained to carry them out, some fall outside of the military purview, and may
have been unusual tasks for military forces to undertake. Nonetheless, Canadian soldiers
were typically deployed without additional training for these tasks. In particular, the lack
of cultural sensitivity training or language training was likely a handicap during the
tenure of UNEF in the Middle East.
This approach to training for early missions in the Middle East persisted over
time, and the belief that Canadian military training met the requirements of early
peacekeeping was prevalent among Canadian soldiers deployed to these operations.
Retired Major George Mitchell recalled that other than one briefing at UN headquarters
in New York he received no special training for his deployment as a Military Observer
with UNTSO in October 1957. He mainly relied on the experience he had gained during
six years of service during the Second World War. Mitchell served as a Military
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Observer with UNTSO until June 1958, when he became an Operations Officer with the
United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL)

97

until September 1958. He then

returned to UNTSO to serve as an Operations Officer until January 1959. Mitchell
pointed out that his job was to observe and report, and that although the military
observers rarely carried their pistols while carrying out their duties, he felt no conflict in
regard to his role as a peacekeeper and believed that his training as a soldier was an asset
to peacekeeping. He did not, however, feel fully prepared for the living conditions intheatre. Mitchell did feel prepared to fulfill his duties and did not experience a period of
re-adjustment on his return to Canada.
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The experience of a Canadian soldier in UNEF was much the same. Retired
Master Warrant Officer Tom Deloughery served as a driver and mechanic in UNEF from
January 1959 to February 1960. Deloughery did not receive any specialized training
prior to joining the peacekeeping mission other than some weapons refresher training,
but, as he pointed out, his cohort contained personnel who had served with UNEF in
1956 and were able to explain the situation that existed in-theatre, and how to deal with
the climate.
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Deloughery felt that the rules of engagement were appropriate for his role

as an observer. He described these rules as: “you couldn’t use a weapon unless fired
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UNOGIL operated from June to December 1958.

Major George Mitchell, retired, completed survey returned to author (Ottawa, Ontario: University of
Western Ontario, 2 July 2003).
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This type of informal, incidental instruction was common to the Canadian peacekeeping experience. It
would be formalized in the 1990s when it was incorporated in new types of peacekeeping training, as will
be discussed in a later chapter.
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upon; if anybody in the area was threatened you were allowed to use force. It was a UN
policy, not a Canadian policy.”

100

The only time he observed force being used was when

UNEF soldiers were preventing people “such as the Bedouins” from crossing the border
into Israel. He also knew of one skirmish involving an ambush of UNEF troops by
Egyptian soldiers, but he was not personally involved. Despite the restrictions on the use
of force, Deloughery believed that a military presence was necessary to quell the Suez
Crisis because “we stopped a lot of maybe trouble or little brush fires that could have
101

happened…besides, we did a lot of really, really good humanitarian things.”

These

humanitarian tasks often focused around the medical care of those injured by landmines,
as there were “mines all over the place, and the Bedouins, locals, desert people,
especially the children, they had a habit of playing with mines, or getting in the
minefields, and they’d come to us … you could see them coming for miles, they’d come
in and we’d carry the medic with us on every patrol and we did a lot of good, we saved a
lot of lives actually.”
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From Deloughery’s description of his day-to-day activities, it is clear that his
military training was likely sufficient for the types of tasks that were required in early
peacekeeping missions. It was hard, manual work, which involved patrolling long
stretches of desert, driving between two outposts, and spending a week or ten days at
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Master Warrant Officer Tom Deloughery, retired, interview by author (Petawawa, Ontario: University
of Western Ontario, 23 June 2003), tape recording.
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each site. Everything had to be done by hand, including maintenance and cleanup, with
only five days at base camp between patrols. The rough living involved in early
peacekeeping, which included being outfitted with Second World War-era Bren guns,
eating hard rations, dealing with ancient vehicles that constantly broke down, and the
lack of sleeping bags, meant that peacekeepers needed to rely on their military training to
survive. They also, where basic necessities were concerned, sometimes had to be selfsufficient. According to Deloughery, most Canadians bought their own sleeping bags
with them because the nights got cold and the Canadian military only supplied blankets
and a poncho. Deloughery was convinced that civilians could not have been sent to do
this job because “we weren’t observers, we were peacekeepers and we had to respond,”
and that the peacekeepers in UNEF made a difference in the larger conflict and to the
local population. Yet many years later he regarded his peacekeeping experience as “a
waste of a year of my life” in that “it was gone and we just lived in the desert, it was
hard, it was really hard, just it being so long being away from Canada.”
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Upon his return to Canada, Deloughery was provided with ninety days of leave
and no other support to re-integrate into Canadian society. Although he recalled that
“nobody [in his rotation] had any trouble” coping with the emotional impact of
peacekeeping duty, he also alluded to the fact that he struggled with the death of one
colleague and the serious wounding of another by a landmine while in the Suez Canal
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zone.

The lack of support for repatriated peacekeeping veterans highlighted the status

of peacekeeping as a new activity that was being treated as no different from warfighting. No additional training, equipment, or support was provided to those deployed
with peacekeeping forces in the 1950s.
In recalling their peacekeeping experiences, Mitchell and Deloughery agreed that
Canadians made good peacekeepers because, they asserted, Canadians do not pre-judge
people and Canadians are compassionate. If there is a mythology of Canadian
peacekeeping, this is the heart of it. It is a mythology that seemingly has been
internalized by many Canadian peacekeepers, as well as civilians, over the duration of
Canada’s participation in international peacekeeping. Mitchell and Deloughery believed
that their military training served them well, and that any shortfall in training was made
up for by their characters as Canadians.
Canadians wanted to believe that peacekeeping was a particularly Canadian
endeavour, invented by Lester B. Pearson, initially carried out by General Burns, and
adopted by Canadians as their internationalist activity of choice. As Norman Hillmer
wrote, Pearson’s
1957 Nobel Peace Prize became a national talisman, contributing to a
peacekeeping momentum which no politician could or wanted to ignore.
Peacekeeping was impossible to resist, fitting the government’s internationalist
objectives and appealing to a public anxious to believe that Canada could be the
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world’s conscience, untainted by power politics and considerations of narrow
105
self-interests.
Canadian participation in peacekeeping seemed inevitable, and accumulated experience
over decades made Canadians peacekeepers par excellence, at least in their own
estimation. But Canadian soldiers were not always naturals in the role, any more than a
soldier of any other nation was, and Canadian soldiers faced the same challenges of
adapting his or her training and experience to fit the rigours of the ill-defined task of
peacekeeping. The first stirrings of interest in peacekeeping did not come about because
it was thought that Canadian soldiers would be particularly good at it, but rather because
it suited the aspirations of the Canadian politicians and bureaucrats who mapped out
Canada’s place in the international community that re-constituted itself in the postSecond World War era.
Yet, as historian Michael K. Carroll argued, this pragmatic reality does not detract
from the fact that “the myth bolstered by politics is not based entirely on a lie.”
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He

asserts that
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Canada’s role in the creation and execution of UNEF was essential. Only a
handful of nations were capable of providing troops with the professionalism and
technical expertise to manage the mission on the ground. Fewer still were willing
to take the necessary leap of faith with the UN. Pearson had that faith in the UN,
and he dragged the rest of the country along with him. As a result of UNEF’s
initial success, and Pearson’s Nobel Prize, Canadians came to view peacekeeping
107
as their national role.
In Carroll’s view, the competence, even in the absence of specialized training, of
Canadian soldiers in the peacekeeping role dovetailed nicely with Pearson’s conviction
that international cooperation, with peacekeeping as its by-product, was the proper path
for Canada to pursue.
After the Second World War Canadian defence and foreign policy turned from
preparation to wage war to an orientation in the direction of international cooperation as a
guarantee of collective security through organizations like the UN, NATO, and the North
American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD). The emphasis clearly shifted from
war to international cooperation as a guarantee of security. The first principles of
peacekeeping were based on this idea of cooperation, but the provision that UNEF could
only enter and operate from Egyptian territory with Egypt’s consent had serious
consequences. UNEF was unceremoniously forced to withdraw at President Nasser’s
bidding in the spring of 1967, and all troops were gone from Egyptian soil by mid-June
of that year. Despite the fact that UNEF would be re-created with UNEF II in the wake
of the Yom Kippur War in 1973, ejection from Egyptian soil in June 1967 cast doubt on
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UNEF as a successful peacekeeping endeavour, and raised the question of what
constitutes a “success” in peacekeeping terms.
Flight Lieutenant Michael Belcher, who was present when the “RCAF at 115
ATU El Arish and the Canadian Army at Raffa were given 48 hours to leave Egypt by
Col. Nasser,” recalls the chaos and uncertainty that led up to the evacuation of
peacekeeping forces and the start of the Six Day War. As Belcher busied himself with
the destruction of files, papers, code and cipher books, and classified documents,
Egyptians were pouring into the areas formerly occupied by peacekeeping forces,
“Picking the bones of our once spotless little camp clean,” as he recalled. “The word was
out! The Canadians are leaving – fast!”

108

Looting and fighting broke out in the areas

that the Canadian contingent had called home for ten years, leaving an ignominious
legacy in their wake.
UNEF had exposed some of peacekeeping’s most fatal flaws, including the
accuracy of Pearson’s requirement that peacekeeping be complemented by effective
peacemaking, and pointed the way to improvements. As one UN assessment puts it,
UNEF is a telling example of the importance of United Nations peacekeeping
forces and their limitations. Its establishment in October 1956 put an end to a
destructive war, and, for more than 10 years, it effectively maintained peace in
one of the most sensitive areas of the middle east [sic]. But in the absence of a
complementary peacemaking effort, the root cause of the conflict between Egypt
109
and Israel remained unresolved.
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Hillmer has argued that “the glow of the Nobel Peace Prize Pearson won for his Suez
initiative has tended to obscure his ideas about the way peacekeeping must operate if it
was to be successful.”

110

Compromises were made in the creation of UNEF in order to

ensure that the force existed at all. Where peacekeeping was concerned, the 1950s were
spent trying to “improvise in haste,”

111

as Lester Pearson wrote. In the final chapter of

his memoirs, he concludes that
[n]othing, I suppose, could better demonstrate than the Suez crisis the extent to
which the United Nations had remained a central factor in our foreign policy. Our
problem was, and is, one of long standing, how to bring about a creative peace
and a security which will have a strong foundation. It remained my conviction
that there could never be more than a second-best substitute for the UN in
preserving the peace. Organizations such as NATO were necessary and desirable
only because the UN was not effective as a security agency. UNEF was a step in
the right direction in putting international force behind international decision.
The birth of that force had been sudden and had been surgical. The arrangements
for the reception of the infant were rudimentary, and the midwives had no
112
precedents or genuine experience to guide them.
The United Nations was firmly embedded as a feature of Canadian foreign policy by the
close of the 1950s, and peacekeeping was designated as the vehicle through which
Canada could have a say in UN matters. The termination of the first major UN
peacekeeping operation and the creation of Canada’s longest mission, UNFICYP, in the
1960s meant that the next decade would be a decade of examination for international
peacekeeping. This occurred at both an operational and strategic level among Canadian
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and international officials, and the role of preparation and training would come to the
forefront.

139

Chapter 3
Honest Brokers and Helpful Fixers

From 1957 to the end of the 1960s, significant peacekeeping experience was
accumulated, and troop-contributing nations like Canada began to think critically about
how to improve and standardize their contributions to UN peacekeeping. This exercise
resulted in a series of reports and conferences that took place throughout the 1960s with
the aim of examining the strengths and weaknesses of peacekeeping, developing standard
operating procedures and integrated practices to guide national governments, and
improving coordination in peacekeeping ventures on an international level.
Shortly on the heels of peacekeeping’s first use, the Canadian government sought
1

a way to stop going “from crisis to crisis improvising in haste.” The “haste” is arguably
a critical component of peacekeeping because peacekeeping forces, to be their most
effective, are often required to be on the scene of a crisis on short notice, but it was
thought that the improvisational nature of these operations could be minimized through
effective planning. By the end of the 1960s, according to DND information, Canada had
participated in almost a dozen UN operations, if observer missions and the “police

1

Lester B. Pearson, quoted from 1957, in The Government of Canada, Towards a Rapid Reaction
Capability for the United Nations 1.

140

2

action” in Korea are counted. This level of activity demonstrates Canada’s early
commitment to UN efforts in the name of international stability, and the studies and
conferences that took place in the 1960s show that Canadians were interested in
improving the country’s capability and that of the UN to mount peacekeeping operations
in an effective, cost-efficient manner. Although Canada pursued solutions to
peacekeeping problems throughout its first decade of practice, the focus tended to be put
on purely military problems such as transportation, communications, equipment, and
logistics, particularly in the area of training. A primary emphasis was placed on predeployment standby arrangements, with little attention given to in-theatre concerns
beyond the military and administrative. Canada attempted to improve the chance of
success in peacekeeping operations by focusing on its capabilities to contribute to UN
peacekeeping missions while urging other nations and the UN itself to improve their
planning and organization.
The first ten years of peacekeeping was the time period during which
peacekeeping was initially popularized as a means of international conflict management.
For Canada, it had a special place in defence and external affairs because peacekeeping’s
glow emanated from Lester B. Pearson. Norman Hillmer argues that, following
Pearson’s role in the Suez Crisis and the Nobel Prize that resulted from it, Canada forged
an indelible attachment to peacekeeping that solidified over years of “practice in the
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3

art.” John English, in his biography of Pearson, argued that the UN peace force
proposed by Pearson in response to the Suez Crisis was the result of “a vision of a system
of international rules and organizations that would restrain the bandits and bullies of the
4

world more effectively than British gunboats ever had.” Canadians placed themselves
prominently in this new international system, and cultivated their reputation as
peacekeepers.
Canada seized upon peacekeeping as its emblematic international activity. In a
1974 article, Jack Granatstein argued that peacekeeping was the perfect middle-sized
responsibility for a middle power like Canada in the 1950s and 1960s, and that this
responsibility suited the desire of Canadians to distinguish themselves in the post-Second
World War world. In this “golden age” of peacekeeping, “Canadians were middlemen,
honest brokers, helpful fixers in a world where these qualities were rare. Peacekeeping
5

made us different and somehow better.” Writing in 1989, then-Chief of Defence Staff
General Paul D. Manson elaborated on Canada’s suitability to its peacekeeping role, and
he could have easily been writing about Canada in the 1960s. He argued that Canada’s
“outstanding reputation” in international peacekeeping was a function of many factors.
Manson thought that Canada was well-suited to the role, as it was a middle power
“striving to bring about effective multilateral cooperation,” and an industrialized,
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Western nation with a high standard of living and modern self-sustaining forces that
6

could field specialists in communications, logistics, and aviation on short notice. He
also noted that Canada was perceived as being sympathetic to the situation of the
7

developing world as a result of having no reputation for intervention abroad. These
factors were appealing to United Nations planners very early in peacekeeping’s history,
and Canadian officials realized that peacekeeping was an area where Canada could make
a recognizable contribution on the international stage.
No matter how brightly the enthusiasm for peacekeeping burned in the immediate
post-war period, it began to dim with the expulsion of the United Nations Emergency
Force from Egypt in 1967, and, as Granatstein asserted, continued to fade as the decades
wore on. As a result of the perceived failure of the United Nations to follow-up
peacekeeping with peacemaking, Granatstein argued, Canadians realized that
“peacekeeping was just a dirty and thankless job,” and one that strained precious military
resources.

8

Granatstein was not alone in his characterization of the 1960s as the heyday of
UN peacekeeping, followed by a period of decline. Dennis C. Jett, in Why Peacekeeping
Fails, categorizes the years 1957-1967 as the assertive period, and 1967 to 1973 as the
dormant period of peacekeeping. According to Jett, UN peacekeeping has gone through
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9

a number of ebbs and flows since. The “golden era” was not without its problems, and a
pall was cast over Canada’s peacekeeping activities by the criticism facing the UN over
the controversial mission in the Congo, the expulsion of UNEF from Egypt, the high cost
of peacekeeping, and domestic concerns such as growing Quebec nationalism which
10

demanded that the attention of the Canadian government be focused at home.

These

domestic and international concerns were part of the reason for the early evaluation of
Canada’s peacekeeping activities, and cast doubt on the characterization of the 1960s as
the “golden era” of Canadian peacekeeping.
By the close of the 1960s, more than a full decade of peacekeeping experience
provided ample cases to study, and peacekeeping’s reputation did not prevent a thorough
examination of these experiences from taking place. In the 1960s there were a series of
reports and conferences initiated by academics, the military and foreign establishments,
and private citizens that aimed to analyze Canada’s peacekeeping commitments, glean
“lessons learned” from its experiences to date, and determine how to better organize
Canada’s involvement in what is, by its very nature, an ad hoc activity. These studies
and discussions were aimed at devising ways to improve the United Nations’ capacity to
mount peacekeeping operations through changes in the way the Canadian Forces
responded to requests from the UN for peacekeepers. This was mainly done through
revised training standards, the creation of a UN Standby Battalion, and by urging the
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United Nations to improve its organizational capacity to streamline peacekeeping
operations in the name of efficiency.
Dating from the creation of UNEF, basic principles govern classical
peacekeeping. Peacekeepers are required to behave in an impartial and non-threatening
manner, and should not rely on the threat of force but on the cooperation of the parties.
The peacekeeping force is present only at the invitation of the host country, and should
11

remember that it is a guest on someone else’s soil.

Beyond these basic principles, few

things are certain in every peacekeeping operation. The geographic location, type of
conflict, size and composition of the force, and its mandate are only a few of the features
that change from mission to mission. The large number of variables in each mission is
the stuff of nightmares for national military planners. To counteract the ad hoc nature of
peacekeeping, “Canada has focused attention on three aspects of the potential UN
contribution to the peaceful settlement of disputes – national preparations for
peacekeeping, improvement of such international arrangements as existed, and the link
between peacekeeping and peaceful settlement.”

12

Two of these factors, national

preparations and the improvement of international arrangements, were very much on the
minds of Canadian planners in the 1960s.
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The impetus for the Canadian reports and conferences on peacekeeping in the
1960s came from a variety of sources, both internal and external. In some cases, Canada
was responding to a request from another troop-contributing country or an international
organization to share its expertise, and in other cases it was a Canadian government
department or university that pushed the study.

13

In all cases, the root cause was the

desire to study Canada’s peacekeeping contribution with an eye to improving its
participation. It was thought that this could be done by making it a cost-efficient and
effective international practice, and by ensuring that the troops Canada was providing
were qualified for the task at hand, whatever that would prove to be in-theatre.
Non-governmental organizations concerned with military affairs were studying
training, and the product of one such study was the 1963 World Veterans Federation
Report The Functioning of Ad Hoc United Nations Emergency Forces. This report sought
answers to basic questions about technical and operational aspects of UN peacekeeping
activities, and was notable for the input of Canadian General E.L.M. Burns, the former
commander of UNEF. The report, which was prepared by a group of military experts
who met in Paris in May 1961, sought to address issues of planning, organization, and
information-sharing, which were becoming obstacles to effective peacekeeping. The
report posed questions such as: “how well technically prepared are [United Nations

13
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emergency forces] to perform the role for which they are formed? What does their past
14

experience tell us? What are the views of their Commanders?”

The military experts

were mainly concerned with finding answers to technical problems, although they
recognized that doctrinal questions regarding the purpose and intent of peacekeeping
forces carry significant weight in a crisis situation. The importance of reaching a
political settlement was also acknowledged, but the report focused on problems to which
the military advisors could provide answers.

15

The military experts were asked to comment on questions about the planning
arrangements, structure, recruiting, training, and administration of United Nations
emergency forces. The report fails to summarize the replies to these questions, so it is
difficult to draw overall conclusions based on the individual responses. For the purpose
of this study, the comments of General Burns will be examined as he is the sole Canadian
voice in this report.
General Burns’ response to the question “What types of troops are best suited for
UN emergency forces?” illustrates the common and persistent belief in Canadian military
circles that the best trained peacekeepers were multi-purpose soldiers.

16

He supported
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the notion that “well-trained, well-disciplined infantry will be the basic element of the
force,” and he put special emphasis on the need for the force to have sufficient
transportation and communications capabilities.

17

He was not alone in this view, for, as

Major-General Carl C. van Horn, a former Commander of the UN operation in the
Congo, Opération des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC), and Chief of Staff of the United
Nations Truce Supervision Organization in the Middle East (UNTSO) said, “a force that
18

is blind is shackled.”

General Burns also thought that a force that could not use force,

or project force, except in self-defence, was fundamentally fettered. Burns advocated
giving UN forces “teeth” by allowing them to be constituted so as to have superior force
in all situations. He stated that
if the UN is sending a force to keep the peace, it should be armed and equipped,
and be sufficiently strong to do so, in spite of the opposition likely to be met. It is
of no use to send a military force unless it is allowed to use its weapons, for
specific and strictly defined purposes, of course … As police forces must be
armed and organized so as to be capable of suppressing those who would commit
criminal acts, a UN police force must be capable of deploying superior force,
sufficient to control those who would disturb the peace, with a minimum of actual
19
use of force.

with up-to-date combat skills. This view was predominant until peacekeeping disasters in the early 1990s
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The issue of the use of force and its impact on a peacekeeping mission’s effectiveness is
one that has been debated, without resolution, throughout peacekeeping’s history. It is
generally recognized that to lift restrictions on peacekeepers’ use of force would limit the
willingness of host countries to accept UN peacekeeping missions as a means of conflict
management.
The principle of use of force only in self-defence has always been contentious, but
one aspect that most of the military experts polled agreed upon was the need for
standardization in peacekeeping operations. This need for standardization was most
keenly felt in the logistical arrangements involved in moving the force from its home
base to the theatre of operations, but was also necessary for such things as equipment,
ammunition, vehicles, administration, personnel selection, and training. Standardization
would be of great benefit to advance planning, but the military experts of the World
Veterans Federation report believed this was sorely lacking.
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The concerns about

peacekeeping that were circulating in international forums like the United Nations and
the World Veterans Federation were especially relevant for Canada, which had already
established itself as a significant player in international peacekeeping. However, the
World Veterans Federation report proved to be a portent of future studies that focused on
the military problems of peacekeeping, at the expense of the activity as an organic whole.
In April 1964, the Central Command of the Canadian Army issued Central
Command Operation Instruction 64/1 United Nations Standby Battalion Group, a
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document designed to provide Canadian military contingents with instructions for any
aspect of deployment to operations in a UN force. This 6 part document covers 110
topics and includes several appendices and annexes, and is a useful example of the type
of directives being distributed to units of the Canadian Army. Central Command’s intent
was to provide guidance to maintain the designated UN Standby Battalion (at that time 1
Canadian Guards and a Supporting Increment), in recognition of the fact that the
“employment of Canadian troops as part of a United Nations Military Force demands a
21

constant state of readiness by the units designated.”

Operation Instruction 64/1 set out instructions for the General Staff Branch, the
Adjutant General Branch, and the Quartermaster General, detailing their responsibilities
in the three phases of readiness: the Standby Phase, the Warning Phase, and the
Movement Phase. The Standby Phase was the period of time from the point of
notification that a battalion was the designated UN Standby Battalion to the time that the
Battalion Group was officially warned for duty with the Canadian Army Standby
Contingent under the UN. The Warning Phase was from the date the official warning
was received until the movement of the Main Body of the contingent began. The
Movement Phase was the period during which movement of the Main Body to the theatre
of operations took place.
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The aim of this document was to lay down the arrangements to maintain 1
Canadian Guards (1 CDN GDS) Battalion Group in a high state of readiness during the
Standby period; to describe the procedures for the final preparations of the Battalion
Group after it has been warned for duty; and to outline the basic air movement plan for
the despatch of the Battalion Group to the theatre of operation.

23

The document operated

on the assumption that duty as part of a UN Military Force required a constant state of
readiness, and that this readiness could only be maintained through “continual appraisal
of the time factor involved, periodic checks and rehearsals, and the proper attitude
towards such a requirement.”

24

It was also assumed that the role of a battalion group

would be to perform “police type duties”; that the likely remoteness of the theatre of
operations would make air transportability a necessity for the Canadian Contingent; that
it was necessary that an Advance Party precede the Main Body to the theatre of
operations by approximately seven days; and finally that, after an initial period of seven
days, the United Nations would assume responsibility for re-supply of rations,
replacement of equipment, and the provision of spare parts.

25

Although coordination

with the United Nations was required in regard to the last point, the Central Command
instruction was aimed specifically at putting Canada’s house in order. It was
acknowledged that, from the time the Warning Phase began to the actual operation itself,
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there would be eventualities in peacekeeping that could not be predicted and no amount
of logistical planning could ameliorate.
One way to combat the unpredictable nature of peacekeeping was to build-in predeployment briefings and training that addressed mission-specific issues. Although this
type of preparation was not often implemented with any type of regularity, it was
explicitly stated in the Operation Instruction 64/1 that,
in addition to operation orders or instructions, and the necessary intelligence
material required for the operation, other briefings by any advisor from the
Department of External Affairs may be given to all ranks. Such a briefing may
include:
a. Local Customs, climate, terrain and health hazards,
b. Up to date political intelligence,
c. Relevant economic factors such as currency in use, rate of exchange, etc.,
d. Welfare and recreational facilities,
26
e. Other known points of interest.
A noteworthy word in this section is “may.” It appears that mission-specific training was
not carried out in a uniform fashion, but only if the commanding officers thought it was
necessary or useful. The same attitude is taken in regard to pre-deployment and intheatre training. There are provisions for pre-deployment Battalion Group level training
using supplies held in stock for the UN Standby Commitment, but only if it does not
compromise the battalion’s state of readiness. This may seem contradictory, but Central
Command’s main concern seemed to be that the Canadian contingent be ready to enter
the Movement Phase no later than one week after receiving its warning order. The
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Advance Party was expected to be ready to deploy within ninety-six hours, so the time
available for refresher training was limited.
The main focus of pre-deployment training was the Movement Phase; in other
words getting the troops to the airport with all their gear.

27

In reality, this probably

meant that most individuals in the UN Standby Battalion were well-trained in the
procedures for the Standby, Warning and Movement Phases, and it was expected that
their traditional military training would be sufficient for the actual peacekeeping
operation. In-theatre training was allowed, but was left up to the discretion of the area
commander. Another difficulty would be encountered if the UN asked Canada to make a
commitment beyond its Standby Battalion, which was presumably the only battalion to
get any training for UN operations. If Canada’s commitment stretched beyond this one
battalion, it would be drawing on units that had no previous training for this type of
duty.

28

Although instructions and standard operating procedures for peacekeeping such as
those discussed above were developed by the early 1960s, Canadian defence planners and
peacekeeping practitioners began to realize the need for guidelines that went beyond the
basic principles of peacekeeping and basic military requirements. Peacekeeping was
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being analyzed from all angles, and it was recognized that, if the activity were to be
continued, it would need careful examination and improvements in planning for
peacekeeping would have to be devised. In a speech before the Eighteenth Session of the
United Nations, on 19 September 1963, Lester Pearson addressed the General Assembly
as Prime Minister of Canada. He applauded the work of the UN to date, but highlighted
problems in peacekeeping that ranged from political control, executive direction,
29

financial means, and administrative coordination.

He stated that

[we] felt that intervention in the Congo was a response which this organization
had to make, a duty which it could not shirk. We believe that this kind of
important, if limited, peace-keeping activity has now moved beyond the stage of
first experiment. It has become a practical necessity in the conduct of
international affairs, and should be provided for as such. A main task of our
organization, therefore, should be to strengthen and improve its capacity in this
field, learning from failures and successes of the past and seeking more effective
ways to perform this function in the future … There are tasks which are
undesirable or impossible for the UN. But there will be other situations where its
intervention will be important, and even essential, for keeping the peace, for
preventing small conflicts developing into big ones. For these, there should be
the advance international planning and preparation without which no national
30
government would think of acting.
Pearson was right. By 1964 peacekeeping was firmly entrenched in Canada’s defence
policy, whether the military liked it or not.
Early peacekeeping experience spurred national governments to analyze their role
in peacekeeping, and peacekeeping’s role in the world, and Canada was no exception.
The year 1964 was a watershed for Canadian peacekeeping. The policy dimension of
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peacekeeping in Canadian defence and external affairs was elaborated and articulated,
perhaps to make up for the lack of clear-cut policies for peacekeeping at the international
level. Historian George Stanley argues that the early 1960s marked a change in Canadian
defence orientation and attitude. Despite Canada’s acceptance of NORAD and its
continued commitment to NATO, Canada shifted from an emphasis on its two military
alliance systems towards the United Nations as the more acceptable agency for Canadian
31

participation in collective security in the 1960s.

Certainly the 1964 White Paper on Defence, produced by the new Pearson
government, put a greater emphasis on peacekeeping. It ranked peacekeeping high in the
list of defence priorities, and projected Canada’s peacekeeping’s activities as likely to
grow. Further, it stated that the nation’s diplomacy should be backed up by a flexible
military force to permit participation in collective security and peacekeeping.

32

Rod

Byers argues that the 1964 White Paper marked the high water mark of declared
government policy on peacekeeping because it acknowledged the need to integrate
foreign and defence policies, and it also set out a framework within which the
Department of National defence could undertake planning, training, equipment
acquisition, and budgetary allocations for peacekeeping.

33

This policy did not

necessarily present a departure in practice, but merely stated how Canada was going to
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deal with its peacekeeping commitment from that point into the future. The formal
statement of policy was important, because it was a first attempt to institutionalize
Canada’s approach to peacekeeping operations. The White Paper, coupled with the
unification of the armed forces in 1968, which instituted a simplified command structure,
tried to address the lag between Canadian involvement in peacekeeping operations and
the precise articulation of how peacekeeping fit into broader Canadian foreign and
defence policies.

34

It was also an attempt to give Canada the means to participate

effectively in peacekeeping by giving it the tools to organize its armed forces into the
flexible force that peacekeeping required.
By the early 1960s, Canada was already producing standard operating procedures
for UN missions, lessons learned documents, and operational instructions for the UN
Standby Battalion. The White Paper was a statement of policy supporting practices that
had been established years before. Like other nations, and like the UN itself, Canada was
taking steps to make peacekeeping a practical and organized venture, and had been doing
so since the creation of UNEF. However, Canadian planners were realizing that they had
a long way to go before Canada’s contributions to peacekeeping missions were backed by
a systematic, efficient process.
In an article published in Maclean’s in May 1964, Lester B. Pearson reiterated his
concern for the “folly” of not organizing for UN peacekeeping missions in advance. He
believed that “the initiative for advance planning should come – as it has come in the past
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– from a country like Canada, not a great power.”

35

He argued for the identification of

basic principles of action and organization, to be used for advance planning so the
“United Nations will not have to scramble and improvise” but would have contingents
“equipped, and ready to go.” Pearson further stated that a “United Nations force sent into
a danger area to keep the peace should know in advance what its responsibilities are;
what it can and cannot do, and how it should operate.”

36

Finally, he recommended that a

number of “middle powers” like Canada work out standby arrangements consistent with
the UN Charter among themselves, essentially to be an “international peace force,” with
its “contingents trained and equipped for the purpose, and operating under principles
agreed upon in advance.”

37

This force could then be used by the United Nations, should

the UN not have a force ready to carry out its decisions. To date, most arrangements for
UN peacekeeping had been done in a bilateral fashion between individual countries and
the UN. This proposal for a system outside of the UN, but at the UN’s disposal, was
novel, and would represent a marked departure from arrangements for previous missions
like that used for the operation in the Congo, which was over by 1964, and the brand-new
United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). It was against this backdrop, outside the
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purview of the UN, that military experts met in Ottawa to discuss the technical aspects of
peacekeeping.
With Pearson, the “founder” of peacekeeping, at its helm as Prime Minister,
Canada hosted a conference titled “The Meeting of Military Experts to Consider the
Technical Aspects of UN Peacekeeping Operations,” also known as the Ottawa
Conference, in November 1964. In his opening remarks of the conference, Pearson
welcomed the international participants and expressed his pleasure that this meeting,
based on a proposal he had put forward the year before at the UN General Assembly, had
come to fruition.
participants.

38

A large background document was distributed to the meeting’s

39

Pearson was not alone in his concern for advance planning at the level of national
governments in order to improve international coordination, but the Ottawa Conference
almost did not happen. In an unpublished paper, Lieutenant-Commander Doug Boot
details the complex negotiations for an international conference that grew out of
Pearson’s desire to achieve outside of the UN what apparently could not be achieved
under its auspices, and out of a casual suggestion by General Burns that there be an
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informal conference consisting of countries intending to create a standby force for UN
duty to share information and experience.

40

The idea of earmarking standby forces for UN use had been circulating for some
time, and efforts to create standby forces seemed to coalesce in early 1964. The
Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Finland) were key players due
to their April 1964 proposal for a “Scandinavian Emergency Force for UN Peace
Keeping Operations,” which would entail the following national contributions:
Sweden: 1600 all ranks, 2 battalions, 1 technical unit;
Denmark: 950 all ranks, infantry battalion, signal company, medical company,
military police unit, staff personnel;
Norway: 1250 all ranks, infantry battalion, air detachment, frigate; and
Finland: no definite undertaking yet, but probably will be about 700 all ranks,
41
infantry battalion, 10 observers.
In June 1964 Norway confirmed that it would share in the setting up of the Scandinavian
force, and that it would contribute about 1300 men recruited on a voluntary basis. The
defence minister of Norway expressed his satisfaction that Finland had also decided to
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establish a UN force and referred to similar plans in Canada, the Netherlands, Ireland and
India.

42

The Swedish government provided the Canadian government with further
information about its standby forces, indicating in June 1964 that it would receive
training in the tasks which a UN force was “likely to undertake.” Its standby force would
be “trained and equipped to fulfill patrol and guard functions in connection with the
general task of maintaining law and order.”

43

By March 1965 it had developed curricula

for a training course to commence the following spring that was intended to train
“observers” for United Nations service. The purpose of this training was to prepare
Swedish military personnel for duty as UN observers, and would address the following
topics:
1) knowledge of organization and activity of the UN;
2) knowledge of the character, terrain, and climate in which duty may be performed,
44
and the demands these may make up on the observer ;
3) knowledge of political, social, religious and other questions within the countries
in which the duties may be performed;
4) knowledge of how to manage in English for staff, liaison, and intelligence
purposes; and
5) adequate proficiency in other respects to fulfil tasks within the scope of the UN.
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This training would span fourteen days, and cover additional areas such as the history,
organization, goals, and authority of the UN; previous UN engagements; branch agencies
of the UN, and the UN department of Swedish army staff; maintenance; liaison; staffing;
intelligence; cash office; combat; physical training; and general instructions.

45

Countries without the will or capacity to field standby forces made other offers to
assist UN peacekeeping. In June 1964 the Italian government offered thirty officers with
technical training for use in UN peacekeeping.
government made a $10,000

47

46

That same month, the South Korean

contribution to UNFICYP and expressed an interest in

earmarking a standby force for the UN.

48

Other countries with the means to earmark a standby force were not always
willing, or welcome to do so. Canadian diplomats in the UK related the content of a
debate the British parliament in June 1964 about the possibility of the UK earmarking a
standby force for UN peacekeeping. The British prime minister, Sir Alec Douglas-
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Home, observed that British troops were “always earmarked in that they are trained and
at short notice … ready to be moved to any part of the world … Should we agree that the
purpose of the UN is one that we would wish to see fulfilled, we can immediately supply
the Secretary General with troops on any occasion.” When asked what objection he
would have to following the example set by Canadian and other governments of making a
certain number of troops available on call for UN service, he replied that there would not
be any difficulty in finding sufficient numbers of British troops to answer the UN’s call
but was doubtful that earmarking a British standby contingent was a “good thing.”

49

The

British government seemed reluctant to dedicate its soldiers to UN peacekeeping in
advance of knowing the particulars of any mission to which they might be sent.
Also in June 1964 the Shah of Iran announced that Iran was prepared to earmark a
detachment for UN standby service.

50

After a testy reminder on 18 June from the

Canadian Ambassador in Tehran, Paul Malone, that his telegrams regarding this offer had
gone unanswered, the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa issued a message for the
Iranian foreign minister on 24 June. This message expressed the Canadian government’s
satisfaction and pleasure at the announcement and the fact that Iran has decided to “join
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with other countries in this common endeavour.”

51

Despite the eventual warm response,

Malone felt compelled to question whether “the lack of response to the … messages
should be interpreted as disinterest in Iran’s possible participation in a United Nations
peace force or simply indifference to our efforts to promote closer co-operation by Iran
with Canada within the United Nations. Your comments will be studied with interest.”

52

Clearly the Ambassador in Tehran interpreted the delay as a rebuff of Iran’s offer. While
the offer appears to have been accepted, it may have been that the delay was caused by
Canadian and UN diplomats weighing the benefits of such a contribution.
When communicating his government’s offer of a standby battalion for UN
peacekeeping, the Iranian ambassador to the UN had also requested information from
Canada on the training and operating procedures of the Canadian Standby Battalion from
the Canadian permanent mission in New York. Other countries, such as Jamaica,
Argentina, and Italy, had also requested details of Canada’s UN standby arrangements to
help inform their own work. Personnel of the Permanent Mission of Canada to the
United Nations believed that having documented SOPs and prepared information about
the Canadian Standby Battalion, and participation in UN peacekeeping generally, would
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be beneficial to other nations and would be useful to have when approaching other
governments for contributions to a standby force.

53

The desire to produce some technical

directions for nations seeking to contribute to UN peacekeeping was another driving
factor in the creation of the Ottawa Conference.
Finland had dedicated a military unit as a UN standby force in late 1963,

54

and

turned to Canada for advice and assistance in the establishment of this organization.
Burns, a knowledgeable and respected expert in this field, was a part of the Canadian
delegation to the UN at that time and available to the Finns for consultation.

55

It was

probably a meeting of military experts like the one involved in producing the World
Veterans Federation report discussed above that General Burns had in mind when he
suggested a similar meeting be hosted by Canada to facilitate information-sharing
between countries which intended to, or had already, established standby UN forces.
General Burns’ desire for a more aggressive program of information-sharing among
nations that were peacekeeping practitioners was one of the catalysts for the 1964
conference, as was Pearson’s desire to circumvent the ineffectiveness of the UN in the
area of peacekeeping. The resulting conference was not what either man had envisioned,
but it was only the second of its kind to take place (the first having occurred in Oslo a
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short while before), and therefore can be viewed as a step forward in peacekeeping
planning and organization.
Intense negotiations lasted nearly a year and almost resulted in the cancellation of
the conference more than once, in part due to attempts by the Soviet Union to jettison the
meeting. Despite these difficulties, 62 military officers and 34 civilians from 22
countries met from 2 to 6 November 1964 to discuss the technical aspects of UN
peacekeeping.

56

Although it was not technically a United Nations conference, the

Ottawa Conference did have the blessing of the Secretary-General, who sent his
representative, Major-General Indar Jit Rikhye, to attend. The delegates were provided
with a backgrounder package that emphasized the goals of the conference and Canadian
experience in peacekeeping. The Canadian experience and advice regarding
peacekeeping once again focused on the need for a UN standby battalion that had
superior transportability and communications capabilities, but it must be kept in mind
that this meeting was a meeting of military experts to discuss military problems
associated with peacekeeping, so the discussion was fairly strictly confined.

57

The

participants were divided into three working groups to discuss a wide array of issues in
peacekeeping. Working Group 1 dealt with Operations and Training, Working Group 2
dealt with Composition, Command and Control and Liaison and Training and
Operational Problems; Working Group 2 addressed Environmental Operational
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Information and Logistical Support; and Working Group 3 addressed Personnel
Administration, Public Relations, Accounting Procedures, and Legal Status and
58

Problems.

In September of 1964, Pearson suggested that
the aim of the proposed meeting should be to review the experience of United
Nations peace-keeping operations to see what might be done to strengthen the
United Nations capacity for engaging in these operations and to enable individual
member states to prepare on a national basis for participation in such operations.
Particular emphasis would be placed on the need for a frank and confidential
discussion of the special military problems encountered in peace-keeping
operations. The exchange of views would be informal, confidential and without
59
commitment.
The intent that the conference be informal in nature was thwarted by the fact that most
military representatives were senior officers and many of the civilian attendees had
ambassadorial status.

60

While the conference resulted in many reports on specific aspects

of United Nations peacekeeping, it failed to produce a clear set of recommendations. In
fact, the final report consisted of a compilation of the reports of the working groups and
the text of the presentations from the conference. Countries like Ghana, the Netherlands,
and the United Arab Republic presented detailed proposals to the conference, which were
taken under advisement with little follow-up action. The proceedings of the working
groups detail the items discussed, but do not give a clear picture of the nature of the
discussions or what conclusions, if any, were drawn. Working Group 1, which focused
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on operational and training aspects of peacekeeping, reiterated the need for national
governments to have detailed standby arrangements in place in order to facilitate
coordination at the international level. The group expressed broad support for the need
for Standard Operating Procedures that transgressed national boundaries and perhaps
originated at the United Nations.

61

International participants were given a demonstration of how Canada organized
its forces and how it moved its forces overseas. The presentation by Colonel W.A.
Milroy, Director of Military Training, Canadian Forces Headquarters, on “The
Organization and Role of the Canadian Army to Support Peacekeeping Operations,” bore
much resemblance to Operation Instruction 64/1. It also emphasized the necessity for the
UN standby battalion to be a formed unit with superior transportation and
communications skills. In most operations, command and control of a unit was
maintained through radio communication, so emphasis on this capability, as well as other
military skills, makes sense. However, it is the lack of attention paid to extra-military
skills and capabilities that is worth noting. Colonel Milroy detailed the various stages of
pre-deployment, yet he did not discuss what happened after a unit arrived in-theatre.
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The assumption that military training would be enough to see a soldier through his duties
on a peacekeeping operation denied the fact that peacekeeping operations could be very
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different from war-fighting operations, and could require training in areas like
negotiation, mediation, indoctrination in the restrained use of force and Rules of
Engagement, thorough knowledge of the operation’s mandate and the Charter of the
United Nations, and knowledge of the chain of command and standard operating
procedures in a multinational force, to cite a few examples.
The most important conclusion of the conference was that the United Nations
itself needed to improve its planning process to set an example for national governments,
and the need for a permanent UN planning staff for peacekeeping operations was seen as
critical.

63

This was not a new idea, and the paucity of organizational capability at the UN

level had been remarked upon for several years. The lack of a military planning staff at
the UN was seen as a grave oversight by many.
In the wake of the Ottawa Conference, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping
Operations (the Committee of 22) was established by the UN General Assembly on 18
February 1965 to attempt to reach agreement on guidelines for the establishment, control,
and financing of operations, and on measures that governments might take to prepare for
such operations. Canada, as a member of the committee, had hoped that it would approve
measures of advance planning and training, but this was not to be, and the need for an
exchange of information and to organize cooperation between states about the practical
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techniques of peacekeeping remained. The Committee’s success in these areas was
64

limited.

The Ottawa Conference, coupled with the general interest in UN standby
arrangements, succeeded in generating some guiding information for troop-contributing
nations. In December 1964 DND provided a response to an Argentinian request for
information about Canada’s standby arrangements. The information provided to the
Argentinians included the following details: in addition to an Infantry Battalion Group, it
was proposed that other units such as a Reconnaissance Squadron, Engineer Troop,
Signals Troop, and Service Company be put on standby; the composition of the Special
Service Force that these units would compose was subject, at the time, of a staff study to
determine terms of reference, location, training, and other details. There was one infantry
battalion, 650 all ranks, assigned to the standby role with a supporting increment of 70 all
ranks, including signals, engineering, and administrative personnel, as well as a
contingent headquarters of 15 personnel. Royal Canadian Navy and Royal Canadian Air
Force personnel were not held in standby, but were assigned as part of a UN force as
agreed by the Government of Canada. Because standby units were selected from
components of the Regular Force, no special recruiting methods were employed.
However, in addition to the “normal” training given to Canadian Armed Forces members,
those assigned to the standby role were to receive specialized training that emphasized:
1) movement procedures, by air and sea;
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2) peacekeeping operations; and
3) exercises involving long moves by air and conduct of peacekeeping operations
under conditions simulating those faced by UN forces.
Training in movement procedures included:
1) Courses for unit key personnel;
2) Joint local training in loading and unloading procedures; and
3) Small-scale joint local exercises.
Exercises involving standby forces as a whole with RCN and/or RCAF support were to
be held annually, or as required, to test all aspects of training under conditions simulating
as closely as possible those which would likely be encountered on UN operations. No
further details were provided of the type of training in “peacekeeping operations” that the
standby battalion received, although the point was made that “[t]raining in peacekeeping
operations includes practice in the individual skills and collective methods required in aid
to the civil power.

65

It appears that the information provided to the government of

Argentina was a general description of Canada’s standby arrangements, and given the
volume of requests it is not surprising that a more detailed document was produced in
response.
In November 1965 the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs requested
that the Department of National Defence Headquarters produce a paper on the
organization and training of forces earmarked for UN peacekeeping operations to fulfill a
request received from the Jamaican representative at the UN. Discussions of a Jamaican
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standby force had begun the year before, and guiding documents were likely considered
necessary for this contingent as it was recognized during negotiations that any force
fielded by Jamaica would depend heavily on support from other participating units, as it
would not be self-sustaining.

66

The paper that resulted, Canadian Operations in Support

of the United Nations: Organization and Training of Canadian Military Forces
Earmarked for Service with the United Nations, was distributed in the spring of 1966 to
all those who had attended the Ottawa Conference. It was intended only as a “general
background paper on peacekeeping operations” and was not expected to take the place of
standard armed forces training manuals.

67

This twelve-page paper drew on the Canadian

experience to discuss the organization and training of UN observers, formed units for
peacekeeping, and the administrative and logistic problems inherent in UN operations.
The bulk of its focus, however, was on training for peacekeeping, and that training was
firmly situated in standard military training, which was not surprising given that it was
produced by the headquarters of the Canadian Armed Forces.
The study acknowledged that the needs of peacekeeping operations “cover a very
wide spectrum with all the variety provided by commitments to observer groups, limited
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war action and peace-keeping tasks.”

68

The recognized frequency of combat situations in

peacekeeping was highlighted by the paper’s argument that
the UN representative must have the military training that will equip him to act
calmly and efficiently under the warlike conditions that sometimes prevail in such
operations. Further, military units have a recognized degree of self-sufficiency
that enables them to exist under the most adverse living conditions … Moreover,
it is easier to train military units in the role of aid to civil authority or police
duties, than it is to make combat units out of police groups. For this reason, it is
Canadian policy to earmark for peace-keeping duties only personnel from our
69
Armed Forces.
This was a realization of the need for flexibility and adaptability in peacekeeping
situations, as well as an early statement of the conviction of the armed forces that, in
peacekeeping situations, military training was necessary. In fact, it was the single most
crucial ingredient, as this study conveyed the message that peacekeeping is a job only a
soldier can do, but peacekeeping is not the soldier’s only job. This paper did not mark a
great divergence from the Canadian approach to peacekeeping since 1956.
This document outlined a number of features that persisted in peacekeeping
training requirements and practices for the two decades following its release. In
discussing the standards of training for the Army (the service most frequently employed
in peacekeeping missions), Canadian Forces Headquarters asserted that
Army participation in the past on UN Operations has required a degree of
reorganization and training for the units earmarked for UN duty. However,
Canadian experience has confirmed that any regular Army combat type unit,
whether artillery, armour or infantry, has the degree of discipline, flexibility and
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know-how to be deployed on peace-keeping duty with very little additional
70
organization and training being required.
This statement could equally apply to the readiness of any unit in the air force or navy.
To train national units for UN service in 1966, it was standard practice to rely on the
sixteen weeks of basic training required of all armed forces personnel as a minimum
requirement. The Standby Battalion, which was the battalion put on notice to be ready to
deploy to a United Nations mission on short notice, needed between two and six months
of pre-deployment training. During this training these soldiers would receive refresher
courses aimed at brushing up on military skills such as signals, unarmed combat, military
engineering, security, first aid, battlecraft and fieldcraft, hygiene and sanitation, map and
compass work, and air transportability.

71

The only training recommendations discussed

in this paper were vague requirements for “peace-keeping or security operations,” and
more specific courses on theatre indoctrination, which “includes lectures as varied as
those covering UN organization and responsibilities to lectures on customs and other
background information on the countries to which the soldiers were likely to be
deployed.”
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The way out of the two to six month requirement was revealed in the statement
that “any unit of our Regular Army forces can be readied for UN service on relatively
short notice. However, it was emphasized that the degree of specialized or technical
training to be undertaken at any given time in the units of our regular forces does vary.”

73

Although the designated Standby Battalion was likely to meet the training requirements
for peacekeeping duty, any other battalion selected for duty and not given the same time
to train and prepare would only have had its particular “degree of specialized or technical
training” to fall back on. These battalions would not have met the Armed Forces’ own
74

suggested levels of training for peacekeeping duty.

Given the technical and operational focus of the Department of National Defence,
it was the role of non-governmental bodies to address the more philosophical aspects of
Canada’s role in United Nations peacekeeping. In early 1967 a conference on
peacekeeping was planned by Queen’s University and the Canadian Institute of
International Affairs. This conference, which took place in February 1967 in Kingston,
Ontario, assembled a group of academics and military and diplomatic personnel who
considered questions about Canada’s role in international affairs, and peacekeeping’s
place as an important aspect of defence policy and a consumer of the resources of
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Canada’s service organizations.

75

These issues would come under intense scrutiny with

the expulsion of UNEF in May 1967, and would be heatedly debated in the interim before
the 1968 publication of Peacekeeping: International Challenge and Canadian Response,
which was partially an account of the proceedings of the conference in Kingston.
There is no verbatim record of the proceedings of the Kingston Conference, but
David Cox provided an interpretive account of the major points of the meeting. He
summarizes the proposals for the improvement of international peacekeeping that
resulted, and here again there are few surprises. The group concluded that more effort
was required to brief military personnel on the political problems of specific
peacekeeping actions as they develop and conversely, more needed to be known about
the political situations faced by personnel in the field. Suggestions for a United Nations
staff college that would train officers from nations with interest in peacekeeping for a
period of six months were also brought forth.

76

The debate over the use of civilian police

in peacekeeping operations concluded that the role of policemen could be expanded to
assist in the maintenance of peace because, “in situations where action in support of civil
order is required, it appears that the policemen may have superior training to the soldier.
He is more skillful at detection and search, for example, at interrogation, and possibly at
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crowd control.”

77

This is in contrast to the conclusions of the 1964 Ottawa Conference,

during which the role of civilian police and their duties in peacekeeping operations were
debated by the Operations and Training Working Group. The Working Group concluded
that, while civilian police would be useful to act as liaison between UN forces and local
law enforcement, their main role should be as a complement to UN troops, not as a
78

substitute.

The Kingston Conference did not suggest that civilian police replace troops,

but envisioned a broader definition of peacekeeping that incorporated the skill set of
well-trained police officers.
The Kingston Conference also drew some conclusions about the need for advance
preparations. Cox stated that, in the past,
the improvised manner in which peacekeeping forces have been thrown together,
and the inability to cope with logistic problems on the part of an overworked and
understaffed Secretariat, have placed military personnel in situations where it has
79
been impossible for them to perform their duties adequately, or even at all.
Recommendations for improvement of this situation included the earmarking of
equipment for UN service, rather than personnel, and the compilation of Standard
Operating Procedures (SOP) accompanied by general approval for these SOPs from
participating states. The conference participants noted that “while there are problems
involved in devising SOP’s able to accommodate the variety of military styles likely to be
found in any international force, the development of SOP’s is a practical move that could
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be accomplished quickly and without undue difficulty.”

80

The development of standard

operating procedures at the national level was well underway by then, but the process of
integrating these procedures to the point that they could be applied at the international
level and used as a blueprint for peacekeeping missions by the UN and its member states
was in its infancy.
The expulsion of the United Nations Emergency Force from Egypt in the spring
of 1967 was thought by the conference to be significant because “nothing could have
brought home to Canadians more forcefully the difficult and delicate diplomacy required
of a well-qualified peacekeeper.”

81

The golden era of peacekeeping was not so perfect as

to obscure the need for intense examination of Canada’s peacekeeping practices, and the
problem of how to prepare soldiers to practice this “difficult and delicate diplomacy” had
by that time been an object of study for years. As the 1960s waned, the defence
establishment in Canada was still attempting to tackle problems of organization, training,
financing, and international cooperation in peacekeeping.
Technical and research divisions of the Department of National Defence took up
the issue of preparation for peacekeeping duty. A meeting of the Defence Research
Board and the Force Mobile Command of Army Headquarters in November 1966, which
took place at the Canadian Armament Research and Development Establishment, was the
second in a series of meetings that year designed to consider problems associated with
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peacekeeping and peace restoration.

82

The following year in November 1967 the

Defence Research Board held its Nineteenth Annual Symposium and hosted a special
half-day session on peacekeeping for its Canadian, British, and American attendees. The
intent of this session was to consider the nature of possible future UN operations and the
problems that could arise as well as the research that would be required by the scientific
83

and military components of the Department of National Defence to solve them.

The

report that resulted from the symposium reiterated the crucial importance of a speedy
deployment for peacekeeping forces to be effective, and concluded that
peacekeeping operations are likely to be required of Canada during the
foreseeable future. They will continue to be multi-national in nature and likely
pursued under the control of a senior civilian agent of the United Nations. They
will probably be lengthy and conducted amidst strange cultures and in unfamiliar
environments, where the conflict may be against the minds of men, women and
even children as well as against fighting units using the more traditional weapons
84
of warfare.
These features were present in most peacekeeping missions since the beginning of
UNEF. Ten years of study had produced little in the way of solutions, and these points
were restated to underscore the need for “continuing thought to obtaining a better
understanding of the nature of possible UN-type operations, [and] the problems that can
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be expected to arise and the research required to help solve them.”

85

The Defence

Research Board’s symposium consisted of the presentation of four papers on specific
aspects of peacekeeping, each of which attempted a new way of thinking about problems
in peacekeeping, including the force structure, command and control problems, culture
conflict in peacekeeping operations, and war-gaming in peacekeeping training.

86

One of these themes was picked up by R.J. Hill in his April 1968 report
Command and Control Problems of UN and Similar Peacekeeping Forces, which studied
command and control problems of observer and emergency forces for the Operational
Research Division, Directorate of Strategic Operational Research, Department of
National Defence. The report was produced with the hope that it might lead to
improvements in the performance of Canadian peacekeeping forces.
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Hill’s conclusions

reiterated that past peacekeeping operations should be studied to “determine the true
functions of the various kinds of Peacekeeping Force, [to] see where the greatest
command and control problems lie, and thereby determine how similar Forces might be
improved in the future.”

88

He concluded that Observer Missions are in need of the best

organizational structures if they are to fulfill a true observer function, but that Emergency
Forces also need
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Terms of Reference, in particular, [which are] adequate to serve the needs of the
Force, giving it the power to defend its own positions and enforce the UN’s rights
when necessary. Organizational structures, information services, supply facilities,
operational doctrines, and training procedures, need to be planned in advance, at
least in broad basic terms, to give each new Emergency Force a chance of
89
effective and rapid reaction in each dangerous new environment.
Even a detailed study like Hill’s draws the conclusion that further study is necessary and
that organization and cooperation is needed at the national and international levels. Few
of the studies discussed above go beyond these general recommendations to more
specific suggestions as to how problems can be remedied. Perhaps it was felt that the
larger issues had to be addressed first, but whatever the reason, it resulted in a decade of
near-stalemate in the area of improving the systems associated with peacekeeping.
Canada employed standard operating procedures for its own UN Standby
Battalion Group, and encouraged other nations to do the same. By hosting conferences
and producing reports for international audiences, it argued that thorough standby
arrangements were needed to allow a UN force to be constituted quickly and effectively.
Canada’s approach to concrete problem-solving was limited, however, to a concern with
technical and operational problems. Logistics, communications, and transportation were
the primary issues for those responsible for Canada’s standby battalion in the 1960s,
despite the explicit acknowledgement that Canadian soldiers might require skills that
went beyond their military training, and the recognition that personnel like civilian police
might have a useful part to play in peacekeeping.

89

Hill, Command and Control Problems, 33.

180

Canadian officials had even less success when it came to urging reform at the UN
level, and integrating practices among nations to facilitate international cooperation. In
1967, Lester Pearson complimented the United Nations as “a masterpiece of effective
90

improvisation and organization.”

Almost from the birth of UNEF it was apparent that

peacekeeping, if improvisational, was not a masterpiece of effectiveness. As
peacekeeping took on increasing importance in defence and foreign affairs circles, some
quarters thought that standard military training might not be enough for the practice of
peacekeeping, but certainly a foundation of military skills was a solid bedrock upon
which to build peacekeepers. Peacekeeping was treated as an offshoot of war, and was
prepared for as such, although there were attempts to marshal any accumulated
peacekeeping experience and use this knowledge to the benefit of future Canadian
deployments. In the 1960s, not long after its first deployment to UNEF during the Suez
Crisis, Canada began to think critically about how to improve its contributions to UN
peacekeeping and participated in a flurry of conferences and reports that addressed the
issue of the disorganized preparation for peacekeeping. The Canadian organizations that
spent the 1960s trying to counteract the ad hoc nature of peacekeeping by studying its
past and producing recommendations for national and international planning had mixed
results.
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Chapter 4
The Golden Age of Peacekeeping?
Running concurrently with efforts to systematize UN peacekeeping at the national and
international levels was an increase in the operational tempo of peacekeeping missions
themselves. The period from 1956 to 1974 has been identified as the “golden age” of UN
peacekeeping. Former UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations and
Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Marrack Goulding has argued that this
eighteen-year golden age gave birth to ten of the thirteen peacekeeping operations
established before the late 1980s, and that, “[o]n the whole, [these missions] succeeded
well in helping to control regional conflicts, especially in the Near East, at a time when
the Cold War made it difficult for the Security Council to take effective action to resolve
1

them.” The late 1950s was a period of intense activity and ad hoc arrangements that
surrounded the creation and first use of UN peacekeeping, and the decade that epitomized
the “golden age” of peacekeeping, the 1960s, would provide more of the same. However,
there was an effort during the 1960s to learn from accumulated peacekeeping experience
and create a standard approach to mounting peacekeeping operations in the Canadian and
UN contexts, as well as to introduce limited specialized training for peacekeeping duties.
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The 1960s was a hopeful time for United Nations peacekeeping. For many
countries, this new concept was seen as a promising way to manage international
squabbles. It was also a way to employ national militaries in peaceful pursuits and it
provided the United Nations with an activity that showed many countries how useful it
could be during the Cold War. Yet, even in this early period and despite its promising
beginnings, peacekeeping was not without its detractors and even its proponents
recognized that the UN and its member states had a long way to go before the concept of
peacekeeping was perfected and its practice ran smoothly. During the 1960s, existing
and new missions provided ample practical experience in peacekeeping for the UN and
its member states to build upon, and more importantly, gave soldiers of national
militaries field experience that employed their soldierly training but required that they
operate under rules different than those that governed war-fighting. In this decade
Canadians took part in UN operations at an unprecedented rate and mainly relied on their
military training, while incorporating rules and guiding principles that must have been
novel to armed forces more accustomed to preparation for combat.
By 1960, a few years of peacekeeping experience had been accumulated and the
UN had established some basic guiding principles for peacekeeping operations. These
principles were mainly determined during UNEF, and were developed in the vacuum left
by “constitutional and operational ambiguity” in the UN Charter as it relates to
peacekeeping. The first of these principles was the principle of consent. In the case of
UNEF, UNGA could not
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legally force the parties to that dispute to accept UNEF, nor could it authorize the
peacekeepers to use force to achieve a settlement. Instead, the General Assembly
relied on the disputants to consent to the force’s presence, without powers of
enforcement. Later, when the Security Council approved subsequent UN
peacekeeping missions during the Cold War, it typically followed this precedent
2
with passive, consensual operations.
In addition to the principle of consent, by 1960 the principle of neutrality had been
established, which dictated that “peacekeeping forces not intervene in the domestic
3

affairs of disputants or influence the outcome of a conflict.” Peacekeeping also, in
principle and practice, was meant to manage hostilities between states. The United
Nations was prohibited by its own Charter from intervening in the domestic affairs of a
state. The structure of the UN and the framing of its Charter meant that early
peacekeeping was modeled on the principles that neutral peacekeepers, likely from
countries that were not permanent members of the Security Council, could only intervene
in international (not national) disputes with the consent of the parties to that dispute.
In early Cold War Canada, the Canadian military and political leadership held fast
to the belief that the best peacekeeping force was furnished with combat-capable, multipurpose soldiers culled from the existing ranks of the Canadian armed forces. These
forces had received general purpose military training with an emphasis on basic combat
and occupational skills, and had the added advantage of requiring no revision in training
standards or practices before deployment aside from cursory pre-deployment refresher
training in military skills and perhaps some mission-specific information such as basic
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geographic information about the host country. This “soldiers first” approach gradually
changed over the succeeding decades, but the tempo was slow and the implementation
was uneven. Specialized training for peacekeeping was an anomaly in the 1960s, with
few exceptions, although there is some limited evidence that the Canadian military was
starting to concern itself with peacekeeping-specific training in the early 1960s. Ray St.
Louis recalls participating in a base-wide training exercise during his preparation for
deployment to UNEF in 1964. During this exercise each unit was called upon to roleplay as peacekeepers. Parts of the base were set up to represent different geographical
regions (for example, Egypt, Lebanon and Israel) and participants would act as
peacekeepers and belligerents. Soldiers acting as “belligerents” would agitate the
peacekeepers as much as possible, to produce the conditions frequently faced in a
4

peacekeeping situation. St. Louis’ experiences show that the Canadian armed forces did
practice some measure of training for peacekeeping, but it is difficult to determine how
widespread this was in light of the lack of documentary evidence.
UNEF became a fixture in the Middle East over the course of more than ten years
of peacekeeping. Historian Michael Carroll writes, “[c]reating camps, patrolling daily a
border fraught with land mines, planning their next leave – these were the peacekeepers’
priorities. Political questions…were inconsequential in the middle of the Sinai desert.”

5

While political questions may have seemed irrelevant to the peacekeepers of UNEF
during day to day tasks, the international political situation inevitably intruded into the
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operations of UNEF. Early in its lifespan UNEF operated with a strength of
approximately 6000 soldiers in early 1957, but by the spring of 1967 this number had
dwindled to less than 3400. From its first commander, Canadian General Burns, to its
last, Indian Major-General Indar Jit Rikhye, UNEF’s troop strength and budget were
gradually reduced so that both were at an all-time low when news came in May 1967 that
the United Arab Republic was requesting the immediate withdrawal of UNEF from the
6

Sinai.

The withdrawal of UNEF in the lead-up to the Six Day War between Egypt and
Israel raised many questions about the success of UNEF. As a measure of success, the
fact that there had been no large-scale conflict during the existence of UNEF seemed to
indicate that Pearson’s strategy for an international emergency force had worked. As
Carroll concludes, “[w]ithin the terms of its mandate, UNEF was able to achieve great
success in maintaining peace in the region for over a decade. The inescapable reality,
however, was that when confronted by determined belligerents, there was nothing the UN
7

force could do to stop the war.” When the Canadian contingent withdrew from UNEF
on 31 May 1967, they took with them UNEF’s capacity for communications, vehicle
8

repair, supply distribution, ground transportation, and airlift capabilities. The
accumulation of a decade’s worth of peacekeeping expertise was achieved on the
backbone of Canadian competency in several areas. The skills and capabilities that
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proved so crucial to UNEF’s operation had a clear grounding in traditional military skills
and training. While UNEF was a testing ground for the concept of peacekeeping, it was
the missions initiated in the 1960s that would begin to usher in an age of reconsideration
for military training for peacekeeping in Canada, as was seen in the previous chapter.
But first, there would be missions that would highlight the highly prized caliber of
Canadian military training, while providing Canadian soldiers with a taste of nontraditional scenarios that would, at times, strain their conventional military training to the
limit.
While UNEF was operating in the Middle East, two operations were mounted in
Africa that highlighted the value placed on Canadian military training by other nations.
The first new operation of the decade, Opération des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC),
and the Canadian Armed Forces Training Team in Ghana (CAFTTG) drew upon
9

Canadian military expertise to re-train national armies, but the situation in each case was
very different. ONUC, in particular, “was significant primarily because it challenged
most of these formative [peacekeeping] principles … ONUC broke all of these early
rules.”

10

When the UN created ONUC with Security Council Resolution 143 (1960) to

respond to the request from the government of the Republic of the Congo for military

9
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11

assistance from the UN , it created an “essentially domestic” operation that contravened
the UN’s prohibition against interference in the domestic affairs of a state. UN
Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld justified such interference by claiming that
international peace and security would be served by the prevention of a proxy Cold War,
in the form of a Soviet-American confrontation, from breaking out in the Congo.

12

At

the heart of the issue, as one scholar put it, was the fact that
with the dispatch of ONUC, the UN entered uncharted territory. As the crisis
wore on and it seemed as though the secessionist movement in the province of
Katanga might jeopardize the territorial integrity and viability of the new country,
the UN abandoned a passive approach to peacekeeping in favour of a more
forceful one. Through their efforts to expel foreign mercenaries from Katanga
and to prevent civil war, the peacekeepers became a party to the conflict,
13
compromising the neutrality principle.
ONUC “stretched not only the definition of peacekeeping but the UN itself” in terms of
budget, size, scope, and mandate.

14

This operation may have borne similarities to later,

more robust post-Cold War peacekeeping, but it diverged from the early standard in
many ways.
ONUC received authorization on 14 July 1960 and ceased operation on 30 June
1964. The mission cost the UN over US $400 million by its end. Its function was to
ensure the withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo; to assist the Congolese
government in maintaining law and order; to maintain the territorial integrity and political
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independence of the Congo; and to prevent civil war and remove foreign military and
paramilitary forces not under UN command.

15

This mission was the first time UN forces

were used entirely within a sovereign nation, and although it was not part of its mandate,
questions of independence and sovereignty arose. The desire of the mineral-rich
province of Katanga to secede became a focal point of the peacekeeping operation, as did
the attempted removal of all Belgian nationals in February 1961. Belgian mercenaries
16

stayed, which complicated matters for the UN at headquarters and in the field.

The unprecedented nature of ONUC, as well years of peacekeeping experience in
UNEF, led the UN to propose a training course for UN personnel in the field. On 1
September 1961, shortly before his death in a plane crash in the Congo, SecretaryGeneral Hammarskjöld shared a paper titled “Proposed United Nations Field Operations
Training” with his military advisor Major General Indar Jit Rikhye. This paper sought
approval to organize the first such training to commence on 1 December 1961.
According to this paper, there was
widespread belief that due to rotations, variations in experience and differing
United Nations practices, some special training for selected civilian and military
personnel would be a desirable measure of improving the staff work at the
Headquarters for both UNEF and ONUC. This would also provide a pool of
trained personnel for the United Nations Field Operations to meet any future
17
requirement of similar operations.”
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This two month-long training was to take place in New York, and would train chiefs,
deputies, and heads of sections at a cost of USD $64,000 per course for twenty people to
attend each course. UN Headquarters concurred that special training for civilians and
military staff was needed, as “some special grooming for duties in the field would be
helpful … It is hoped that some prior training would improve efficiency and the overall
18

standards of the United Nations Field Operations.”

The following areas of study were

identified for this course: the role of the UN; the organization and function of the UN; the
history and geography of the country where officers will serve; background on the
specific operation to which officers will be assigned; the UN system of operations; staff
training and organization; staff procedure; writing of memos, orders, estimates, letters
and cables; communications, and liaison work.

19

This course seemed aimed at training

leadership elements mainly in administrative and organizational matters, but given the
relative newness of UN peacekeeping it is not surprising that this type of training was
seen as necessary to assist in producing a smooth-running mission.
The UN was focusing on ONUC in other areas as well. ONUC was controversial
enough that the United Nations felt it necessary to issue a report, The United Nations and
the Congo: Some Salient Facts, in February 1963 to counter some of the serious and
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harsh criticism that had been leveled at the mission. The introduction to this document
stated that
[n]o major activity of the United Nations has apparently encountered so much
misunderstanding and confusion in the public mind as the United Nations
Operation in the Congo … the Operation is unique in United Nations experience
as to its purpose, size and cost. Various political cross currents have added to its
inherent complications. Beyond doubt, however, much of the misunderstandings
and confusion results … from the deliberate, planned, and well-financed activities
of the Katanga propaganda machinery, ably abetted by certain habitual detractors
of the United Nations, disseminating falsehood and distortion about the
20
Operation.
The UN sought to answer detractors who questioned why the organization was in the
Congo in the first place, how this meshed with the principle of self-determination, how
the use of force was sanctioned for a peacekeeping operation, and the all-important
question of results, among other questions. The document explained that the UN had
gone into the Congo in response to an urgent appeal from the government of the Congo,
after the Congolese army mutinied a week after the country gained independence from
Belgium on 30 June 1960, and Belgian paratroopers were deployed to protect Belgian
nationals against the wishes of the Congolese government. This situation, combined with
tribal conflicts, threats of secession, and politically and financially motivated interference
from outside of the country, meant that the country was threatened with a “complete
breakdown of authority and resultant chaos.”

20

21

The view that this situation constituted a

United Nations, The United Nations and the Congo: Some Salient Facts (New York: United Nations,
February 1963), introduction. Directorate of History and Heritage, Department of National Defence, Fond
95/7 (UN), file 80/375.
21
United Nations, The United Nations and the Congo: Some Salient Facts, 1.

191

threat to peace and security, combined with Cold War concerns, spurred the UN into
action.
The UN assembled a large team of military and civilian personnel to respond to
the complex task, and at its peak, ONUC numbered more than 20 000 military and 1300
civilian personnel.

22

The complex scope of this operation was outlined in UN Security

Council resolutions, and it included assisting the government in the restoration and
maintenance of the national unity and territorial integrity of the Congo; assisting the
government in the restoration and maintenance of law and order and protection of life and
property; protecting the country from civil war; and helping the government control and
pacify tribal conflicts. Additionally, the SC resolutions tasked ONUC with protecting the
country from external interference in internal affairs, especially through the elimination
of mercenaries; assisting the government in the development and maintenance of
essential public services; assisting the government in social and economic issues through
a wide, long-term program of training and technical assistance; the encouragement of
discussion and negotiation; avoidance of interference in internal affairs; and only using
force in self-defence.

23

According to the UN document, ONUC was able to carry out

these tasks and the overall cost of the mission was relatively low.
Within days of the creation of ONUC in mid-July 1960, five to six thousand
peacekeepers had arrived in the Congo. It was not an entirely smooth process. The
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commander of ONUC, General Carl von Horn, had little notice of when peacekeepers
were due to arrive, the equipment they would be bringing with them, or how the units
were organized. Historian Kevin Spooner argues that “the sheer size of the Congo
operation meant that the initial chaos and confusion inherent in any multinational military
24

operation was multiplied.”

Canada had decided to send a maximum of 200 signalers

from the Royal Canadian Corps of Signals, so two units, Canadian HQ and No. 57
Canadian Signals Squadron, were formed and were being readied for deployment with
immunizations and the acquisition of necessary equipment, but it was taking time to
25

prepare them for deployment.

A reconnaissance party was deployed from Canada to

determine personnel and equipment requirements, among other tasks, and it was able to
clarify UN requirements. Consultations with the ONUC commander revealed the level of
disorganization and differing expectations that existed:
ONUC required the signal squadron to provide communications between ten
mostly stationary positions throughout the Congo, instead of the eight cipher
detachments and twelve mobile wireless detachments initially approved by
Cabinet. It appeared that ground-to-air communication links were also no longer
required, as the Canadians could not discover who had made the initial request;
those concerned disclaimed any knowledge of it. This pointed to the level of
disorganization at ONUC HQ. The Canadians reported, “We are working in a
vacuum here. Info very difficult to obtain and when obtained is almost invariably
conflicting. No coordination anywhere. In summary can only say that pers
26
should be sent over ASP as they can certainly be used in many capacities.
Soldiers continued to arrive at Camp Barriefield (now McNaughton Barracks) in
Kingston, Ontario, to be processed, immunized, and trained before deployment to the
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Congo. Soldiers received “training in small arms, attended lectures in tropical disease,
27

and were briefed on conditions in the Congo.”

They were armed with weapons for self-

defence only. The first group of Canadian peacekeepers destined for the Congo left
Trenton airbase on 8 August 1960.
The main task of the Canadian contingent was to provide communications and
officers to liaise with the various headquarters of the infantry battalions that made up
ONUC. In the end over 200 signalers were employed in small detachments throughout
the Congo.

28

Canadians also provided a Food Services section and a Canadian Provost

Corps detachment. Commanding officers were often drawn from outside of the signals
service, in particular from the Royal 22e Regiment and “became important links between
district Congolese commanders, UN troops, and ONUC HQ.”

29

The ability of some

Canadian peacekeepers to operate in French was invaluable during ONUC, which may
have contributed to the fact that “for the duration of ONUC, there were almost always
more Canadians serving as officers at headquarters than there were of any other
nationality.”

30

However, most Canadian peacekeepers were white, and several spoke

French, which created tension with the Congolese who presumed that these white Frenchspeakers were Belgians. This led to some tense confrontations between the peacekeepers
and Congolese agitators, police, and military despite the fact that Canadians were not in a
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combat role in the Congo. This was just one of the challenges faced by Canadian
peacekeepers in the Congo.
According to Sean M. Maloney, ONUC forces were “generally employed as a
peacemaking force, not a peacekeeping force, though the terminology of the day did not
distinguish the differences between the two. The tasks that Maloney identifies as falling
into a “peacemaking” category include
counter-insurgency activities of a low intensity nature against various factions
opposed to centralized control from Leopoldville, while at the same time trying to
moderate the excesses of central government forces. … Multinational UN forces
used signals intelligence, Canberra light bombers, close air support, and mobile
light armoured columns to bring order in areas which could not be controlled by
31
central government forces.
In addition, Maloney points out those Congolese forces, minus their Belgian officers,
were “relatively untrained” and poorly equipped.

32

The lack of training that the

Congolese military displayed was seen as a major impediment to returning law and order
to the Congo.
The requirement that the UN undertake a massive program of economic and
technical assistance, once law and order had been restored, included a plan to train the
national army.

33

This idea, which included possible Canadian involvement in the

training of Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC) officers, had been circulating since the
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start of ONUC. Security Council Resolution 161 (1961) of 21 February changed the role
of ONUC significantly, and included a plan for the reorganization of the ANC. A later
Security Council resolution, Resolution 169 (1961) of 24 November 1961, largely
34

reiterated Resolution 161.

Amidst increasing political chaos in the Congo, Resolution

161 expressed “deep regret” at the killing of Congolese leaders and deep concern “at the
grave repercussions of these crimes and the danger of widespread civil war and
bloodshed in the Congo and the threat to international peace and security.”

35

This

resolution responded to a 12 February report of the Secretary-General’s Special
Representative that alerted the UN to a “serious civil war situation” in the Congo by
urging the UN to “take immediately all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of
civil war in the Congo, including arrangements for cease-fires, the halting of all military
operations, the prevention of clashes, and the use of force, if necessary, in the last
resort.”

36

This resolution was a game-changer on many levels: it sanctioned UN

intervention in the domestic affairs of a sovereign nation using direct language that was
new for resolutions related to the Congo. It also authorized the use of force, albeit as a
last resort.
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Resolution 161 again called for the immediate withdrawal and evacuation of all
Belgian and other foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisors not
under UN command as well as all mercenaries. It expressed a fundamental belief that the
only way to repair the general absence of rule of law and respect for human rights in the
Congo was to locate a solution “in the hands of the Congolese people themselves without
37

any interference from the outside.”

One way to do this was to remove foreign military,

paramilitary, and mercenary elements and address problems of professionalism within the
ANC and its interference with the political life of the Congo. To that end, the resolution
urged that:
Congolese armed units and personnel should be reorganized and brought under
discipline and control, and arrangements made on impartial and equitable bases to
that end and with a view to the elimination of any possibility of interference by
38
such units and personnel in the political life of the Congo.
Joseph Mobutu, as Chief of Staff of the ANC, and Mekki Abbas, the Secretary-General’s
acting special representative, were able to come to an agreement for ONUC to organize
the training of ANC officers. Mobutu had one condition – the instructors would have to
speak French and be either French or Canadian. Although no formal request had yet
come from the UN, Canadian planners engaged in “preliminary planning for a retraining
scheme.” This was partly to respond to the warning that the UN was incapable of coming
up with a rational plan for the retraining of the ANC, and if the Canadians did not come
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up with a plan themselves they might find themselves involved in a scheme that was
poorly arranged and dangerously executed. Two months later Mobutu indicated to
Canadian consul general Michel Gauvin that he was still waiting for Canadian trainers.
Ottawa was still waiting for a request from the UN, and the matter was not discussed
39

again until September 1961.

On 12 September the official request from the UN came, asking Canada to supply
“Canadian officers for training and advising duties,” specifically “qualified Frenchspeaking personnel to fill some of the eighteen officer and eleven NCO positions required
as part of its plans to reorganize the ANC.”

40

The plan to reorganize and re-train the

ANC hit several snags. DND determined that the only staff available were seven officers
already serving with ONUC, and these would have to be removed from their current
duties to provide training assistance. The opening of a training school to be located in
Kamina, Katanga, was pushed back due to the hostilities in secessionist Katanga and
Hammarskjöld’s death. In November the senior military adviser to the Congolese
government, General Iyassu, threatened to resign if the school did not open and made an
appeal to Gauvin for eleven officers, nine to staff the training school and two advisors for
the ANC. Yet again Canada expressed its inability to provide French-speaking officers to
ONUC, citing operational requirements. The question of training was yet again
postponed until 23 December, when Secretary-General U Thant made a direct request of
Prime Minister John Diefenbaker for fifteen French-speaking officers for the training of
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the Congolese army. The Canadian military was not enthusiastic about providing
numbers beyond the 38 mostly French-speaking officers already in the Congo. In late
January 1962 Cabinet debated the merits of sending additional French-speaking soldiers
and, despite the support of External Affairs for the idea, the position of DND won out and
Canada decided not to send additional officers to the Congo.

41

U Thant renewed his appeal to Diefenbaker shortly after Cabinet’s decision,
which revived talks in Canada of training support throughout February and March of
1962. The Secretary-General’s request indicated that, should Canada not provide Frenchspeaking officers, he would have no choice but to abandon the project and be forced to
inform the Congolese government that the UN could not provide its military with any
training support. The UN was now willing to take any number of Canadians available,
whether retired, inactive, or reserve, and so DND started to consider the possibility of
providing seven retired French-speaking officers to ONUC. The UN, meanwhile,
acceded to the proposition that the training school could be run by officers from a
mixture of contingents, not Canadians alone. This position was objected to by the
Congolese, who believed that Canadians were best suited due to their status as a country
that had never been a colonial power, did not have any economic or political interest in
42

Africa, and possessed good quality military schools.

Canada agreed in late 1962 to

send a Canadian to serve as the liaison and training officer with an ANC battalion,
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bringing the number of Canadians serving at ONUC HQ to fifteen.

43

DND also agreed to

send an officer at the rank of lieutenant colonel or major to be chief instructor for
movement control courses in the Congo, which was a compromise over DND’s
unwillingness to send an officer to be a military assistant to the chief of staff out of fears
that he would be used as an “office boy.”

44

It was felt that Canadians in ONUC HQ were

over-used and under-compensated, given their training and experience.
Training and reorganization of the ANC remained a priority, particularly once the
UN began to prepare for ONUC’s eventual withdrawal. In early 1963 the Greene Plan, a
proposal created by an American colonel who was sent to assess the ANC’s training
requirements, “called for a series of bilateral aid programs to train the various services
within the Congolese military, coordinated under the aegis of the United Nations.
Canada, Belgium, Italy, Norway, and Israel were asked to participate.”

45

Canada was

specifically requested to provide training for officers and communications units, and to
provide senior officers to oversee the entire training mission. Canada’s official response
was that it would only entertain requests for training assistance that came directly from
46

the secretary-general and that were supported by the Congolese government.

The

Canadians were not in favour of a direct bi-lateral relationship with the Congo for
training purposes.
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The UN faced limitations due to Resolution 1474 which disallowed the provision
of military assistance to the Congo except at the request of the secretary-general, and
some interpreted this to mean that the Congo could not seek bilateral relationships with
other countries for military assistance as long as ONUC was present in the country. The
heart of the problem was that the “ANC needed to be retrained and reorganized in order
for ONUC to be able to complete its withdrawal, but political realities ruled out both
direct, bilateral military aid and aid provided under the umbrella of the United
47

Nations.”

In the fall of 1963 the new Liberal government finally decided not to take

part in any retraining scheme. The extension of the ONUC mission to mid-1964, in
which Canada was still taking part, and a commitment of a chief of staff were given as
reasons why Canada could not contribute further resources. On 29 June 1964 DND
confirmed that, of the 109 members of the Canadian contingent left in the Congo at the
end of June, approximately half had departed three days earlier and the remaining
element was to leave the following day. DND denied the Department of External
Affairs’ request to leave a few token personnel in the Congo, and Canada assisted with
the airlift to evacuate other national contingents.

48

Upon the Canadians’ departure,

Secretary-General U Thant relayed the following message to the Government of Canada:
“In performing their unusual and demanding duties in the Congo they have been pioneers
in international peace-keeping and have written a new and most important chapter in the
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history of this art.”

49

Despite this praise, and the uncontestable fact that ONUC

challenged previous peacekeeping assumptions, the mission was not an unqualified
success.
For the duration of ONUC, the Canadian contingent was not effectual in the key
area that was identified by the UN as needing their help the most: the training of the
ANC. Major General Rikhye was military advisor to the UN Secretary General for the
Congo operations beginning in July 1960, following a two-year stint as chief of staff with
UNEF I. Rikhye, reflecting in 1990 on his experiences with ONUC, believed that the
operation was flawed from the start because it operated on several assumptions that
proved to be inaccurate. Rikhye pointed out that
there was an assumption in the resolution that the UN troops were going out there
to assist the Congolese Government. This was an assumption which included that
there would be the Congolese army, there would be the Congolese police. It was
true that they had mutinied. But there was a hope and expectation that there
would be a semblance of command and control by the Congolese Government
over their security forces and that the role of the UN would be to provide
50
technical assistance for them to use to be able to carry out the basic functions.
Rikhye also believed that the “single major factor which contributed to the lawlessness in
the country from the day we arrived until we left in June 1964 were Congolese security
forces.”

51

Rikhye argued that if not for the presence of the UN in the Congo there would
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have been a terrible tragedy. Yet the absence of functioning Congolese security forces,
combined with ill-defined UN rules of engagement that were the product of a lack of
clarification of the “right of self-defence” that governed the actions of UN peacekeepers,
meant that definitions and rules had to be “redefined and honed and redefined time after
time in order to meet new situations that we had not expected.”

52

For example, he

recollects that the UN peacekeepers had to escalate the nature of the weapons they carried
to keep pace with the escalation of weaponry used against UN troops. Initially UN troops
carried only personal weapons but once ONUC leadership was made aware that armoured
units were being employed by Colonel Mobutu’s forces, UN forces that were stationed
near Leopoldville were allowed to be equipped with anti-tank weapons. The increasing
firepower of the gendarmerie in Katanga also prompted the UN to allow UN forces to use
heavier weapons.

53

The increase in armaments did not negate the need to use force only

in self-defence, however.
Rikhye also addressed the seminal issue of training the ANC. A Moroccan
General, Deputy Force Commander Kittani, was chosen as the military advisor to the
Congolese government, and collaborated with the chief of staff of the Congolese army,
General Mobutu. With Mobutu’s cooperation, Kittani was able to instill some discipline
in the Congolese forces through training. He trained the first gendarmerie unit and the
first parachute unit. The “major part of the training that was done was largely under the
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weight of General Kittani.”

The fact that the training of Congolese forces came down,

in large part, to the work of a single person highlights the lack of importance that retraining military forces took within the scheme of ONUC’s priorities. Canada’s reticence
to become too embroiled in a retraining scheme through the dedication of skilled Frenchspeaking military trainers spoke to an underlying ambivalence toward successive UN
Security Resolutions like Resolution 169 of 24 November 1961 that reaffirmed the UN
member states’ commitment to assisting the Central Government of the Congo “in the
restoration and maintenance of law and order.”

55

Presumably lawfulness could not be

restored while roving bands of gendarmerie and foreign mercenaries were patrolling the
streets of the Congo, but the larger problem was that the country had no indigenous,
functioning military or security forces to keep the people of the Congo safe. Mobutu’s
ruthless seizure of power in 1965, and the maintenance of his dictatorship for thirty-two
years, painfully underlines this absence.
In 1963 the UN stated that ONUC was a “unique venture by a community of
nations and has taken place in a unique series of circumstances,” and that it had
“provided a very large body of experience and precedent both to the Member States and
to the Secretariat of the United Nations and to the soldiers of the national contingents
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who have served in the United Nations Force in the Congo.”

56

Although it

acknowledged that such an action could only be taken by the Member States of the UN
acting through the Security Council or General Assembly, it did assert that the “United
Nations, of course, if it is to live up to its maximum potential for service, must be ever
willing and prepared to do whatever needs to be done in the preservation of peace,
wherever and whenever the need arises.”

57

ONUC not only abandoned many past

precedents, but introduced a new type of peacekeeping – one that dealt with a country’s
internal conflict, had a wide and complex mandate, and was more flexible about the use
of force – that would serve as the model for the multi-dimensional missions of the postCold War period. The human cost of ONUC included the deaths of Hammarskjöld,
seven members of the UN Secretariat, and eight others in a plane crash; 127 officers and
men who died in action; 50 who were killed in accidents; and 133 who were wounded.
Despite the casualties and heavy price tag, ONUC, in early 1963 and later, was judged a
successful peacekeeping mission because there was no wider war over the Congo. The
question of the training of the ANC highlights two aspects of Canadian military
intervention worldwide in the 1960s: the reputed strength of the Canadian military, based
on a firm foundation of military training, and the perception of the impartiality of
Canadians as the product of a non-colonial power, which would become a hallmark of
Canada’s peacekeeping brand.
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Almost simultaneously with ONUC, Canada was pursuing a “dynamic Canadian
policy which involved maintaining a Western presence in Africa and seeking to convince
58

the developing countries that their best prospects for the future lay with the West.”

In

light of Canada’s reluctance to bear responsibility for re-training the ANC, this policy
curiously included providing training assistance to the national armies of African nations,
including the scheme known as the Canadian Armed Forces Training Team in Ghana.
There are many gaps in the story of the training teams sent to Africa in the early 1960s,
and it may seem odd that Canada undertook the training of foreign national armies at a
time when it was still getting its footing in multinational, UN-sponsored activities.
However, the “decision to establish the Canadian Armed Forces Training Team in Ghana
was indicative of Canada’s willingness to accept a responsibility to both the
59

Commonwealth and the Western World.”

This willingness to offer military training

assistance to Ghana while largely withholding it in the Congo is puzzling. Canada’s offer
of training assistance was given by then-Prime Minister John Diefenbaker in response to
a request from the President of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, at the Commonwealth
Conference of 1961. It was also offered to act as an alternative to the influence of
communist countries like the Soviet Union and China that were trying to make inroads in
the recently de-colonized countries of Africa in the 1960s.
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Lieutenant-Colonel G.D. Hunt, in his “Recollections of the Canadian Armed
Forces Training Team in Ghana, 1961-1968,” argues that the reasons Cabinet approved
the provision of a military training team to Ghana must have included the following:
Canada was a leading proponent of the need to maintain international peace and stability,
and one way to do this was to offer newly independent African nations an alternative to
Russian or Chinese influence; the benefits to meeting the modest Ghanaian request would
outweigh the commitment involved; the mission would benefit the Canadian forces by
broadening the range of experience for officers involved and bring them into contact with
areas in which new military doctrine and tactics were being developed; Canada could
contribute to the peace, order, and good government in Ghana by providing training
assistance via Canadian officers in the Military Academy and various training schools
who would emphasize a disciplined and loyal force under competent leadership; and the
possibility that Canadians would be involved directly in operations was ruled out,
although this proved difficult to ensure.

60

From the Ghanaian side, Nkrumah may have

seen the Canadian training mission as an inexpensive way to maintain and improve the
standards of his Army without invoking the spectre of neo-colonialism. These points
may explain why the Canadian government was reluctant to provide training assistance in
the Congo, as it was already involved in some measure in operations on Congolese soil
and training the ANC may have muddied the waters for peacekeepers meant to be
impartial; additionally, the misidentification of French-speaking Canadians as Belgians
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was a major stigma in the Congo, a factor that did not seem to apply to the presence of
English-speaking Canadians in the former English colony of Ghana.
The lack of information provided to the trainers deployed to Ghana, as well as
their accompanying families, highlights the lack of information and training provided to
Canadian military members deployed to foreign posts. As former infantry officer Bill
McAndrew related, “no one in Canada knew very much about Ghana, and those who
might have had some knowledge, such as the African desk at External Affairs, either
were not asked, or did not wish to enlighten the soldiery.”

61

The climate and culture

were often a shock to the Canadians. Hunt’s article largely represents the viewpoint of
officers at the rank of captain, and their experiences echo the sentiment heard elsewhere
that Canadian soldiers were valued for their willingness to lead by example, and required
little direction and managing to get a job done.
If the training efforts of the team were successful, and by any criteria they were, it
was because the Ghanaian army, from top to bottom, knew they could trust most
of us to always give them our best. … The single most important ability which a
Canadian needed to serve in Ghana if he was to gain respect and hence the
attention of the Ghanaians, was leadership by example. No one, quite correctly in
my opinion, had felt it necessary to give us any special instructions on how to act
in our capacity as trainers of Ghana’s future officers and soldiers, hence we all
62
behaved as we would have in our own regiments.
There was a desire among the Canadian trainers to see the Ghanaian soldiers succeed and
be as good as any soldier trained in Canada, and with a shortage of specialists in-country
Canadian soldiers were called upon to do it all. “No doubt Ghanaian cadets were
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surprised at first to see their platoon commander down on the monsoon slick earth
demonstrating the leopard crawl, but they soon got the idea what we could do, they could
63

do, and must, do.”

The ultimate objective was to train the Ghanaian soldiers to take

over positions of leadership. After 1965 it was Canadian policy to have Canadian
soldiers cease to hold training positions and assume staff positions, mainly at Army
Headquarters, instead. In this way the Canadians were to assist the Ghanaians in the
development of managerial, administrative, and financial expertise.

64

Arguably this shift

allowed Canadians to exert maximum influence over the entire structure of the Ghanaian
military, from field operations and the comportment of its soldiers to its structure and
administrative arrangements, but it was seen by some as the start of the decline of
Canadian influence on the Ghanaian officer corps.
Several factors brought about the end of the CAFTTG. Providing training in
Canada, instead of in a host country, was thought to be more cost-effective and less
politically-charged by the government of the time and officials at the Department of
National Defence. They believed that “the conduct of training in Canada exerts no
significant influence on the development of the assisted nation, where provision of a
training team can. The deployment of a training team is, inherently, a political act and
should be recognized as such, while offering training in Canada is not.”
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Several

factors, including reduced budgets, the stresses of the unification of the armed forces in
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the 1960s, and the high visibility of a training program that was coming to be seen as a
diversion of resources and a potential political minefield, led to the 1969 Cabinet decision
66

to phase out all military assistance to developing countries.

This was later

reconsidered, and the training mission in Ghana was allowed to limp along until its last
deployed Canadian was called back in 1982.

67

As Hunt states, “its very success in

accomplishing its missions to help keep Ghana western-oriented and to help develop the
Army as a source of internal stability has to have been one reason for downplaying the
Training Team’s very existence.”

68

In addition to UNEF, ONUC, and the training mission in Ghana, Canada
participated in other missions during the 1960s that contributed to its peacekeeping
experience. The most significant mission for Canada was The United Nations Force in
Cyprus, which was created in 1964. Four years after Cyprus gained independence from
Britain the UN intervened to put a stop to the inter-communal violence that was taking
place between the island’s majority Greek and minority Turkish populations. Canadians
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were among the first rotation into Cyprus, and although Canada removed the bulk of its
personnel in 1993 it still, according to DND information, contributes one Canadian
69

Forces member to UNFICYP headquarters.

This mission is among the most significant

of Canada’s peacekeeping contributions, if only for its longevity. Its duration and overall
stability provides an example of “classical peacekeeping.” Even though “the idea of
peacekeeping, so shinily attractive a short while before, had become deeply tarnished” by
ONUC, by March 1964 the UN was proposing to send a force to “another volatile
internal conflict” and Canada was willing, if not exactly determined, to be part of it. But
Canada did have certain conditions for participation, including Pearson’s hopes for a
political settlement and the desire that the force be multinational so as to prevent the
perception that Canada was Britain’s assistant in a colonial affair.
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Once a multilateral force acceptable to all sides had been composed, Canada sent
peacekeepers to Cyprus in early 1964. In UNFICYP’s first year, the Permanent Mission
of Canada to the United Nations, in conjunction with the UN, produced standard
operating procedures to govern the activities of the Canadian contingent in-theatre. A
confidential telegram sent on 9 April 1964 from the Canadian Permanent Mission in New
York to the Canadian Department of External Affairs detailed the Standard Operating
Procedures for the United Nations Force in Cyprus. Clearly outlined were the aims of the
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operation, peacekeeping duties, the carriage of weapons, principles of self defence, and
the procedures to follow after firing a weapon.

71

The aim of the mission was to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of
law and order and a return to normal conditions, in the name of preserving international
peace and security.

72

To do this, UNFICYP personnel were to avoid any action designed

to influence the political situation in Cyprus, and to follow orders as delivered through
the chain of command. Canadian soldiers on UN peacekeeping duty remained directly
under a Canadian commander; therefore, the orders they received, even if they came from
higher-level UN command, were funneled through a Canadian authority. These orders
had to comply with the principles upon which peacekeeping duties were to be based,
which were set out in the telegram from the Permanent Mission. They were as follows:
A. Only the minimum force necessary to achieve the objective is to be used.
B. Incidents are to be prevented and if necessary stopped by negotiation and
persuasion rather than force. The decision as to what course of action to take
normally rests at battalion commander level.
C. The Commander must act as he feels justified, at the time and under the
circumstances, always following principles A and B.
D. All members of UNFICYP must act with restraint and at all times act with
73
impartiality towards Greek and Turkish Cypriot sides.
The mission in Cyprus was governed by well-established peacekeeping principles, yet
there was no mention in the Canadian Army’s April 1964 Central Command Operation
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Instruction 64/1 United Nations Standby Battalion Group, discussed in Chapter 3, of the
need for negotiation training or indoctrination in the rules of engagement. Given the
emphasis in the telegram, and in practice, of the necessity of restraint in peacekeeping,
and that “[t]he principle of minimum force will always be applied and fire will be opened
only when all peaceful means of persuasion have failed,”

74

the fact that there is no

mention of negotiation, mediation, conflict resolution, and stress management training in
the Operation Instruction 64/1 that governed the UN Standby Battalion is noteworthy.
From the telegram discussed above, it is clear that a peacekeeper serving with UNFICYP
was expected to have superior negotiating skills and possess a measure of self-restraint,
whether naturally or through training.
The recollections of retired Lieutenant-General Philip Neatby give insight into the
early training of peacekeepers for UNFICYP. Neatby recalled that this training actually
took up very little time, and it focused on junior leadership skills because of the added
responsibilities of UNFICYP duties. Mission-specific subjects such as the geography and
military organizations of Cyprus were also taught. The key to being a good peacekeeper,
according to Neatby, was to be a responsive, disciplined soldier. He highlighted the fact
that military personnel often regarded peacekeeping as part of regular military duties and
belonging in the same category as filling sandbags, conducting drills, fighting forest fires,
and fighting wars.75
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In 1966, former Lance Corporal John O’Neil was posted to Cyprus on his first
UN tour with the fourth regiment to be deployed from Canada with UNFICYP. As a
member of the infantry, he was a section commander in charge of outposts and areas of
responsibility. In terms of pre-deployment training for this peacekeeping duty, O’Neil
recalls that he was
basically…trained for war, and I was on my first UN tour and we ended up doing
a lot of training for riot control and to control and secure different areas…We had
a lot of talk sessions, not training per se, but social sessions where we could ask
questions and … we had training in socializing with [the Greek and Turkish
Cypriots]…I had been trained for war…confrontations where you would shoot
first and ask questions later. Well, on UN peacekeeping we were taught to
negotiate long before the shooting ever started …we learned how to speak to
people and talk to people and get their confidence.76
From this evidence, it appears that the Canadian aims and principles of peacekeeping
were indeed communicated to the troops. O’Neil says he understood the Rules of
Engagement and those governing the use of force and the use of his weapon, and he
regarded the instructions regarding all of these factors as reasonable. The fact that he
never had to discharge his weapon, and indicated that he was only ordered by a senior
officer to load his normally unloaded weapon on two occasions, is evidence supporting
the idea that the instructions were appropriate to the situation.
Retired Major D.J. (Bud) Dion served on four UN tours in Cyprus between 1966
and 1986. His opinions echo those of O’Neil, in that he believed that “you require all the
skills of a soldier to be on peacekeeping duties” and that the instructions he received
regarding the use of force and the use of his weapons were reasonable given the
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circumstances of each of his peacekeeping missions. “They all boiled down to, in
essence, you cannot use force of any kind unless force is actively being employed against
you.”

77

While most peacekeepers surveyed seemed to have a clear understanding of the

Rules of Engagement and the use of force, their pre-deployment training was often
another matter. Dion remarked upon the “extensive training [and] background research”
that was conducted prior to his deployment to Cyprus, in each of the four cases. This
does not seem to have been the norm, judging from the testimony of other interview
subjects, and it highlights the uneven and sporadic nature of peacekeeping training. The
amount of training received and the subjects covered was often left up to the
commanding officer.
Upon return from his peacekeeping duties, Dion received de-briefings that were
for the purposes of gleaning “lessons learned” from the tour so that they could be passed
on to the next batch of Canadian peacekeepers.

78

This is reminiscent of a comment made

by a Korean War veteran, who recalled being grateful for the presence of Second World
War veterans in Korea because they could instruct new soldiers on the ways of war.
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The theme of passing on lessons from one generation of soldiers to the next is important.
Learning from one’s predecessors can combat the ad hoc nature of any situation, and it
obviously made a crucial contribution to the soldiers’ preparedness. In recent years, the
armed forces have employed this idea of “lessons learned” to collect information about
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peacekeeping missions, using this informal method to supplement and inform formal
peacekeeping-specific training guides.

80

Less than a year after UNFICYP was established, a paper was produced
reviewing the early “lessons learned” in UNFICYP. Major-General B.F. Macdonald
authored United Nations Force in Cyprus – A Report on Operations and Principal
Lessons Learned, with the intent of recording the lessons learned by the UN Force in
81

Cyprus “which might be of value to future operations.”

Macdonald’s work was based

on interviews and discussions with Zone and District Commanders and various staff
officers and advisors in Cyprus, and he pointed out that his work was somewhat
unfinished because he received notice in late September 1965 that he was to become
Chief Officer of the UN India/Pakistan Observer Mission, a post he held from September
1965 to March 1966. Macdonald’s report became a foreshortened version of what he
intended due to one of the vagaries of peacekeeping: a short notice deployment.
Nonetheless, his report provides valuable insight into the state of peacekeeping in 1965,
and the views of members of a multinational force and their recommendations for
improvement.
Writing from Nicosia in September 1965, he indicated his intent to “record briefly
the principal lessons learned by the UN Force in Cyprus in respect of Command, Tactical
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Operations and Administration, which might be of value for future UN Operations.”

82

His work on this “complex, evolving art” was limited to the study of military problems,
and to this end he identified four objectives for his paper: to provide a summary of the
problems which were encountered in the UNFICYP operation with an indication of the
tactics or techniques evolved to surmount these problems; to provide examples to the
“military man being assigned to peace-keeping operations for the first time” of the type
of problems which may be encountered in peace-keeping operations at the Contingent
(battalion) level and below; to provide assistance to the military planner charged with
forecasting requirements for future UN operations; and, finally, for the diplomat,
politician or civilian planner at the national or UN level, an insight into the problems
which arise for the military and an indication of areas needing improvement in overall
powers and terms of reference if UN military operations are to be viable and effective.

83

Macdonald’s study argued that there needed to be early and detailed planning, coordination, and cooperation between competent staffs in order to successfully mount a
peacekeeping operation. He identified several key areas for detailed examination in his
study, and most areas focus on issues like the use of force (which Macdonald argued was
the most difficult and complex aspect of peacekeeping, tied as it was to UNFICYP’s
mandate), freedom of movement and ability to gather information, techniques for
handling incidents, negotiation, understanding agreements, the handover process,
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command and control, staffing issues, the employment of reserves, the need for
interpreters, measures during Cypriot National Guard exercises, the UN image, searches,
incidents affecting commerce, and miscellaneous subjects that had arisen.

84

Macdonald’s practical review of problems encountered in peacekeeping
highlighted the odd mix of traditional and non-traditional military elements that were
being dealt with in-theatre during the early years of UNFICYP. Peacekeepers had to
function in a quasi-military structure that required them to carry out tasks largely military
in nature (patrols, reporting, etc.) but that also asked that they work out how to function
in a large, multi-national force that was operating under a strict mandate implemented at
an international level. Macdonald identified the use of force as particularly tricky to
manage in UNFICYP, and thought this problem was likely to extend to any future
missions: “As a rule, peace-keeping missions can be more effectively performed and the
international morality and law better served without meeting force with force. However,
in the long term it is difficult to see how a UN Force can effectively perform its mission
unless there is a clear realization of the Force’s willingness and ability to stand its
ground.”

85

This conundrum would plague generations of peacekeepers to come, as

peacekeeping became more and more volatile and individual soldiers had to make tough
decisions in the face of morally repugnant acts, all the while being required to show
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restraint in the face of situations they found unacceptable.

86

Overall, Macdonald’s study

identifies several key areas in which problems had arisen during the early stages of
UNFICYP, and he discusses the standing orders that apply to each. It is more a
descriptive document than a prescriptive one, as there are few explicit “lessons”
identified. However, it is a useful snapshot of things as they were in Cyprus in the mid1960s.
A 1989 article by Major-General J.A. MacInnis, who had just finished a stint as
the Chief of Staff/Canadian Contingent Commander of UNFICYP in June 1988,
reviewed lessons learned from his recent experiences as well as the formative 1964-1965
time period. Canada’s ability to deploy quickly was highlighted by MacInnis as key to
the early role of Canadians in Cyprus, as well as to the mission itself. In reviewing
documents related to the 1964-1965 period, he drew the following lessons learned during
UNFICYP’s earliest phase:
•

•
•
•

86

Peacekeeping operations are not particularly pleasant or rewarding from the
soldier’s point of view. The work is boring and repetitive, and yet very
demanding on the soldier.
In a situation where men must stand between highly armed, trigger-happy
fighters, a soldier’s training and a strict military discipline are essential.
The practice of using a brigade headquarters to form a Zone Headquarters is
sound.
Training for war is the best training for peace. What is required in peacekeeping
is well-trained, well-disciplined soldiers, and intelligent and flexible officers, all
accustomed to working together.

Macdonald went on to write The Military Officer and United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in
August 1966, a more complete account of his work in Cyprus and which also drew on his experience in
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•

There are no major equipment items needed (exclusively) for peacekeeping.

87

The messaging is clear, a decade after Canada first wet its toes in peacekeeping’s waters:
soldiers trained for military purposes are the best fit for peacekeeping duties, and in fact
military organization meshed well with the structure required for a UN peacekeeping
mission.
Canada’s military organization changed fundamentally in the 1960s with the
directives of the 1964 White Paper, which decreed the unification of the Canadian Armed
Forces into the Canadian Forces under a single Chief of Defence Staff. This change took
effect on 1 February 1968. Arguing that the White Paper positioned Canada as the
world’s “helpful fixer” by emphasizing the country’s diplomatic role, historian George
Stanley saw this change as necessary “if Canada was to play a truly effective role as
peace-keeper, [because] it would require a highly specialized force, with a centralized
command from which competition and inter-service rivalry were absent.”

88

The solution

for Canada, and one the armed forces could live with, was to treat peacekeeping as an
offshoot of traditional preparation for war, keeping the emphasis firmly on the production
of highly disciplined, general-purpose, combat-capable soldiers. This rationale avoided
additional questions about the financing of peacekeeping, and allowed the Canadian
Forces to maintain the status quo in the area of training and preparation. It also kept the
Canadian military combat-ready, as befitted a Western nation during the Cold War.
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In the late 1960s and 1970s the defence establishment in Canada aimed to
improve the training of individuals and units in the Canadian Forces, and to increase the
capacity of DND’s training sections to administer this training. A reorganization of the
armed forces’ training branch occurred in 1967, with the transfer of responsibility for
training functions of the Directorate of Training going to Training Command
Headquarters. The types of training mentioned in this transfer of responsibility included
language, command and staff, academic and out-service, flying, navigation, junior
89

officer, junior and senior NCO, NBCW , combat and support, technical and trades, and
common training.

90

The Report on the Study of Individual Training Organization and

Responsibilities for Men of the Canadian Armed Forces, also known as the “Dare
Report” for its Chairman, Major-General M.R. Dare, was released later in 1967 and
aimed to “examine the present situation and make such recommendations as are
necessary for the establishment of a unified individual training system for men of the
Canadian Forces.”

91

The Dare Report concluded that a central agency to coordinate

training was needed, and responsibility for training should remain in Canadian Forces
Headquarters (CFHQ). Although it pointed out that “[i]nternational training
commitments, arising from NATO, military assistance or equipment sales, are of benefit
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NBCW to nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare.
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to the Canadian Forces,” it did not discuss training for peacekeeping, as either an
obligation or benefit for the Canadian military.

92

A document from spring 1968

underlined the focus on training individual members of the forces, and reiterated that it
should be the Canadian Forces Headquarters staff that was
responsible for the effectiveness of individual training of officers and men in the
Regular Forces by ensuring that appropriate staff action is taken at CFHQ to
create policies on matters affecting individual training. Staff action implies
planning, organizing, directing, coordinating and controlling individual training
93
94
activities in consultation with TCHQ for the Chief of Defence Staff.
There is mention of training for new equipment, “non-military training and education” at
Canadian military colleges and universities, physical education and recreation, the
coordination of training taking place outside of the Canadian Forces, trades, and
language, but no mention of training for UN duties.
Military training was coming under scrutiny, and a further measure to improve
training for members of the military was the creation of an Operational Research section
under Training Command Headquarters in 1968. According to its Terms of Reference,
the primary purpose of this section was to conduct research and development aimed at
improving the capability of Training Command to carry out individual training for
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personnel of the CF.

95

The section was to fulfill a research and advisory role, and to keep

track of research done outside of the section that could be used by Training Command.
Its job was to survey training operations, identify possibilities for improvement through
research, and study problems which did not fall within the purview of other research
sections.

96

The section was rather small, with only five people assigned to its staff under
97

the Chief, Dr. J.E. Mayhood, by April 1969.

A review of Canadian Forces Headquarters’ forecasted training requirements for a
ten-year period from 1968 to 1978 paints a picture of the CF’s training priorities in this
time period. According to CFHQ Instruction VCDS 8/68, Field Force Operational
Training Fiscal Year 1969-70, CFHQ’s training aims for 1968 were to “prepare and
maintain combat ready land and tactical airforces required to meet Canada’s defence
commitments ... [and] to have all units achieve the highest standards of combat readiness
at the battalion group level.”
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This Instruction set out a number of training priorities and

their preferred sequence, indicating that Mobile Command should place emphasis on the
following: aid to civil authority with its attendant problems of crowd control,
communications and protection of property; surveillance and patrolling in close country
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for mounted and dismounted forces; training designed to develop a high degree of
efficiency between light aircraft surveillance and ground forces; battle craft and field
leadership; realistic tactical employment of weapons systems; training of combat group
and task force headquarters; and field administrative and logistics units to prepare these
elements for exercises above the battalion group level in 1970-71.

99

The subsequent

CFHQ training directive, CFHQ Instruction VCDS 10/69 Operational Training Directive
1970/71 (Revised) set out the missions, in order of priority, of Mobile Command:
a)
b)
c)
d)

National Security;
Joint Canada/US Defence of North America;
Other Collective Security Arrangements, e.g. NATO; and
100
International Peacekeeping Commitments.

In support of these mission priorities, Mobile Command’s operational training priorities
were to be a) Unit Readiness, including Northern Operations; aid to civil power;
airportability; tactical air support procedures; night operations; environmental
indoctrination training, as appropriate for designated units; and b) Individual Readiness,
including physical fitness; weapons handling; environmental skill; and chemical warfare
defence.
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The following year’s Operational Training Directive was intended to

“promulgate general policy direction for conduct of Field Force training during Fiscal
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Year 1971/2.”

102

Its Training Objective was “[t]o obtain and maintain the highest

possible level of operational readiness at the unit level. To achieve this, major exercises
should be regarded as rehearsals for related operational tasks.”

103

For example, exercises

were to be held to practice Aid of the Civil Power. Peacekeeping is discussed briefly,
with the directive that Mobile Command “shall deploy one battalion to Jamaica for
environmental training” and, in addition, “Mobile Command is authorized to conduct
104

sub-unit training in desert and jungle environments in the U.S.A.”

This environmental

training clearly anticipated deployments to hot climates such as the Middle East and
Africa, and was likely intended to prepare the armed forces for deployment to Cyprus,
among other missions.
Subsequent training forecasts and directives contained similar information to
those discussed above. The Operational Training Directive for Fiscal Year 1972/1973
emphasized training for NATO operations and the training of individual replacements for
“4 CMBG,” or 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, Canada’s contribution to NATO
forces in Europe. Again, the only mention of peacekeeping training was environmental

102

Canadian Forces Headquarters, DND, CFHQ Instruction VCDS 4/70 - Operational Training Directive
1971-2 Part 1 - General. V4980-2 (DORL 3) (Ottawa: 4 April 1970), Part I. Library and Archives Canada,
RG 24, Volume 23959, File 585-35/0-1.
103

Canadian Forces Headquarters, DND, CFHQ Instruction VCDS 4/70 - Operational Training Directive
1971-2 Part 1 – General, Part I.
104

Canadian Forces Headquarters, DND, CFHQ Instruction VCDS 4/70 - Operational Training Directive
1971-2 Part 1 – General, Part II.

225

familiarization training.

105

Mobile Command Forecast of Training, 1 Apr 74 to 31 Mar

77, dated 28 February 1973, provided an expanded list of training priorities:
a) training for operations in support of national sovereignty, including Internal
Security (IS) Operations, Control and Reconnaissance Operations, Direct
Defence Operations (DDO);
b) training for conventional operations under the threat of nuclear war;
106
c) training of reinforcements for CFE , including an Airfield Defence Battery;
d) Training for International Stability Operations;
107
e) Training an administrative support group to support ATC during world
wide relief or rescue tasks; and
108
f) Training for other commitments.
There is no explicit mention of peacekeeping training although it could obviously fall
under “other commitments.” The 19 March 1974 Forecast of Training issued by Mobile
Command covered the period from 1 April 1975 to 31 March 1978. It outlined a
proposed program of operational training for Mobile Command formations and units that
recommended annual formation-level Command Post Exercises (CPX), with a particular
focus on land/air operations such as helicopter, close-air-support, and air-transported
operations.

109

It also mandated that each Combat Group would conduct two Collective

Training Periods (CTP) annually “designed to correct weaknesses in individual skills and
110

collective field operations.”

These CTPs would focus on the sub-unit level and basic

105

Canadian Forces Headquarters, DND. CFHQ Instruction VCDS 5/71 - Operational Training Directive
1972/1973. V4980-2 (DLOTR 3), 1. Ottawa: 19 May 1971. Library and Archives Canada, RG 24, Volume
23959, File 585-35/0-1.
106
This is likely Canadian Forces in Europe.
107
This is likely Air Transport Command.
108
Mobile Command, Forecast of Training, 1 Apr 1975 – 31 Mar 1978. FMC 4980-0057 (COMD) (19
March 1974), 1. Library and Archives Canada, RG 24, Volume 23959, File 585-35/0-1.
109
Mobile Command, Forecast of Training, 1 Apr 74 – 31 Mar 77. FMC 4980-0057 (COMD) (28
February 1973), 1-2. Library and Archives Canada, RG 24, Volume 23959, File 585-35/0-1.
110

Mobile Command, Forecast of Training, 1 Apr 74 – 31 Mar 77, 2.

226

battlecraft. In addition, each Combat Group would conduct a battalion-level Field
Training Exercise each year. More specifically, this Forecast of Training set out
requirements that all units would train in winter; conduct exercises involving Control and
Surveillance Operations; hold a major study group or training war game; conduct specialto-branch training (for example, training specifically for armour, artillery, infantry,
engineers, communications, medical, logistics, and so on); and training was to be held in
Canada by other NATO countries.

111

These training forecasts and directives attempted to

anticipate the training that would be needed to prepare the Canadian Forces for
operations in the 1970s. Their emphasis seemed to be on NATO operations and domestic
security in the form of aid to the civil power, with scant mention of peacekeeping apart
from environmental training.

112

This reflected the reality that few new missions were

created during this time period, and it was still thought among military planners that
traditional combat training would adequately prepare Canadian soldiers for service in
peacekeeping theatres like Cyprus and, once again, Egypt.
Cold War considerations played a significant role in the creation of one of the few
“new” peacekeeping missions of the 1970s. The Second United Nations Emergency
Force was created in October 1973 to manage a ceasefire between Egypt and Israel in the
wake of the Yom Kippur War. Russia backed Egypt and Syria in the conflict, and the
United States sided with Israel. A ceasefire was reached and, through the intervention of
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the UN, it was agreed that a UN force would be placed between the separated sides.
Canadian Brigadier General Clayton Beattie, who was then serving as Deputy Chief of
Staff at Headquarters UNFICYP and Canadian Contingent Commander, indicated to UN
headquarters that the closest peacekeeping forces could be found in Cyprus, and that they
could be sent into immediate action for UNEF II. This was the first time that
peacekeepers from an existing mission were deployed directly to another mission in
significant numbers. Beattie was charged with getting UNFICYP contingents
(numbering 600 soldiers) on the ground for UNEF II, explaining the level of support
UNEF II could expect from UNFICYP, and obtaining a list of requirements for UNEF II.
Beattie had only 24 hours to make arrangements to move the contingents and reassign his
duties with UNFICYP in the short-term, but as he pointed out, “[p]rompt action in
UNFICYP and at every level in the peacekeeping community brought about the
establishment of the Force and Canada as a prime player.”

113

Canada’s operation in

UNEF II was codenamed OP DANACA, and it quickly reached a strength of 1100
personnel in five units, including headquarters staff and members of service, signals, air
114

transport, and administrative units.

UNEF II reached maximum strength in February 1974 when it reached 6973
personnel, with Canada providing the largest contingent of 1097 personnel. When UNEF
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II withdrew in July 1979 its strength was at 4031 personnel, with Canada contributing the
second-largest contingent of 844 people.

115

For Canadian personnel deployed from

UNFICYP or from Canada, service in UNEF II followed a familiar pattern. One former
peacekeeper who served in UNEF II from May to November 1975 explained that the
mission was “traditional” peacekeeping and that the training consisted of just over 6
weeks at Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Petawawa ensuring that his skills as a Weapons
Technician were sufficient for the mission. As he asserted, “there was almost no
peacekeeping training other than the normal confirmation of basic soldiering skills.”

116

This soldier felt that the rules of engagement and preparation were appropriate to his
tasks, as in the case of UNEF II and his later duty with the United Nations
Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights, he was placed with a
force that was essentially there to exist between warring factions and maintain a ceasefire
line. Another Canadian soldier who served with UNEF II Headquarters in 1977 indicated
that he received no pre-deployment training of any kind, but felt that his military training
117

was sufficient because the force was “acting as a buffer between belligerents.”

It

seems that, when the task was a straightforward separation of conflicting factions, these
Canadian soldiers believed that their foundation in Canadian military training was more
than sufficient to the task.
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UNEF II existed against the fixed backdrop of UNFICYP, which faced challenges
of its own in the 1970s. On 15 July 1974 the Cypriot National Guard, with guidance
from the Greek military, staged a coup d’état against the government of Cyprus, and in
retaliation against the threat of unification with mainland Greece, Turkey launched a
military operation against the island on 20 July. The UN, faced with a destabilized
NATO alliance and what it perceived as a threat to international peace and security,
enacted Security Council Resolution 353 (1974) which called on the parties to “respect
the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus,” and to agree to a
ceasefire, end foreign military intervention, enter negotiations for the restoration of peace
and constitutional government in Cyprus, and to cooperate with UNFICYP to enable it to
carry out its mandate.

118

Resolution 354 (1974) of 23 July reiterated the call for a

ceasefire in the face of continued fighting.
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Canadian Brigadier General Clay Beattie, serving as Canadian Contingent
Commander and Deputy Chief of Staff, had a front-line view of the events surrounding
the coup d’état against the Cyprus government and the subsequent invasion. His previous
experience in UNFICYP throughout the 1960s had prepared him for the “complexities of
the Cyprus problem” and the “pursuit of a mandate in a relatively unchanged political and
military environment.”
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This relative stability was shattered by the events of July 1974,
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and the peacekeepers of UNFICYP found themselves indirectly under fire once the
invasions started. Beattie recalled visiting the headquarters of the Cypriot National
Guard during the worst of the invasion, and being relieved that his driver, whom had
remained in the car outside, narrowly missed being hit by a falling Turkish bomb.

121

Many years later he recalled his service in UNFICYP as “exciting, sometimes
frustrating,” and one can only imagine that he was recalling incidents like these, which
occurred while the UN force was “negotiating cease-fires while in the middle of a war
zone and under fire.”

122

According to Beattie, the reactions of the peacekeepers on the

ground during the invasion, which at this point in time included a contingent of 950
Canadians, were threefold: they focused on survival; they focused on the cease-fire
violations; and they tried at all times to uphold the mandate of UNFICYP.

123

While the scope of UNFICYP responsibilities had always been broad and
incorporated diverse tasks ranging from administrative work related to the operations of
UNFICYP headquarters to patrolling the “Green Line,” or zone of separation along the
1964 cease-fire line that separated Greek and Turkish Cypriot factions, and employing
confrontation tactics to maintain buffer zones between factions, Beattie observed that,
“we at UNFICYP would be fully committed to trying to manage a full-scale war. This
was one task that had never been foreseen and was not within the Forces mandate.
Manpower, weapons and equipment were hardly suited to the circumstances. These
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deficiencies would have to be remedied.” Beattie and his soldiers were encouraged to
“play it by ear and do our best … I cannot think of a single soldier under my command
124

who thought of it as anything more than doing his job.”

Beattie further reflected that

the point must be made that UNFICYP found itself in a situation with which its
mandate was never intended to deal. In one day we had made the transition from
a peacekeeping force in an inter-communal situation to the role of referee and
humanitarian aid agency in the middle of a war. The speed with which this multinational organization reacted has surprised many observers and it must be
admitted that had it not been present the loss of life and property would have been
125
far, far greater than it was.
The challenges in this situation were great, not the least of which was the ability to do
force protection for UNFICYP personnel in the face of insufficient numbers of armoured
vehicles and observation posts that lacked significant defences.
The cease-fire was eventually brokered by Beattie with the Turkish Force, and the
“Green Line” zone of separation was solidified but remained hotly contested for decades.
As one Canadian peacekeeper stated, “[n]obody gives up a bloody inch of ground on the
cease-fire line. They all cheat to move a bloody inch and it’s our job to keep them
126

honest.”

Given that the buffer zone was only ten feet wide at some points, it is easy to

see how every inch could count. The war officially ended on 16 August 1974, although
cease-fire violations and conflict on a lesser scale continued throughout the remainder of
Beattie’s tenure in UNFICYP. Beattie left Cyprus in October 1976, having witnessed

124

Beattie, The Bulletproof Flag, 49.
Beattie, The Bulletproof Flag, 69.
126
Tad Szulc, “Cyprus: A Time of Reckoning,” National Geographic 184, No.1 (July 1993), 110, 114.

125

232

“death, destruction and displacement of people on a massive scale.”

127

When he

reflected upon the Canadian legacy in UNFICYP, he mused “[h]ow much carnage we
helped prevent I am not certain, but I am sure that without our presence it would have
been much greater. In many cases it was the training of the Canadians and their capacity
to stay cool under fire that won the day.”

128

His experiences led him to reflect upon any “lessons learned” from UNFICYP,
and to become an advocate for peacekeeping training in the Canadian Forces. He
asserted that “we were always training” in theatre, and thought that there was significant
room for improvement in training standards for peacekeeping and the transmission of
lessons learned from one mission to another.

129

As he wrote of his work in the

peacekeeping field after his return from deployment,
The most difficult situation I faced was associated with my feelings for the
requirement of a peacekeeping training centre for Canada. There were those who
argued that no special training was required for forces entering the field of
peacekeeping. My view was then and is today that we need to ensure that our
Forces are combat ready, physically and psychologically, and that they then be
130
given additional training to prepare them as peacekeeping forces.
Given the more than 25,000 Canadians who rotated through UNFICYP between 1962
and when Canada withdrew its contingent in 1993, UNFICYP was a key mission in the
Cold War development of the Canadian Forces, and provided ample opportunities to
identify successes and areas in need of improvement when matching the military’s skill
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sets to the demands of peacekeeping. Additionally, throughout Canada’s commitment to
UNFICYP, the Canadian Contingent “carried responsibility for the most volatile
areas.”

131

At times Canadian soldiers were greatly tested in this peacekeeping role, and

many had opinions on how suitable their training was to the task.
A Canadian Forces member deployed to UNFICYP in 1967 as a Transportation
Operator, Royal Canadian Army Service Corps with the rank of Private, noted that he
was deployed as an individual tradesman and received no special pre-deployment
training, but only a few short years later, as an Infantry Private with the PPCLI he
received at least three months of pre-deployment training when deployed as part of a
formed unit in 1971. One of the difficulties of providing bodies to UN operations has
been that it has not always been possible to deploy complete, formed units, and in those
cases where an individual is sent on his or her own because their expertise is needed intheatre or another person had to be replaced, their pre-deployment training may suffer.
This individual also explained that the training he received in preparation for his
1971 deployment was
not much different than the normal training we did to become good soldiers. The
only difference I recall was the importance that was placed on certain aspects
such as searching prisoners, checking ID’s, cordon and searches of areas, convoy
duties, making reports, ROE’s and passage of information. All of these are
important to regular soldiering but are more important when on peacekeeping
132
duties.”
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He also noted that the Rules of Engagement governing the use of force for his 1971
deployment to UNFICYP required that ammunition be carried in the pocket and that
orders allowing return fire were carried inside a sealed envelope that had to be opened
before taking action. He believed that “[w]hile I didn’t think much of [the ROEs] at the
time, the fact that you had to carry your ammo in your pocket and tear open an envelope
gave you the time to consider what the proper action should be before you did something
stupid like shoot someone when it wasn’t necessary. On all the other tours I seldom even
had a weapon.”
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ROEs in peacekeeping are often contentious, particularly during

missions with high civilian casualties and those involving war crimes, but it seems that in
the case of UNFICYP, for the most part, the ROEs were suitable to the mandate of the
mission, and the mandate itself was reasonable with the possible exception of the time
period covering the Turkish invasion.
By the 1980s there had been several Canadian rotations into Cyprus, and training
packages for the mission were better developed. One CF member who served on four
peacekeeping operations over the course of fourteen years and had begun his
peacekeeping experience as a Private deployed to UNFICYP in 1988 recalled that the
training “got incrementally more detailed with every mission. Each had at least 3-4
134

weeks …and even Cyprus had some peace support operations training prior.”
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Deployed to UNFICYP as a Platoon Commander in 1986, another CF member reflected
that his peacekeeping training “differed, but did not really involve learning new skills. I
think it could be said that what was different was the application of the basic soldiering
135

skills.”

This same soldier highlighted the differing Rules of Engagement governing

the use of force in peacekeeping versus war-fighting as a key example of this, but also
thought the ROEs were appropriate for the situation.
Major General Andrew Leslie, who served as the Civil Affairs/Humanitarian
Officer in UNFICYP in 1984, indicated that he received six weeks of pre-deployment
training including aid to civil power training for his specific tasks, but little missionspecific training, and little training that was applicable to the tasks he and others
performed in Cyprus such as cordon and search. In regard to the ROEs, he found them
“complicated and nonsensical.” In addition to training and ROE challenges he identified
a significant lack of appropriate equipment, in that they were “missing everything”
including a sufficient number of radios and heavy weapons. He also offered a variation
on a peacekeeping trope: that peacekeeping is something soldiers are not always good at,
but is something only soldiers can do, because “you don’t know when the bullets start
flying.”
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One sergeant who served in UNFICYP in 1987 observed that “Canadian

soldiers benefit from good basic training when compared to other participating
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countries.”

137

The content of that basic training has changed over time, but has generally

comprised of 12 to 16 weeks of training that covers topics including drill; first aid;
weapons handling; physical training; topography; field training; chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear defence (CBRN); force protection; Canadian Forces regulations
and orders; communication; military history; and, in the case of Officer training,
leadership and military planning.

138

During the 1970s and 1980s, when peacekeeping

had seemingly hit its stride but there was little appetite for much expansion of
peacekeeping operations at the national or international level, soldiers themselves seemed
satisfied to conduct peacekeeping duties largely through relying on their basic military
training.
Another important factor that came to light through the testimony of former
peacekeepers was the fact that the level and duration of training seems to have been
dependent on several factors beyond prescribed training standards, and that this endured
throughout UNFICYP’s lifespan. One Radio Technician recollected that he received no
extra training before deploying to UNFICYP in 1991. He cited his several years of
service with the CF as an asset that somewhat compensated for his lack of predeployment training.
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A Captain deployed as a Movements Officer to UNFICYP in
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1988 indicated that he had “zero” pre-deployment training; neither refresher military
skills training nor mission-specific training. Another Captain deployed to UNFICYP in
1983 indicated that his training before deployment consisted of training where the “focus
was on application of basic skills to the theatre. Material on local culture was cursory …
Training for Cyprus focused on probable tasks associated with manning Ops, patrols and
civil unrest. These build on basic skills with theatre specific application.”

140

His ROEs

governing use of force seemed appropriate to him, as they stated that they “emphasized
self-defence in situations involving threat-to-life. Both seemed appropriate in “classic”
peacekeeping.”
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If any conclusions can be drawn from these observations from Canadian Forces
members deployed to UNFICYP in the 1970s and 1980s, it was that generally most felt
that their military skills were well-suited to the UN mission, and that any additional
training for peacekeeping had to be built on top of the foundation of standard training that
included weapons handling, vehicles training, first aid, how to man an observation post,
and so on. For those who had peacekeeping experience in later missions, there was a
general consensus that training improved, particularly in the area of mission-specific
training, in both quality and duration. A few thought that UNFICYP could be described
as fulfilling more police that military duties, due to the emphasis on patrolling and
reporting. Several indicated that their military training on how to deal with combatants
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was a key asset. Interestingly, most thought that the ROEs were reasonable for the
situation, particularly later in the 1980s. Given that the rules governing the use of force is
one of the key differences between a war-fighting and peacekeeping situation, the
indication from former CF members that they adjusted to restrictions placed on their use
of force, especially in the face of armed combatants, is noteworthy.
UNFICYP was one of the Canada’s longest peacekeeping commitments, and the
mission helped to secure the place of peacekeeping among the duties considered to be the
domain of the Canadian Forces. The lessons learned from Cyprus had implications for
the training of future peacekeepers. As Major-General MacInnis in his 1989 article,
“Cyprus – Canada’s Perpetual Vigil” put it, “Cyprus is now therefore embedded in the
Canadian military psyche, as is our view that maintenance of peace is an appropriate role
142

for professional soldiers.”

This willingness to accept peacekeeping duty as a task that

does not detract from the Canadian Forces’ status as a professional, combat-ready
military is remarkable in light of the differing philosophies that govern peacekeeping and
war. This might be because of the armed forces’ considerable efforts to stress its military
capabilities, or perhaps it is a testament to the flexibility and superiority of Canadian
training that its soldiers can adapt so well to new circumstances.
Peacekeeping training faced intense scrutiny in the 1960s, but by the 1970s and
throughout the 1980s the enthusiasm for a peacekeeping-specific training program for the
Canadian Forces, or at least its UN Standby Battalion, had waned in the face of fiscal
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restraint. A reliance on traditional military training was largely thought to be enough.
When peacekeeping training did occur, it was sporadic and varied from unit to unit, and
could include refresher training in traditional military skills, the teaching of police-type
duties, conducting role-playing activities, and the conveyance of mission-specific
information, but there was no uniformity in the application of this training.
Soldiers themselves held differing views about how peacekeeping duty fit into
their chosen profession, and what type and amount of additional training they thought
was required. As stated earlier in this chapter, Retired Major Bud Dion, in describing the
training he went through in preparation for four missions to Cyprus between the 1960s
and 1980s, said that he received extensive training in all four cases. This training
included background research and information on the changing Rules of Engagement.
He also received refresher training in standard military skills such as driving, equipment
familiarity and riot control. Retired Sergeant Ray St. Louis similarly remembered being
involved in training exercises for peacekeeping in the early 1960s in preparation for
deployment to UNEF. He recalled a base-wide exercise in which soldiers role-played as
peacekeepers and combatants in various geographical locations.
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Yet, of the former

peacekeepers interviewed who served in UN operations prior to 1990, few recalled any
type of in-depth training for peacekeeping before the late 1980s. Although many
received some basic information about the geography and population of peacekeeping
destinations, that information was often the extent of their pre-deployment training. The

143

St. Louis, Interview by author.

240

1970s and 1980s represented something of a wasteland for documentary research on
peacekeeping training; it seems that the status quo prevailed in this area, and directions
and policies that originated in the 1960s held sway until the early 1990s.
During the Cold War, the Canadian Forces maintained the belief that the best
training to meet the demands of peacekeeping was general purpose military training with
an emphasis on basic combat and occupational skills, and that the forces should not be
trained solely for peacekeeping. The unpredictable nature of peacekeeping operations led
CF leadership to believe that soldiers could best deal with these situations by relying on
their “soldiers first” training. This posture is aptly summarized by then Chief of Defence
Staff Paul Manson, commenting in 1989:
Canadian soldiers are trained as “soldiers first”; that means that Canadian
contingents can be deployed in peacekeeping roles as integrated, self-sustaining units
capable of dealing with the widest range of potential military contingencies. The
determination to deploy only fully-trained military personnel in what can be,
potentially, a very dangerous role, bears witness to Canada’s unwillingness to put the
144
lives of those who serve in Canadian peacekeeping contingents at unnecessary risk.
Perhaps to allow that additional, specialized peacekeeping training was required would
undermine the Canadian military’s view of itself as a combat-capable, multi-purpose
force. The drastic international changes that took place in the wake of the fall of the
Berlin Wall, in particular the dramatic events that unfolded in the Former Yugoslavia,
Somalia, and Rwanda in the early 1990s, would put this “soldiers first” ethos to the test
like never before.
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Chapter 5
Re-evaluation and Revolution
Traditional peacekeeping, or Cold War-era peacekeeping, emerged as “a low-level
conflict management tool” that employed “non-threatening military activity, involving
the use of unarmed or lightly armed personnel for the purposes of truce observation or
1

interposition between parties to a cease-fire.” While this may represent an overlysimplified version of what Cold War peacekeeping was, in general it was true that most
UN peacekeeping operations took place under these conditions until 1989. With the fall
of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the context of international peacekeeping changed.
Cold War considerations and the fear of proxy Cold Wars diminished, but intra-state civil
conflict in areas formerly governed by the Soviet bloc and emerging strife in developing
nations came to present such challenges to international peace and security that the UN
believed it necessary to respond with military and humanitarian intervention on an
unprecedented scale.
Eighteen UN peacekeeping operations were created between 1948 and 1989,
according to the UN publication The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations
Peacekeeping. By contrast, there were twenty-three new UN operations initiated in the
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2

six years between 1990 and 1996. This number does not take into account “peace
support operations” undertaken under the auspices of other multinational organizations
such as NATO. With the rapid growth in the number of peacekeeping missions
worldwide, the international community began to realize that modern, multi-dimensional
peace support operations
encompass the monitoring or administration of elections; preventive deployments;
implementation of peace settlements; humanitarian, human rights and information
functions; enforcement of UN Security Council resolutions; and nation-building
3
mandates, which can include activities such as the training of police.
As peacekeeping duties became numerous and multi-faceted, there was growing concern
over the qualifications and safety of Canadian soldiers put in perilous peacekeeping
situations.
The Canadian Forces were exposed to the potential dangers of post-Cold War
peacekeeping through three key missions in the early 1990s. The experiences of
Canadian soldiers on missions in the Former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda sparked
debate on a national and international level about international peacekeeping, the soldiers
charged with carrying it out, and the training those soldiers received to perform their
duties.

2

The United Nations, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping (United Nations,
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Much of the scholarly work that addresses the differences between the roles of a
soldier and a peacekeeper comes from the discipline of sociology.4 In “Do Soldiers Hate
Peacekeeping? The Case of Preventive Diplomacy Operations in Macedonia,” Laura L.
Miller found that, of the eight former peacekeepers she interviewed, all agreed that
peacekeeping was an appropriate role for the military, and that the duties of a
peacekeeper did not detract from their status as professional soldiers.5 However, her
subjects questioned the wisdom of placing peacekeepers in ever-more hostile situations,
armed only with basic military skills that in many cases, due to the ROE, could not be
fully employed.
Similarly, a 1995 Ottawa Citizen article charged that the “[f]ocus on combat
training ignores other crucial skills.”6 Defence analyst Peter Langille accused the
Canadian Forces of endangering its own personnel, because “we expect a lot from our
soldiers in increasingly complex and dangerous United Nations peace-support operations.
Their tough job is made all the more difficult by military institutions that aren’t very
adept at initiating quick, albeit necessary, adjustments in a period of transition and rapid
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change.”7 This resistance could have disastrous results for peacekeepers who did not
have the benefit of training Langille identified as crucial to post-Cold War peacekeeping
operations. He concluded that
the requirements of peacekeeping have changed. Our officers, professional
soldiers and reserves need advance training for increasingly sophisticated UN
missions; general training in how to manage and defuse a crisis; courses in how to
conduct themselves with new partners in larger multi-dimensional missions, as
well as specialized training in their assigned roles and responsibilities …
Moreover, it can’t come as any real surprise to some military leaders that soldiers
who have been trained to react with force and to pursue victory aggressively have,
on occasion, found it difficult to adjust to the equally demanding requirements of
peaceful third-party intervention.8
In the wake of peacekeeping scandals, these are some of the areas that the Canadian
Forces focused on for improvement in peacekeeping training.
As discussed in the Introduction, Major David Last and Dr. Ken Eyre define
combat experiences as “those in which basic military skills and physical force
predominate.” Contact experiences, on the other hand, are “those in which interpersonal
communications and personal contact are dominant.”9 The conclusion of their study is
that both skill sets are important, as Canadian peacekeepers have drawn on both in equal
measure in past peacekeeping operations. The authors state that “[t]he importance of
contact skills for peacekeepers is evident from the Canadian experiences in two very
different missions in the former Yugoslavia. This should not eclipse the importance of
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basic combat skills.”10 The Canadian Forces gradually came to realize the need for both
skill sets and in the 1990s began to adapt training accordingly, particularly in light of CF
experiences in early post-Cold War peacekeeping.
The collapse of the Former Yugoslavia and the resulting civil war created a whole
new dilemma for the Canadian Forces, as CF resources were stretched to the breaking
point and Canadian soldiers were in demand and being tested as never before in their role
as Blue Berets. A major factor in this dilemma was that, as the United Nations’ Brian
Urquhart stated, the ideal peacekeeper would have to be “trained in the techniques of
peacekeeping and negotiation as well as the more bloody business of fighting.”

11

These

requirements were not new, but it was finally becoming apparent to policy makers, and
the CF, that peacekeepers required training tailored to the challenges of both classical
peacekeeping and the new multi-faceted peace support operations. In the 1990s the
peacekeeping ethic of the Canadian Forces evolved and as peacekeeping took over a
larger part of the CF resources and peacekeeping missions themselves seemingly became
more dangerous and demanding, the CF put more emphasis on peacekeeping training.
There is much evidence that skills beyond basic military and occupational skills have
always been required in peacekeeping situations, but the CF only attempted to
institutionalize the learning of such skills since the fall of the Berlin Wall.

10
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With Security Council resolution 743 (1992) the United Nations Protection Force
(UNPROFOR) came into being to manage a carefully brokered cease-fire in the former
Yugoslavia and protect its civilians. UNPROFOR’s original mandate covered only a
twelve-month period, and its elements were initially deployed to Croatia, with its
mandate later extended to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and Slovenia.
Its headquarters were established in Sarajevo, Bosnia, but later moved to Zagreb, Croatia.
UNPROFOR included military, civil affairs, civilian police, UN military observers,
public information, and administrative components and as of 20 March 1995 its strength
numbered 38,599 personnel from thirty-nine countries.

12

In December 1995 UNPROFOR was replaced by the NATO Implementation
Force (IFOR, later the Stabilization Force, or SFOR) in the wake of the signing of the
General Framework Agreements for Peace, or as it is also known the Dayton Accords.
The Dayton Accords called for the adoption of a Security Council resolution that would
request UN Member States or regional organizations to establish a military
implementation force to reinforce compliance with the provisions of the peace
agreement.

13

Canada contributed to both UNPROFOR and IFOR/SFOR. The CF’s

Operation HARMONY was created in February 1992 to protect and demilitarize three
“UN Protected Areas” in Croatia, but its mandate was soon expanded to encompass more

12
13

United Nations, The Blue Helmets, 488-489.
United Nations, The Blue Helmets, 495.

247

area and a wide variety of duties. According to DND’s statistics, “more than 2000
Canadian Forces personnel served in the Balkan region with UNPROFOR and one of its
major successor missions, the United Nations Peace Forces Headquarters (UNPF).”

14

The Canadian contribution to the NATO-led peace enforcement mission that replaced
UNPROFOR was known as Operation PALLADIUM. In total, over 40,000 CF
personnel served in the former Yugoslavia as part of UN or NATO-led operations
between 1992 and 2004.

15

The operations in the former Yugoslavia represented a

significant increase in operational tempo, and caused some CF soldiers to have grave
misgivings about their roles in light of the situations they faced in theatre.
An issue that emerged as a key concern for CF members participating in postCold War peacekeeping operations, and one that was a potential stressor during missions
that involved a dire humanitarian component, was the Rules of Engagement. Restrictions
on the use of force were commonplace in peacekeeping missions dating back to UNEF,
but the increasingly dangerous missions of the 1990s – ones in which peacekeepers had
to confront heavily armed belligerents or stand idly by in the face of gross human rights
violations – caused many CF members to chafe under restrictions on use of force as never
before, and highlighted the conflict that is sometimes inherent in adapting soldierly skills
to the task of peacekeeping.
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The issue of ROEs engages the debate over which qualifications or skills (if any)
separate a soldier from a peacekeeper, the way in which force is employed often being
cited as a key difference. That a trained soldier cannot use force as he or she is instructed
in military training has caused some to believe that the preparation of peacekeepers must
mean the “untraining” of soldiers. With the Canadian Forces’ consistent emphasis on
general military training as the best core training for peacekeeping, it is difficult to
reconcile the principle of self-defence governing the use of force with the utility of
combat training for peacekeeping missions.
On peacekeeping operations, ROEs are a soldier’s guiding principles for the use
of force. Given that mission mandates often exercise a restraining hand on the use of
force by military forces deployed for peacekeeping duties, the clarity of ROEs is
extremely important, as is a national contingent’s comfort level with and understanding
of them. Ambivalence about the ROEs was often expressed by the DND survey
respondents who were deployed to the Former Yugoslavia, in particular those who served
in UNPROFOR. One observed that the ROEs were unsuitable because “as a UN
peacekeeper you have to wait to get shot at before you can do anything.”

16

The ROEs,

like the mission itself, evolved over time, and some peacekeepers thought that the later
NATO ROEs, which allowed “deadly force when faced with perceived “real threat,” to
be more relevant for the conditions in which they served. A CF member who had been to
the Middle East on three different peacekeeping operations in the 1980s thought that the

16

Survey #15, Survey of Canadian Forces Members who had served on two or more peacekeeping
operations.
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“keep your bullets in your pockets” limitations on the use of force was not effective, and
that later ROEs such as those encountered under NATO in the Former Yugoslavia were
more realistic.

17

One former UN peacekeeper related that the ROEs governing the use of force
during his deployment to Bosnia Herzegovina in 1992-1993 were “too restrictive. No
clear mandate for the UN mission.” Despite this feeling, he “had no choice” but to obey
the ROEs because each soldier was personally accountable for their actions. As a result,
he and his fellow soldiers “had to stand by while the Serbs ethnically cleansed the village
nearby. Could not intervene. … I felt useless. If I had my way I would never wear a blue
beret again.”

18

There were divergent opinions among survey respondents as to the

appropriateness of ROEs for specific situations, but the consensus was that ROEs need to
be permissive enough to allow not only self-defence, but the protection of civilians,
particularly those facing extreme violence or human rights violations. ROEs also needed
to be flexible to reflect changing situations.
The experiences of one soldier in the former Yugoslavia furnishes evidence that
Canadian peacekeepers needed both contact and combat skills in the “new” variety of
peacekeeping operations, where little in the theatre was predictable and the limits of
one’s training were often put to the test under the most dangerous conditions. Major Dan
Drew of the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI) served in Croatia with
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UNPROFOR from March to October of 1993. For his rotation into Croatia, his unit took
reservists (the force was seventy-eight percent militia); therefore, they spent three months
prior to deployment “beat[ing] the guts out of [the reservists]” in order to toughen them
mentally and physically. It was important to “harden both their feet and their minds.”19
He explained that, “[f]irst off, soldiers are war-fighters first and foremost. The fact that
we’re excellent war-fighters makes us excellent peacekeepers.”20 Despite this, Bosnia
was “totally a new picture for all of us” because there was no established peace or ceasefire to manage, as was often the case in traditional peacekeeping. In this new
environment, combat skills were highlighted, but Drew emphasized that additional skills
such as negotiation and mediation were an invaluable asset. The restraint required by
Canadian soldiers in the former Yugoslavia, as well as the necessity of combat skills in a
civil war-torn area, meant that the training requirements for peacekeepers had grown in
proportion to the difficulty and complexity of peacekeeping operations in the 1990s.
The requirement for mental and physical toughness in peacekeeping reinforced
the need for strong combat skills. Colonel Gordon Grant, in commenting about the peace
enforcement role NATO undertook in Bosnia, stated that the aims of the peacekeepers
were to “go there and stop the atrocities, stop the ethnic cleansing and establish some
stability, however apprehensive the people were, however tenuous – NATO was to go

19

Major Daniel R. Drew, Interview by author (Ottawa, Ontario/Yellowknife, Northwest Territories:
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there with all possible force and ability to re-establish some stability in the country.”

21

This is obviously a departure from “classical peacekeeping” as practiced by the UN. As
one scholar writes, “[e]ver since the UN effectively invented armed peacekeeping in
1956, blue helmets have relied on a trinity of principles as their conceptual body armour.
The consent of the parties, the neutrality/impartiality of the peacekeepers, and their
minimum or non-use of force, was meant to keep them above the conflicts that they were
despatched to ameliorate or end.”

22

The advent of post-Cold War peace support

operations and the involvement of other multi-national organizations like NATO in the
realm of peacekeeping challenged these traditional principles of peacekeeping.
In addition to questions about new roles for peacekeepers, the issue of success in
peacekeeping and the related problem of mission creep were becoming areas of concern
for planners. Canada’s thirty-year role in Cyprus is a good example of this, as it has been
accused of being the ultimate case of “mission creep.” Was a mission successful when
the shooting stopped and a peace was maintained, or was state building also a job for
peacekeepers, as it seemed to become in the former Yugoslavia? Some, like Colonel
Kevin McLeod, who served in Cyprus in 1993 and 1994 and in Bosnia in 1995, believed

21

Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon Grant, Interview by author (Petawawa, Ontario: University of Ottawa, 23
November 1997), tape recording.
22

Dominick Donald, “Neutrality, Impartiality and UN Peacekeeping at the Beginning of the 21st Century,”
International Peacekeeping, Vol.9, No.4, (Winter 2002), 21.

252

that democracy answered this question, thus putting “election supervision” on the roster
of combat and contact skills required by peacekeepers.

23

New peacekeeping operations represented a widening scope of responsibility for
UN peacekeepers. The CF, as a professional military, believed its troops could meet the
challenge, and when speaking about the conduct of Canadian peacekeepers in their
interaction with belligerents in Bosnia, Major Drew asserted that “Canadian soldiers
reacted extremely professionally to any situation; less seasoned soldiers would have
caused an international incident.”

24

Yet international incidents have occurred, often

when intra-state conflicts with few clear-cut boundaries between combatants have
muddied the purpose of international peacekeeping, and soldiers have found themselves
less and less prepared for the realities of peace support operations. Two UN
peacekeeping operations in Africa served to underline this point to the CF, at great cost to
the organization and some of its members.
In the aftermath of the overthrow of President Siad Barre in 1991, civil war raged
in Somalia as the country descended into conflict spurred on by Somalia’s clan-based
warlords. The situation was worsened by a deepening humanitarian crisis brought on by
serious drought in 1992. The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) was
created in April 1992 to monitor a cease-fire in Somalia’s capital city, Mogadishu, as
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well as provide protection to UN personnel, equipment and supplies at the seaports and
airports in Mogadishu, and to escort deliveries of humanitarian aid to distribution centres.
In August 1992 UNOSOM I’s mandate was widened to include the protection of
humanitarian convoys and distribution centres throughout Somalia.

25

The humanitarian

situation was thought to be so grave that it was estimated that millions of people were at
risk of starving to death, so in response to an appeal by the UN’s World Food Programme
(WFP) and the International Commission of the Red Cross (ICRC), Canada agreed to
mount a humanitarian aid mission to provide assistance to the suffering country as
Operation RELIEF. According to historian Grant Dawson, the decision to use
peacekeepers as escorts for aid was “controversial, but the famine was so serious that it
had to proceed.”

26

Issues arose from the “prominence of the Somalia mission’s

mandated responsibility to escort aid [which] prevented it from remaining impartial. This
prompted hostility in Somalia because the control of food was vital to the disputants’
survival and power.”

27

From the outset, the mission in Somalia was distanced from

classical peacekeeping by the tasks it set for its peacekeepers in an extremely hostile
environment.
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The Canadian contribution to UNOSOM I, Operation CORDON, was debated by
Canadian military leadership during this period because of a perceived weak mandate and
the existence of a very fragile security situation in Somalia for what was supposed to be a
Chapter VI peacekeeping operation.

28

The Mulroney government announced in August

1992 that it intended to send 750 soldiers to UNOSOM I for Operation CORDON.

29

Dawson argues that, fairly early in the negotiations for this mission, the “UN and Canada
encountered difficulty in Somalia because the situation was extremely complex and could
not be resolved quickly. Decision makers’ problems were worsened because they had
energetically committed to the operation without a full understanding of the risks
associated with peacekeeping in the midst of a civil war, [and] of the Canadian Forces’
roles.”

30

31

The Canadian Airborne Regiment, as the UN Standby Battalion , was readied

for deployment in September 1992. Before it could deploy, however, the UN mission in
Somalia collapsed in December 1992 and was replaced by the US-led Unified Task Force
(UNITAF, also known as Operation Restore Hope).

32

Consequently, plans were changed

so that only a few Canadian staff officers would work directly with UNOSOM I and the
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Canadian Airborne Regiment, under the name Operation DELIVERANCE, would
instead be deployed to Belet Huen to work with UNITAF.

33

Although the mandate of UNITAF was somewhat different from that of
UNOSOM I, Dawson convincingly argues that the Mulroney government had compelling
reasons to support the mission to Somalia, in whatever form it took. With UNOSOM I
the government was committed to sending troops to shore up the UN mission in Somalia
and show Canadians their humanitarian values in action, and once UNITAF took over the
mission the government’s priority was “the management of Canada-US relations through
personal diplomacy.”

34

Canada also wanted to exert its middle power influence by

ensuring that the UN remained relevant and was not “crowded out by US unilateralism”
in the coalition. Dawson, like many before him, believes that the Mulroney government
and the Canadian Forces should have asked more questions about the UN’s strategy when
the mission changed.
UNITAF, as a Chapter VII mission and coalition of twenty-four nations, arrived
in Somalia on 9 December 1992. The expanded Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle
Group (CARBG) that had been preparing for deployment with UNOSOM I began their
UNITAF deployment in Belet Huen in late December 1992, numbering about 900
soldiers. Of this 900, the majority were from the Canadian Airborne Regiment,
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supplemented by 130 personnel from the Royal Canadian Dragoons and smaller numbers
from four additional regiments, and air-supported by eighty-nine personnel from the
Tactical Helicopter Squadron from CFB Petawawa in February 1993.

35

Combined

Canadian air, sea, land and joint task force headquarters personnel constituted a total
Canadian contribution of 1250 personnel.

36

The CARBG understood that UNITAF would incorporate robust enforcement
practices in its operations, but its assignment to the Belet Huen Humanitarian Relief
Sector reinforced the perception that it was being deployed to Somalia on a largely
humanitarian assistance mission. The understanding was that the “Unified Task Force
was a humanitarian intervention. The United States engaged because the severity of the
mass starvation was so troubling and international assistance continued to be
frustrated.”

37

The purpose of the CARBG’s activities such as securing airport, seaport,

key installations, and major distribution sites were all seen as contributing to the
underlying goal of delivering humanitarian aid to the starving population and reestablishing the social structure of the area. Further contributing to the re-establishment
of order was the CARBG’s goals of undermining the influence of local warlords, limiting
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banditry, and demilitarizing local militias, again with the objective of safe delivery of aid
and increasing the security of local populations to facilitate a return to normalcy.

38

The training that CARBG had received in preparation for UNOSOM I, which was
understood to be a typical Chapter VI mission, would prove inappropriate to the violent
mission in which the Canadian contingent found itself embroiled. The unpreparedness of
the CARBG and the inappropriateness of its training is highlighted by an example given
by David Bercuson in his book Significant Incident. Canada’s Army, the Airborne, and
the Murder in Somalia. Bercuson describes a four-day exercise mounted in October
1992, prior to the CARBG’s deployment to Somalia, to test the battle group’s preparation
for the UN mission and its “newly acquired capability as a mechanized unit.” This
exercise, Exercise Stalwart Providence, was run by the Royal Canadian Dragoons, and
the Dragoons “found that the Airborne’s security procedures were lax; it was weak on
intelligence gathering; its soldiers were not yet proficient in the operation of their
vehicles; its chain of command did not function properly, especially in passing
information about operational procedures to the lowest ranks.”

39

Additionally, there

were
other findings that suggested the Canadian Airborne Regiment was too much
influenced by Ramboism for a peacekeeping mission. Airborne soldiers seemed
too ready to use physical force on unarmed “Somali demonstrators”; they were
too quick to charge their weapons; they often lost their temper with
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demonstrators, they seemed confused about procedures for dealing with armed
40
versus unarmed Somalis; they were still too aggressive for the mission.
This exercise took place only two months before the CARBG was deployed to Somalia
and pointed to weaknesses in basic combat skills as well as a lack of understanding of the
skills required for UN peacekeeping operations. These shortcomings were disastrous for
the Canadian contingent in Somalia.
ROEs were also a problem for the CARBG. ROEs are provided to soldiers on
aide-mémoire cards which are supposed to distill their ROEs into usable, practical
guidance. The deployment of the CARBG was complicated by the fact that the aidememoire cards drawn up by DND, which were apparently more precise and less
permissive in the use of force than those drawn up by the Airborne Regiment, were not
ready in time for deployment. The battle group deployed with the Airborne cards,
41

intending to use the DND cards once they were provided.

As a result there was likely

more than one version of the Canadian ROEs circulating in Somalia, with different
interpretations or wording for the use of force.

42

Four significant incidents in 1993 tarnished the reputation of the CARBG and
ultimately resulted in the disbandment of the Canadian Airborne Regiment. On 17
February 1993, following attempts to deter a crowd of approximately 300 rioting Somalis
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at the Bailey Bridge outside of Belet Huen, Canadian soldiers shot two of the rioters, one
fatally. A subsequent investigation found that the soldiers involved acted within the
Canadian rules of engagement and no charges were laid. On the night of 4 March 1993,
two Somali civilians tried to find a way through the fence into the Canadian compound
and were shot after attempts to apprehend them failed. One intruder was wounded and
the other was killed. In this case charges were laid but ultimately resulted in acquittals.
A third incident occurred on 17 March 1993 when members of the CARBG were
escorting a convoy of ICRC vehicles from the Belet Huen airfield to the Red Cross
compound. Upon arrival at the compound the CARBG soldiers were fired at by a Somali
gunman, and the Canadians fatally shot one Somali. Again, the actions of the Canadians
43

were judged to fall within their rules of engagement, and no charges were laid.

The most infamous incident was the arrest and subsequent murder of a 16-year
old Somali youth, Shidane Arone. On 16 March 1993 Arone was apprehended inside the
Canadian compound and placed under arrest. He was then tortured and beaten, found
unconscious later that night, and ultimately pronounced dead. Seven Canadian soldiers
were charged in relation to this incident; two were acquitted, one was found mentally
unfit to stand trial and attempted suicide while in custody. The only person charged with
second-degree murder and torture, Private Kyle Brown, was found guilty of manslaughter
and torture and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment and dismissal from the Canadian
Forces. In the wake of these events, the CARBG, and the Canadian Forces generally,
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came under public and political scrutiny, spawning a commission of inquiry that would
have far-reaching influence on the future of the CF.
These events serve to highlight the type of violent situations that Canadian
soldiers faced in Somalia, and reinforced the idea that the mandates of UNOSOM I and
UNITAF may not have been equal to the task of calming and rebuilding a fractured,
starving Somalia. Recognizing the need for a more robust security environment, a
Chapter VII mission named UNOSOM II was authorized by the Secretary General of the
UN to be a successor mission to both UNITAF and UNOSOM I.
UNOSOM II was created as a multinational force, led by the United States, to
take over from the temporary expedient of UNITAF in March 1993 via Security Council
Resolution 814 (1993). This resolution explicitly designed UNOSOM II as a mission
with an expanded force size and mandate, under the authority of Chapter VII of the
44

Charter of the United Nations.

UNOSOM II began operations on 4 May 1993 with the

purpose of completing UNITAF’s task of securing an environment for delivery of
humanitarian aid, achieving disarmament and reconciliation, and restoring peace,
stability, law and order. Its mandate included enforcement measures, as it was tasked
with activities such as monitoring the cessation of hostilities, seizing unauthorized small
arms, maintaining the security of ports, airports, and lines of communications, mineclearing, repatriating Somali refugees, assisting the Somali people to rebuild their
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economic, social and political life, re-establishing the country’s institutional structure,
achieving national political reconciliation, recreating a Somali state based on democratic
governance, and rebuilding the infrastructure.

45

UNOSOM II’s mandate was revised in February 1994 to exclude the use of
coercive methods after several violent incidents and attacks on UN soldiers. The mission
was withdrawn in March 1995 after its peacemaking efforts were deemed a failure by the
UN, but Canada had already withdrawn its contingent in May and June 1993 in light of
the incidents described above. Violent confrontation was not unknown in peacekeeping
operations, but the high-profile and well-publicized actions of the CARBG drew attention
to the problem of modern peace support operations as never before.
One soldier who served on UNITAF and UNOSOM II as the second-incommand of 2 Commando from December 1992 to June 1993 recalled that the contingent
training for the mission included little peace support operations training, but that predeployment training lasted three months in the period immediately leading up to
deployment. He believed that the rules of engagement, and UNOSOM II’s operation
under Chapter VII, were appropriate to the situation as “anything less than a Chapter 7
mission would only put people at risk needlessly.” He felt that the instructions regarding
the use of force were appropriate to the mission, as they “afforded a sense of confidence
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to deal with whatever situation may arise.”

46

Another Canadian soldier who participated

in Operation DELIVERANCE for 6 months in 1992 as a supply technician and driver at
the rank of Corporal thought that pre-deployment training could have been improved to
help deal with the climate and way of life in hot countries. He believed that the orders
received before leaving on the mission were clear, but “once we had arrived decisions
and reactions varied depending on the situation.” In the course of his duties in Somalia
he had to aim his rifle and was prepared to use it, but upon reflection thought the rules of
engagement needed to be better elaborated. He also believed that there were few
resources to deal with combat-related stress during his time in Somalia, and wrote that
47

“nothing existed to deal with this.”

The triad of difficult post-Cold War missions was rounded out by a peacekeeping
commitment to Rwanda that began in 1993. Fighting had broken out in October 1990
along the Uganda-Rwanda border between the Armed Forces of the Hutu government of
Rwanda and the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). The Arusha cease-fire
agreement, brokered on 22 July 1992, called for the presence of UN military observers to
be provided by the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Hostilities broke out again in
February 1993, and Rwanda and Uganda requested the deployment of UN military
observers. The United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) was
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created to monitor the border between the two countries to prevent Uganda from
providing Rwanda with military assistance, and ran from June 1993 to September 1994.
The Arusha talks resumed in March 1993 and a comprehensive peace agreement
was reached. Another appeal was made to the United Nations for assistance in its
implementation and to restore the countries to normalcy. Security Council Resolution
872 (1993) of 5 October 1993 created the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
(UNAMIR).

48

Its mandate included establishing a weapons-secure area in Kigali to

ensure the capital city’s security; monitoring cease-fire agreements and the establishment
of cease-fire zones; monitoring the security situation during the final stage of the
transitional government’s mandate leading up to the elections; assisting with mine
clearance, particularly through training programs; investigating instances of noncompliance with the Arusha Peace Agreement relating to integration of the armed forces;
monitoring the repatriation of Rwandan refugees; assisting with humanitarian activities;
and investigating incidents involving the gendarmerie and police.
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Canadian Brigadier-

General Roméo Dallaire served as Chief Military Observer in UNOMUR from June to
October 1993, when he became Force Commander with UNAMIR, the United Nations
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Mission for Rwanda.

50

Dallaire held this post until he departed Africa on 20 August

1994, and UNAMIR was officially withdrawn on 29 February 1996.
In the midst of this fraught political situation, ethnic-based conflict between the
minority ruling class Tutsis and majority Hutus boiled over with the April 1994 airplane
crash that killed the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi. This event lit a fuse in the
powder keg; killings of Tutsi and moderate Hutus began shortly after word of the crash
near Kigali spread. In the ensuing months UN peacekeepers witnessed genocide and
atrocities carried out mainly by Rwanda’s Armed Forces, the presidential guard, and the
ruling party’s youth militia. The RPF advanced from the north and east of Rwanda and
government authority disappeared.
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When Dallaire became Force Commander of

UNAMIR it had a small force of 450 members, but expanded to 5500 personnel at its
height, including 300 Canadians. On 21 April 1994, after the killings had begun, the
Security Council authorized a force reduction from 2548 to 270 personnel. UNAMIR
personnel still protected thousands of Rwandese that sought shelter at UNAMIR sites, at
great risk to themselves. By May 1994 the UN authorized an increase in troop strength to
5500, but it did not reach these levels until October. The civil war ended in July 1994
when the RPF took control of Rwanda and established a government. The new
government signaled its commitment to the 1993 peace agreement and cooperation with
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UNAMIR on the return of refugees.

52

The final death toll, as of October 1994, was

estimated by the UN to be at least half a million people, and according to some sources
was as high as 800,000 people, with approximately 2 million internally displaced persons
and a further 2 million Rwandans as refugees outside the country.
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Romeo Dallaire was Force Commander during a crucial eleven-month period
from October 1993 to August 1994. He arrived in Kigali from UNOMUR on 22 October
54

1993 and was soon followed by an advance party of twenty-one military personnel.

In

the Introduction to his 2003 book about his time in Rwanda, Dallaire writes that
[i]t is the story of a commander who, faced with a challenge that didn’t fit the
classic Cold War-era peacekeeper’s rule book, failed to find an effective solution
and witnessed, as if in punishment, the loss of some of his own troops, the
attempted annihilation of an ethnicity, the butchery of children barely out of the
womb, the stacking of severed limbs like cordwood, the mounds of decomposing
bodies being eaten by the sun.
This book is nothing more nor less than the account of a few humans who
were entrusted with the role of helping others taste the fruits of peace. Instead,
we watched as the devil took control of paradise on earth and fed on the blood of
55
the people we were supposed to protect.
Dallaire relates how, as commander of the 5ième Group Brigade Mechanisé du Canada at
Valcartier, he witnessed the deployment of more than 4000 troops on peacekeeping
duties around the world between 1991 and 1993, and observed that [w]e were sending
our soldiers, who were ready for classic chapter-six peacekeeping missions, into a world
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that seemed increasingly less amenable to such interventions.”

56

Like the missions in the

Former Yugoslavia and Somalia, UNAMIR was initiated as a classic UN peacekeeping
operation whose personnel quickly encountered situations outside their mandate.
Dallaire soon encountered what he would consider one of the biggest challenges
of the mission: United Nations bureaucracy. His plans for a reconnaissance mission were
foiled when he was asked by the UN to fit the mission to the resources available, rather
than determine what resources were necessary to fulfill the duties set out for UNAMIR.
Funding was also an issue, and the mission’s early days “introduced me to begging and
borrowing to a degree I’d never dreamed of.” He argued with UN headquarters over
every detail of running the force, while encountering little clear direction. He haggled
with UN officials over everything from “toilet paper to the form of official
communiques” and, because the mission funding was not yet secure, was apparently
forced to pay phone bills to New York with his personal line of credit.
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An additional challenge in Kigali was of course the presence of armed
belligerents, and to deal with this factor he proposed that the mission ROEs allow “us to
use force up to and including deadly force to prevent ‘crimes against humanity.’ We
were breaking new ground, though we didn’t really understand it at the time. We were
moving toward what would later be called “Chapter six and a half,” a whole new
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approach to conflict resolution.”

Robust ROEs aside, when Dallaire tried to address the

controversial presence of the Belgian contingent, who were judged to be overlyaggressive and unruly and part of the military of the former colonial presence in Rwanda,
he was confronted with the very “boys will be boys” mentality he was working against in
the Canadian Forces.

59

Dallaire’s interaction with the Belgian contingent was not the only challenge
when managing a force composed of representatives of different nations. He extolled the
professionalism of the Tunisian contingent and came to place high value on their soldiers.
By contrast, he felt that the attitude of the Bangladeshi contingent, expressed by their
national commander’s assertion that the protection of his soldiers should take priority
over the success of the mission, was anathema to Dallaire’s training as a soldier, or as he
put it, “[p]utting the safety of his soldiers above the mission was heresy in my
professional ethos .”

60

Forced to work with these limited resources, Dallaire did what he

could to bolster the authority of UNAMIR. On April 11th, the fifth day of the slaughter,
UNAMIR was ordered to participate in the evacuation of foreign nationals, so Dallaire
signed new ROEs that permitted UNAMIR troops to disarm belligerents and to intervene
with force after issuing warning shots, and allowed local commanders to decide on the
level of force they needed to use. He later reflected that the “question remains as to
whether I had the authority to change my own ROE for the duration of an evacuation
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mission. I was on the ground, I was in command, I had been given the mission and I took
the decision.”

61

The evacuation of the foreign nationals acted as a signal to the

génocidaires to step up their activities. In Dallaire’s view, the UN, and its Member
States, bear the responsibility for what happened in Rwanda, as they made a collective
decision not to prevent the genocide despite his, and others’, dire warnings.
Dallaire eloquently expressed his feelings of guilt at not being able to prevent this
continued slaughter: “My own mea culpa is this: as the person charged with the military
leadership of UNAMIR, I was unable to persuade the international community that this
tiny, poor, overpopulated country and its people were worth saving from the horror of
62

genocide – even then the measures needed for success were relatively small.”

These

experiences took their toll on him, and he began to manifest the signs of combat-related
stress.
By July 1994 Dallaire began to see signs of stress in himself, such as not being
able to sleep, being moody, and being overtaken with daydreaming, and his subordinates
recognized his deteriorating health as well. He observed that “[w]hen close subordinates
realize that their commander is becoming a liability, the act of passing such information
to the chain of command is not disloyal, but the epitome of loyalty. To have subordinates
63

with the courage to act in such a way is a reward in itself.”
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Dallaire knew he needed to
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leave Rwanda, but felt guilt over the decision. However it is difficult to judge him in light
of the catalogue of horrific experiences he endured in Rwanda: he and his officers forded
streams full of bodies, passed over bridges in swamps that had been lifted by the force of
the bodies piling up on the struts, and walked vehicles through desperate mobs screaming
for food and protection. His “courageous men had been wading through scenes such as
this for weeks in order to save expatriates and members of religious orders. No wonder
some of them had fallen off the face of the world and had entered a hell in their minds.
64

We had absolutely no medication to help them.”

To make matters worse, decisions

taken by UNAMIR’s peacekeepers, or ones that were taken out of their hands due to UN
delays, sometimes resulted in the deaths of people that Dallaire’s peacekeepers were
trying to save. They had to address the question of who to save when so many needed it:
“was a VIP more important than nuns? … As men, we do not play God well, but the
situation demanded that in some cases we had to choose who lived and who died.”

65

The nightmares did not end upon his return to Canada, and Dallaire became wellknown for his struggle with PTSD, mainly due to his openness about his own experience.
He vividly described how his mission in Rwanda had long-lasting effects on him
personally. For example, much later back in Canada, Dallaire was taking a vacation with
his family, and was
driving down a narrow road on the way to a beach. Road workers had cut a lot of
trees down on either side of the road and piled the branches up to be picked up
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later. The cut trees had turned brown, and the sawn ends of the trunks, white and
of a fair size, were stacked facing the road. Without being able to stop myself, I
described to my wife in great detail a trip I had had to make to the RPF zone,
where the route had taken me through the middle of a village. The sides of the
road were littered with piles upon piles of Rwandan bodies drying in the sun,
white bones jutting out. I was so sorry that my children had no choice but to
listen to me. When we got to the beach, my kids swam and Beth read a book
while I sat for more than two hours reliving the events reawakened in my mind.
66
What terrible vulnerability we have all had to live with since Rwanda.
This vulnerability perhaps ran counter to the “soldiers first” ethos in that it undercut the
idea that military training could prepare a soldier to deal with anything he or she
encountered in theatre. However, it did reflect the reality of post-Cold War
peacekeeping, in that there were situations for which no amount of training could prepare
a human being.
The growing awareness that the horrors of modern peacekeeping were not so
different from the horrors of war led the Canadian Forces to undertake a “stress
management and awareness” program. The Canadian Forces have studied the problem of
peacekeeping-related stress, and implemented programs to reduce and treat “stress
casualties.” A number of factors in theatre can cause this stress, but “experts agree that
the effects of stress, particularly in military situations, can be lessened by good training,
cohesive units, trustworthy leaders and stable family life.”67 Actions taken by DND
included understanding and measuring peacekeeping stress; screening members for their
military readiness before sending them on a mission; continuing military training that
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“can effectively inoculate soldiers against peacekeeping stress”; and initiating predeployment stress training, among other measures.68
The Canadian soldiers surveyed for this study who served in UN or NATO theatre
of operations in the 1990s expressed a variety of opinions about the issue of stress
management. Some indicated that they received no pre-deployment stress management
training (often due to short warning periods for their deployment overseas, which
indicated a short training period overall), and others said that they did receive some
training and briefings on this subject, which they found useful since “coping skills are
important.”69 Most indicated that, although they did not seek it out, they believed there
were resources available to them in-theatre and upon return for help with combat-related
stress or Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).70 Interestingly, when asked the
subjective question, “Were you emotionally prepared for the things you saw and did on
your peacekeeping tour? Was there a period of adjustment for you upon your return? If
so, how long was it?” thirty-seven of the 108 respondents (thirty-four percent) indicated
that they were not emotionally prepared and required some period of adjustment, with
several more indicating that although they thought they were emotionally prepared for
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their peacekeeping tours, they required a period of reintegration upon return to Canada.
Respondents cited having to stand by while civilians were slaughtered, viewing mass
71

graves, and being amongst crushing poverty as stressors in peacekeeping missions.

Tellingly, one person pointed out that “It’s not always what we see and do in these places
that is hard to accept. Sometimes it’s why they won’t let us do anything about what we
see.”

72

As one survey respondent stated, “I was not prepared for the PTSD. It took me
73

about 1 year to get back to almost normal. In some ways I am still not back to normal.”

When asked about reintegration briefings, a majority indicated that there were no
formal “briefings” but often informal meetings. A Captain who had served on the United
Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) for a year from
1992 to 1993 recalled thinking it was strange that he had no reintegration briefing: “I
returned from spending 12 months in the Sahara Desert and no one wanted to debrief
me!”74 Another soldier who served on four peacekeeping missions between 1975 and
1999 wrote sarcastically “what reintegration briefings?” but noted that “[w]e all had to
see the Doc, Padre, and collectively the Commanding Officer spoke to us.” By contrast,
for his service during Op Apollo in support of US military operations in Afghanistan,
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“[t]here were 5 formal briefings for the … soldiers. They hated them. Too much.”75
Another respondent indicated that there were no reintegration briefings for his missions
prior to 1990, but that he did receive counseling sessions in theatre and was asked if
“everything was okay” after returning from the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) in late
1999. He felt that he “had more than enough help to return to normal life and duty.”76
Both of these survey respondents, despite witnessing mass graves, plane crashes, and
refugee exoduses, felt that they were prepared for their time on peacekeeping tours and
did not experience any reintegration stress or experienced PTSD as a result of their
peacekeeping experiences. One advantage mentioned was that those who had predeployment stress management training were trained to recognize signs of stress in others
as well as themselves. One soldier in a leadership role between 1996 and 1999 related
that “I found these resources useful … [p]re-deployment briefings were in place and
useful in helping watch my soldiers for signs of problems and be able to ensure proper
support as required.”77 That meant that, although many of the survey respondents relayed
the stoic attitude of “nothing I have seen or experienced has ever bothered me”78 when
discussing stress and combat-related trauma, the possibility existed that soldiers would be
aware of warning signs in others deployed alongside them.
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In some cases, however, soldiers did reveal that they experienced signs of stress
during and upon return from peacekeeping operations, even if they were subtle. After
serving in the Canadian Contingent to the Stabilization Force in Bosnia (CCSFOR) in
1997 and 1999-2000, a soldier described how he received reintegration briefings related
to family and home life to help reintegrate with his family and friends in an environment
that may have changed while he was away: “a small thing, like the furniture in the living
room might be rearranged. This process aids you and your family in that you do not
upset the balance of your family life during your absence.”79 Both the home life and the
soldier himself may have changed during a deployment. The same individual believed it
was impossible to be prepared to deal with everything while on tour in a foreign country.
It all depends on what you are exposed to and how you handle the situation. In
Bosnia, you think about landmines because there were so many due to the civil
war, all along the side of the road and throughout the countryside. So when you
leave the base (which I had to do on almost a daily basis) you don’t step on to any
surface that is not solid, for a while when you get back to Canada you think of
stuff like that, you can walk in a field or even on grass and not have to worry.
You don’t pick anything up on tour, for fear of booby trapping, you think of this
stuff for a while.80
There is anecdotal evidence that the evolving system of stress-management training was
helping to recognize and treat signs of stress among CF members who served on
peacekeeping missions post-Cold War. One CF member who was deployed to Bosnia in
1992, 1994, and 1997, and to Kosovo in 1999, was skeptical about the utility of
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reintegration briefings, specifying that they were useful from an administrative standpoint
but
I don’t know how much the return program has helped me … emotionally, it only
covers [the cases] who are so obviously troubled they can’t be missed. Later, if
the guy hasn’t lied to the system, he or she may get noticed for problems. I don’t
know of any person who has had the system catch a potential problem. … there is
an accumulative stress that cannot be overcome by preparation. … in the latter
tours they had [PTSD] experts to assist us. In the beginning, no. I felt that we
were well briefed to do what was needed to get ourselves squared away after tour.
The special help channels were in place. Initially, we saw a lot of guys who fell
apart because of two factors, the tour and the way their life was structured to fail
due to personal problems such as alcohol or marriage or personality traits. Now,
we see fewer disasters after tour.81
The increase in rotations, particularly in the case of the mission in Bosnia, meant that CF
members were accumulating peacekeeping experience faster than ever. But keeping pace
with this increased activity was a recognition that resources needed to be in place to
address the “accumulative stress” that frequent deployments put on an individual. It
seems that, while not a perfect record, CF personnel were aware that resources were
available and perhaps having some impact on the lives of returning soldiers.
Three Canadian Forces members who served in Rwanda have interesting
observations about the immediate and long-term effects of their time with UNAMIR, and
whether their training adequately prepared them for events that occurred during their
deployment. A Captain who served in Somalia for six months (date unspecified) and
Rwanda for six months (date unspecified) indicated that in both cases he received a few
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weeks’ training on customs and culture, the mandate, mine awareness, and first aid
refresher with an emphasis on sickness to be met in theatre, and thought that this training
complemented basic training. He indicated that the ROEs for Somalia were modified a
“few times” during his tour. While he thought that the rules governing the use of force
were appropriate to the situations he encountered in Rwanda because “they conformed to
Canadian and to Red Cross values,” he felt that those governing the use of force in
Somalia were not appropriate as they did not always conform to these same values. He
also indicated that “[i]n Somalia, I disobeyed the orders of the ROE that did not conform
and I modified the orders for my platoon.” He thought that it was impossible to prepare
for everything seen in theater, such as “mass graves, children,” and shared that he was
diagnosed with PTSD ten years after Somalia and seven years after his return from
Rwanda.
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A female medical technician who served in Rwanda for three months in 1994 as a
Private indicated that she received two weeks of training on general information related
to the country and climate. She thought the ROEs governing the use of force were not
appropriate for Rwanda, as “with the genocide, there was much hostility with the army
and civilians.” She did not feel that she was prepared for conditions in the host country,
particularly because, as a medical technician given just two weeks’ preparation, there was
no time to practice medical scenarios that might occur in theatre. Upon her return, there
was no reintegration briefing, and she “had just my close family to confide in.” Finally,
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she asserted that “you are never prepared as a soldier for what happens during a genocide.
83

Yes, I talked very much with my family. Several months.

She alluded to the fact that

her reintegration took a long period of time, which indicates that she was not simply able
to shed her experiences upon her return to Canada.
Another Canadian Forces member deployed to Rwanda from November 1994 to
February 1995 was employed as a driver and one of his tasks was to transport refugees in
refugee camps. He stated that “I received no training. I was called to replace someone
else on very short notice (one week) … I never even had the chance to know the
difference between a Hutu and a Tutsi.” In reference to the ROEs, he explained that there
was a lot of insistence on the rules of engagement. We had the impression that
we would have to have a death in our camps before we would defend ourselves
with force … and we knew that if we were to use our weapons there was a good
chance we would end up at a court martial... best not to use our weapons! The
rules of engagement were such that no one wanted to use their weapons. … In
Rwanda, the earth was still red with blood, and the local armies made sure we
84
knew that.
This combination of a severe restriction on the use of force and the presence of armed
belligerents meant that “the local Rwandan army knew very well that we were not
permitted to use our weapons. When we went into town (Kigali), our security diminished
significantly.” Fearing for their own safety no doubt made it difficult for UNAMIR
peacekeepers to carry out the mission’s mandate. This soldier concluded that
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[n]o one could ever truly be ready for what is in these countries. It took me a
certain time to readjust to the culture at home. … For Rwanda, I was the only one
in my unit during that period (North Bay). My deployment was rapid and, at my
return, I had one month of vacation as well as s few visits to the hospital in
85
Ottawa. Once I was back in North Bay, it was as if nothing had happened.
The intersection of ROEs, restrictive guidelines on the use of force, and the expectation
that a soldier be stoic in the face of indescribable horror has grave implications for the
soldiers expected to keep the peace in far-flung nations, and for the success of the
peacekeeping missions on which they serve. This was cast in sharp relief in the
immediate post-Cold War era, and personified by the actions of two generals in the
middle of peacekeeping war zones.
Carol Off, in her book The Lion, The Fox & The Eagle. A story of generals and
justice in Rwanda and Yugoslavia, argues that the Lion of the story, Dallaire, was heroic
in his attempts to stop the slaughter in Rwanda, as “Dallaire saw horror coming down the
86

rails like a speeding train, and he tried to recruit the UN in a bid to stop it.”

By

contrast, the Fox, Major-General Lewis MacKenzie, who was a sector commander at the
start of UNPROFOR, is harshly judged by Off for discouraging more robust UN
87

intervention to stop the ethnic cleansing taking place in the Former Yugoslavia.

These

two generals, plucked from the same Canadian military system and, as Off points out, the
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same peacekeeping tradition, hold very divergent views of the role of a commander, and
of peacekeeping and the need for peacekeeping training for military forces.
Dallaire has been publicly vocal, both in his book and other mediums, about the
need for realistic pre-deployment training for peacekeeping and advocated strongly for
additional stress-management and PTSD resources to be put into place for Canadian
Forces members after his experiences in Rwanda. MacKenzie, in a survey he completed
for this study, related his contrasting opinion that “there was very little training needed”
for his time on peacekeeping missions throughout his career, which included tours in
UNEF I, the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS) in Vietnam,
UNEF II, the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA), and
UNPROFOR, and multiple tours in UNFICYP. He believed that his training as a soldier
adequately prepared him, and in commenting about the lack of reintegration briefings
available to him he stated: “None requested and none needed – the experts I respect say
revisiting the chaos is the worst thing one can do. Suck it up and get on with the rest of
your life!” He concluded that there was “no need to emphasize “peacekeeping” training
as the task is a sideline activity. Train as soldiers first – other activities when required.”
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The “soldiers first” ethos is evident here, as MacKenzie clearly argues for the
maintenance of military skills above any mission-specific training that might be required.
He asserts that the missions that have taken place since the end of the Cold War are
erroneously termed “peacekeeping” as they are far more complex than classical
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peacekeeping , with few exceptions, yet he denies any real need for training beyond
standard military training to cope with the demands of these missions.
The contrast between the two Generals could not be more stark, and one wonders
what Dallaire would make of MacKenzie’s assertion that it is a bad idea to “revisit the
chaos” when it seems that, in Dallaire’s case, the chaos was ever-present for him.
Another Canadian General, Major General Andrew Leslie, felt he was prepared for the
events he witnessed on peacekeeping tours to varying degrees. As he stated in March
2005, his experience in UNFICYP in 1986 was “fine,” his experience in Croatia in 1995
was “bad, lots of dead people,” whereas his deployment to Bosnia also in 1995 was fine
in comparison. His later experiences fighting the war in Afghanistan were “not fine but
by then [he] had seen much worse.” He reflected that there was always a period of
adjustment upon return from deployment, and that after a period of frenzied activity it felt
like a return to nothing. He also indicated a more thorough level of training than that
indicated by Dallaire, perhaps suggesting that, although each mission had its challenges,
90

he was better inoculated against the horrors of modern peacekeeping operations.

The missions in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda constituted a new
type of peacekeeping in which humanitarian concerns ranked as high as maintaining
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cease-fire lines, and peacekeepers were confronted with gross human rights violations,
genocide, and a lack of respect for international law. Given its decades of accumulated
peacekeeping experience, and with intra-state conflicts looming on the horizon, the UN
sought to provide the countries that furnished its peacekeeping contingents with general
guidelines for the preparation of peacekeepers. In February 1991 the Permanent Mission
of Canada to the United Nations disseminated the UN document Training Guidelines for
National or Regional Training Programmes to National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ)
91

and the Department of External Affairs for feedback.

This document was designed to

provide high-level guidance on how to prepare national soldiers for peacekeeping duty
under the auspices of the UN, and was produced as a result of the 8 December 1989
General Assembly Resolution 44/49 on the “Comprehensive Review on the whole
question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects.”

92

Topics covered in this

manual were background to UN peacekeeping, including the UN Charter, ROEs,
geopolitical briefings, the study of the mandate and mission, and administrative matters;
weapon training and familiarity with theatre weapons, vehicles, and equipment; general
military training areas such as physical training, map reading, communications, first aid,
hygiene, and sanitation; training in UN operating techniques such as positions and
observation posts, checkpoints, roadblocks, and searches, patrolling, investigation,
negotiations/liaison; use of force, and leadership; safety measures and precautions; and
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specialized training in areas such as driving, helicopter, training, language training, and
93

explosive ordnance reconnaissance and disposal.

The communication between the

Permanent Mission in New York, NDHQ, and the Department of External Affairs on the
matter of peacekeeping training underscored its emerging importance and demonstrated
that there was an attempt to synchronize national training guidelines with international
ones.
Another example of consultation between Canada and the UN on matters related
to peacekeeping was the 14 April 1992 Report of the Secretary General titled
Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peace-Keeping Operations in All Their
Aspects of 14 April 1992, which includes a submission from Canada.

94

As part of this

review process, the Chief Review Services of DND scheduled a military review in
1989/1990 of the Canadian Forces’ participation in peacekeeping operations. The
ensuing report included scant few details about training, because, as it stated,
[t]here are no published guidelines or standards for training in preparation for
peacekeeping operations. DPKO has developed a six day course for United
Nations Military Observers (UNMOs) and a 10 day training and orientation
course is conducted at Base Montreal for personnel selected for service with
UNDOF. It is a popular view of NDHQ and Command staffs that general
military training is sufficient for personnel preparing for peacekeeping operations.
Experience has shown that there is a requirement for specialist training in such
areas as Military Observer methods, supply, finance and reorientation training for
the soldier who is to be deployed in the Cyprus type situation. There is also the
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need for a thorough orientation training program for officers which deals with
their specific mission and mandate. These training requirements should be
95
recorded and published in the form of training guidance and standards.
The only specific instance of training that was evaluated in this review was UNMO
training for service with ONUCA, with the exception of specialist training for groups
such as aircrew and groundcrew for helicopter squadrons. The UNMO training for
ONUCA was “less than adequate. UNMOs were briefed based on the experiences of
UNMOs deployed in the Middle East. While this training covered the basic principles
and method of operation of UNMOs, it did little to prepare the officers for service in the
96

Central American situation.”

At the time of the training ONUCA had not yet

commenced operation, so UNMOs were briefed on a possible concept of operations that
was not fully developed, with insufficient background information on the mandate. The
review concluded that “consequently, the UNMOs arrived in Central America with little
knowledge of the mandate and what was expected of them in support of the mandate and
concept of operations.”

97

Training for peacekeeping, when it occurred in the Canadian

Forces, was still a sporadic, ad hoc affair.
Scrutiny of peacekeeping and peacekeeping training on the part of the defence
establishment was matched by attention from other sectors of government. Concern over
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“new” peacekeeping requirements manifested itself in two reports generated by Senate
Standing Committees, and a third commissioned by the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff.
All drew attention to the fact that, although Canadian peacekeepers had performed
reasonably well in peace support operations by relying on their basic military training and
occupational skills, additional skills and training reform were needed in the wake of
events in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda.
The first of these reports, the March 1993 Report of the Standing Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Meeting New Challenges: Canada’s Response to a New Generation of
Peacekeeping, asserted that “a major theme which has emerged in recent UN discussions
98

on peacekeeping operations has been the need for training for peacekeeping.”

The

report stated clearly that peacekeeping was a derived task of the Canadian Forces, not a
primary role, yet the “armed forces have stated that they are able to provide highly
trained, experienced, and self-sustaining forces – trained as “soldiers first” – capable of
99

dealing with the widest range of potential military activities.”

The report, citing the

conclusions of the internal DND study on peacekeeping that “the best peacekeeper is a
well-trained soldier, sailor or airman, one who knows his or her trade,” agreed with the
“Canadian Forces’ contention that well-trained peacekeepers require general purpose
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combat capabilities and believes that this type of training is of primary importance.”

100

Meeting New Challenges concluded that peacekeeping was a derivative task of the
military, and agreed that military training was the best core training for peacekeepers.
Nevertheless, the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs identified several areas
in which training could be improved or implemented for peacekeeping purposes,
including: mediation and conflict resolution techniques; an introduction to the UN system
and the UN Charter; UN command and control structures; an overview of peacekeeping
activities; mission security and defence; emergency procedures; the proper conduct of a
Canadian soldier in a multinational force; the importance of the roles of civilians in
“peacebuilding” initiatives; humanitarian aid; neutrality; impartiality; and cultural
sensitivity and mission-specific topics such as the history, tradition, and culture of the
country to which they are being sent.

101

Also on that list was a recommendation for the

establishment of a Canadian peacekeeping centre to contribute to the standardization of
the quality and duration of training for peacekeeping. This would be a huge task for any
organization to undertake, but the Standing Committee was firm in its argument that, if
Canada was to continue to participate in peacekeeping and maintain its exemplary record,
it would have to reconsider the way its armed forces were trained.
With regard to the provision of mission-specific training such as cultural
sensitivity and basic language instruction, the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs
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was alarmed at the “ad hoc, last-minute approach to something as fundamental as the
ability to act effectively within a political/cultural milieu entirely different from
Canada’s.”

102

There is evidence of this last-minute approach to peacekeeping in the

January 1992 deployment of Andrew Chaplin to Operation MATCH as part of the United
Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) as a United Nations Military
Observer. Having first heard that he may have been going to El Salvador ten days earlier,
he found himself on a plane bound for that country on 25 January 1992. In the
intervening time, he encountered confusion over whether he was actually going or not,
mix-ups in his inoculation orders, and difficulties in obtaining the proper kit and
documentation.

103

There is no reference to training anywhere in the diary he kept during

this time. It seems that the ad hoc feature persisted, making the ensuing debate over the
nature of mission-specific training relevant.
A flurry of studies was produced following the Meeting New Challenges report.
The Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs (SCONDVA) issued
its own report in June 1993, titled The Dilemmas of a Committed Peacekeeper: Canada
and the Renewal of Peacekeeping. This report devoted an entire chapter to training and
cemented several ideas circulating at the time, including the notions that existing training
needed to be formalized and the creation of a permanent peacekeeping training facility
would benefit the Canadian Forces. The underlying argument, however, was that
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traditional military training was the best foundation for peacekeeping, and these skills
104

should be supplemented by peacekeeping-specific skills, not supplanted by them.

This

“soldiers first” stance that persisted throughout the 1990s has roots in the earliest
peacekeeping missions.
The SCONDVA report reiterated the “soldiers first” ethos in a quote from
Admiral John Anderson, then Chief of Defence Staff. Anderson claimed that “[t]he best
trained peacekeeper is still a well-trained and well-equipped member of the military.”

105

Yet the SCONDVA report expressed impatience with the CF’s insistence on that notion.
While it was acknowledged as basically true, the denial on the part of military planners of
the need of any additional skills outside the scope of traditional military training was
starting to infuriate those who read headlines about the war-like situations into which
Canadian soldiers were being sent under the banner of peacekeeping. After hearing
testimony from military officials that the ability to efficiently perform peacekeeping
duties stemmed pre-eminently from basic military training, the Standing Committee
issued a testy retort:
Thus, according to the Department of National Defence, if general purpose forces
can properly perform their duties in peacekeeping operations and conventional
military operations which may still be required, there is no need to change the
forces’ orientation and transform them into exclusively peacekeeping specialists.
Further, if general purpose military training is enough to enable Canadian military
personnel to carry out duties as Blue Berets, specialized peacekeeping training,
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apart from periodic training in general operations or the next operation in
106
particular, would, in their view, be superfluous.
While agreeing that there was still an operational need for versatile military forces to take
part in the heaviest combat or most pacific peacekeeping operations on limited notice,
SCONDVA felt that there was room for improvement in a training system they judged to
be of high quality, and that this could be done without robbing the Canadian Forces of
their military capabilities.

107

SCONDVA agreed with the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs on many
points. It also saw a need for a permanent peacekeeping training centre, and for the
training to be systematic, not ad hoc or given on an uneven basis.

108

SCONDVA

recognized the “tradition within the Canadian Forces whereby personnel with
peacekeeping experience pass on lessons learned in previous operations by word of
109

mouth.”

This was standard operating procedure in the past, but it was no longer

enough. SCONDVA was suggesting the institutionalization of the processes by which
peacekeeping knowledge and experience was transmitted.
Those who argued for the need to implement peacekeeping-specific training in the
Canadian Forces received qualified support from the 1994 White Paper on Defence. The
Chrétien government’s White Paper solidified the decision to remain active in
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peacekeeping missions throughout the 1990s, and this commitment would likely require
Canadian soldiers to possess both contact and combat skills. The White Paper reiterated
that
the Government believes that combat training – undertaken on a national basis as
well as with allies – remains the best foundation for the participation of the
Canadian Forces in multilateral missions. In situations short of war, such training
equips Canadian Forces personnel with the complete range of skills that may be
needed to meet the varied demands of the unexpected situations they will
encounter.110
In promising that “Canada will support and contribute to the enhancement of
peacekeeping training,” DND acknowledged the value of cultural sensitivity training,
instruction in international humanitarian law, and dispute resolution training prior to
deployment, but gave them little attention in favour of combat skills.
The continuing deficiencies of the Canadian peacekeeping training program were
highlighted in Training Requirements for Peacekeeping Operations, a late 1993 Deputy
Chief of Defence Staff study that met the question of the effectiveness of CF
peacekeeping training head on, and attempted to provide solutions.

111

This document

was given to environment Command Headquarters with the instruction to implement its
directives upon receipt. Because “the effectiveness of CF peacekeeping training has been
questioned,” specifically by the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans
Affairs, one recommendation resulting from this brief was that a review should be done
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Department of National Defence, 1994 Defence White Paper (Canada: Department of National
Defence, 1994), 34.
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Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, Training Requirements for Peacekeeping Operations, Document #
4500-1 (DCDS), (Ottawa: National Defence Headquarters, 14 December 1993).
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of peacekeeping training requirements.

112

This review was commissioned, and the

results appeared in A Report on a Deputy Chief of Defence Staff Study to Determine
Training Requirements for Canadian Forces Peacekeepers, authored by M.K. Bitten and
published on 29 March 1996. This study made its recommendations based on the results
of focus group discussions and 250 responses to a questionnaire. The overall conclusion
of the study was that
there is a clear requirement for peacekeeping and mission specific training over
and above normal combat and occupational training…[also] common standards
have not been developed and the quality, comprehensiveness and availability of
113
current training is inconsistent and, in specific areas, inadequate.
Yet the Canadian Forces still maintained its viewpoint that “the best core trainer for
[peacekeeping duties] is general purpose military training, with emphasis on basic
combat and specific-to-occupation skills.”114 This, coupled with annual and predeployment refresher training, fulfilled most of the training requirement for UN
peacekeeping operations. Nevertheless, there was recognition of the need for additional
training in UN peacekeeping and mission-specific subjects.
The Bitten study identified a list of thirteen objectives that should be met by
additional training for peacekeeping, among which were thorough knowledge of the
Rules of Engagement and the skills of mediation and negotiation. In addition, postdeployment debriefing sessions for returning personnel needed to be consistent in quality
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and availability. Bitten also argued that “although opinion is divided on the severity of
the problems caused by stress, training in stress awareness and management is an
essential requirement.”115 Making stress awareness a training requirement implicitly
made the point that, in hostile theatres of operations, the old peacekeeping ethic could no
longer hold sway. In the days of classic peacekeeping before the end of the Cold War,
violence and stress were not unknown, but they were usually sporadic and short-lived.
More recent peacekeeping theatres exposed peacekeepers to horrors and prolonged
stressful situations that required them to be equipped with coping mechanisms.
Responding to this “new peacekeeping,” the CF started putting its new
peacekeeping ethic into writing in the mid-1990s, through a series of DCDS
“Instructions” issued by National Defence Headquarters on the training and screening
processes for peacekeepers. While still agreeing that core military training was the best
preparation for peacekeepers, these new directives decided it was better to err on the side
of caution and recommended additional training in areas like mediation and conflict
resolution techniques; an introduction to the UN system and the UN Charter; UN
command and control structures; an overview of peacekeeping activities; mission security
and defence; emergency procedures; the proper conduct of a Canadian soldier in a
multinational force; the importance of the roles of civilians in “peacebuilding” initiatives;
humanitarian aid; impartiality; and cultural sensitivity and mission-specific topics such as
the history, tradition and culture of the country to which they were being sent.
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In May of 1996 the training of peacekeepers once again came under scrutiny, in
the Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons – Peacekeeping.
This report concluded that pre-deployment training was indeed improving, but that an
adequate system to standardize this training was still needed.

116

To achieve some

measure of consistency in training for peacekeeping, the Deputy Chief of the Defence
Staff, in December of 1996, issued two DCDS “Instructions” on the training and
screening processes for peacekeepers. These were NDHQ Instruction DCDS 4/96,
Screening, Preparation and Training of Individuals for Peace Support Operations and
NDHQ Instruction DCDS 5/96, Training Requirements for Peace Support Operations,
followed two years later by DCDS Direction to Commanders of Operational
Deployments, dated June 1998.

117

These represent a comprehensive attempt on the part

of the Department of National Defence to implement the recommendations made by the
various parliamentary Committees and internal departmental studies. They also went a
long way to integrating the combat and contact skills into a single skill set that, at that
point in time, seemed appropriate for peacekeeping duty.
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The section of DCDS 4/96 that deals with pre-deployment training begins with a
familiar refrain, but with a new twist:
The best core training for peace support operations is general purpose military
training with emphasis on basic combat and occupational skills. Prior to
deployment, refresher training may be required to ensure currency and
proficiency in these skills. There is also a requirement to augment them with
additional, mission-specific knowledge and to ensure that deploying personnel are
thoroughly briefed on operational and administrative aspects.118
This Instruction carefully sets out the criteria for prerequisite training and qualifications,
as well as the required mission-specific training. Mandatory refresher or prerequisite
training for any UN peace support operations posting must include: weapons handling;
NBCD (nuclear, biological, and chemical defence); first aid; physical fitness; and driving.
The entire scope of pre-deployment training must also encompass the following mission
specific subjects, if they are applicable to the peace support operation: mine awareness;
routine personal survival skills; enhanced first aid; preventive medicine measures;
operation and maintenance of equipment; intervention between hostile factions;
equipment recognition; conduct of investigations; monitoring for violations; operation of
communications equipment; navigation; media relations; relationships with governmental
and non-governmental organizations involved in peace support operations; stress
management; and use of force.119 These categories are repeated in DCDS 5/96. The
articulation of a decisive agenda for peace support operations training was an important
step in beginning the standardization of this training. Equally important were the
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initiatives to begin addressing relatively new issues in peacekeeping, such as civilmilitary cooperation, stress-awareness training, the ever-concerning ROEs, and
peacekeeping training centres.
The studies and reports discussed above resulted in some concrete changes to the
way in which Canadian soldiers were prepared to keep the peace. The CF and the
Department of National Defence undertook the implementation of a number of the
recommendations made by the studies and reports outlined above. A key example was
the creation of the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training
Centre (PPC) and the Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC). Two permanent centres
were established in the 1990s under the authority of the CF to implement recommended
changes to peacekeeping training and to direct its development. The Lester B. Pearson
Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre (which became known as the
Pearson Centre in 2012) grew out of a request from the UN that member states establish
regional and national peacekeeping training centres and the SCONDVA recommendation
for a permanent peacekeeping training centre. The proposal A 1994 Blueprint for a
Canadian and Multinational Peacekeeping Training Centre detailed a plan for the costeffective conversion of CFB Cornwallis in Clementsport, Nova Scotia into this centre,
with the intent to train Canadian and international civilians and military personnel for
peacekeeping duties.

120

120

The proposed curriculum specified the form and content, in

Common Security Consultants, A 1994 Blueprint for a Canadian and Multinational Peacekeeping
Training Centre at CFB Conrwallis (Nova Scotia: Prepared for the Province of Nova Scotia, January
1994).
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general terms, that courses at the centre would take. The peacekeeping training program,
which would include briefings, lectures, and field training and simulations, would cover
topics such as UN and peacekeeping operations; political and security considerations;
information on the responsibilities and tasks of a UN peacekeeper; briefings on the
conditions under which UN service is performed; and training for the role likely to be
assigned, and would emphasize lessons learned from previous operations; techniques and
requirements of current operations; survival and first-aid; and conflict resolution skills in
mediation, negotiation and de-escalation. Additional topics would include how to
function as part of a multinational force and how to respect the customs and habits of the
local population, and mission-specific or role-specific courses would also be offered.

121

The centre was established by the Government of Canada in 1994 to “support and
enhance the Canadian contribution to international peace, security and stability.”

122

It

was responsible for initiating the “New Peacekeeping Partnership,” a term it applied to
organizations and individuals who worked together to improve the effectiveness of
peacekeeping operations. It included the military; civil police; government and nongovernment agencies dealing with human rights and humanitarian assistance; politicians
and diplomats; the media; and organizations sponsoring development and
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democratization programs.

123

The PPC, as it became known, offered two foundational

courses, the “Basic Course” which was classroom-based and introduced students to the
basic tenets of peacekeeping and the New Peacekeeping Partnership; and the “Advanced
Course,” which was a four-week long course of study that took a multifaceted approach
to peacekeeping training. Among other methods, it delved into conceptual issues in
peacekeeping in a classroom setting, examined case studies of missions, held class
exercises in conflict mediation, hosted expert guest lecturers, and had the participants
conduct a field study through travel to UN headquarters in New York and to an active
124

UN mission.

This author attended the Basic Course and Advanced Course in 1999,

and traveled to the NATO mission in Bosnia as part of the field work. The coursework
was rigorous, and covered a great breadth of topics, as indicated by the list above. The
125

1994 Blueprint emphasized the desirability of attracting foreign participation,

and in

that the PPC appears to have been a success as there were far more international students
on these courses than Canadian attendees.
Over the course of its lifespan, the PPC trained 18,000 civilians, police, and
military from more than 150 countries. In 2011, its operations were moved from CFB
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Cornwallis and continued on a smaller scale from offices in Ottawa. In 2012 it lost its $4
million core funding from the federal government, and shut its doors in the fall of 2013.
126

Alex Morrison, President of the PPC from 1994 to 2001, believes it was a mistake to

move the centre from Cornwallis. As he said in October 2013, “[t]he government has
seen fit to reduce Canada’s participation in international peacekeeping. However, simply
because we’re not contributing thousands of peacekeepers around the world as we used to
is no reason not to continue to pass on the Canadian experience and expertise to other
countries.”

127

While Canada has lost this capacity, it has retained the ability to pass on

peacekeeping expertise among its own military personnel.
The Peace Support Training Centre was a member of the New Peacekeeping
Partnership, and is a component of the broader education and training program
encompassed by the Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre (CADTC), which was
the Land Force Doctrine and Training System (LFDTS) until its renaming in 2013.

128

Established in 1996 at Canadian Forces Base Kingston, the Peace Support Training
Centre provides operational training for Canadian Forces and other personnel prior to
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129

deployment to peace support operations, and is a place to “train the trainers.”

The

PSTC was highlighted by more than one DND survey respondent in this study as a centre
of excellence for peacekeeping training, while the PPC was not mentioned at all in the
108 survey responses. In one respondent’s opinion, “the people working at the PSTC in
Kingston are awesome, this is a really good idea, and I’m very happy that the DCDS has
mandated that everyone will attend prior to deployment.”

130

Major Luiz Araujo, Chief Instructor at the PSTC in 1999, said that the centre
aimed to teach personnel non-traditional military subjects, but that the best basis for good
peacekeepers is a soldier properly trained in military skills. In his view, peace support
operations training coupled with basic military training resulted in the best
peacekeeper.

131

There was a growing consensus in the 1990s among military personnel

and in military establishments in Canada that this was indeed the best formula for a
peacekeeper, and it was reflected in training policy. Major Araujo did, however, have a
word of caution for those who believed it was possible to train a peacekeeper to be
prepared for any situation. He believed that “you can never be prepared for what you’re
going to face in theatre; … you are not prepared to deal with the horrors of war until you
physically are there [and] you can’t ever be emotionally prepared for what you will
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see.”

132

Despite this challenge, the PSTC aimed to provide non-traditional and mission-

specific training “to provide a nucleus of expertise within the CF responsible for the
development of peace support techniques based on lessons learned, training
133

methodology, training standards and the provision of training and training support.”

On a visit to the PSTC in 2004, the author was able to observe the facilities used to run
the Basic and Military Observer resident courses at the PSTC, and learn about their
programs. PSTC curriculum covers the following areas: Peace Support Operations,
general; mission and mission area information; Military Observer duties; mine
awareness; risks and threats; negotiation and mediation skills; preventive medicine; stress
management; media awareness; code of conduct/Law of Armed Conflict; application of
force and ROEs; and administration, benefits, and allowances.

134

The PSTC also focused

on providing training assistance to DND, other government departments, and in some
cases other countries, as well as further developing the curricula for pre-deployment
training.
Major Serge Boissoneault, a Chief Trainer at the PSTC in 2004 and veteran of
several peacekeeping operations with thirty years of service, observed that when he first
joined the CF he would go on occasional courses and refresher training for combat
capabilities, but this was all the training he received for peacekeeping duties. This
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changed in the 1990s when the DCDS saw the need for mission-specific training, and
once the PSTC was stood up in 1996, it was determined that every member of the CF
would receive peace support training in the form of the seven-day basic course from the
PSTC. The training was only valid for one year after deployment with the exception of
the military observer course, which is valid for life except for any mission-specific details
it included. The PSTC employed a group of core trainers as well as guest speakers for
course delivery. It has outdoor training areas that include two observation posts, a mine
awareness training area with a “minefield,” a trip wire area in a forest, booby-trapped
houses, and a sandbox for wintertime mine probing. The PSTC also has a collection of
foreign weapons for familiarization purposes. The main difference between the PPC and
the PSTC was that the PPC operated at the operational and strategic level, while the
PSTC tends to focus on the tactical level.

135

The PPC and the PSTC were created in an environment of scrutiny of the
Canadian Forces and its training and indoctrination systems. Following the shocking
revelations of the actions of Canadian soldiers in Somalia in early 1993, the Canadian
public as well as members of the government of Canada erupted in debate over the state
of the CF. In the House of Commons, the opposition parties challenged the abilities of
the Mulroney government and its Defence Minister, Kim Campbell, to effectively deal
with the crisis and reform a military that was seen as badly damaged by some. Debates
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from April 1993 that occurred shortly after the Somalia Affair became public knowledge,
illuminate the environment of accusation and concern that this debacle caused in
government circles. Lloyd Axworthy, at that time Liberal MP for Winnipeg South
Centre, accused the government of a cover-up and expressed his conviction that the
inquiry being set up to investigate the Airborne’s actions in Somalia would not have all
the information available to it that it would need. Axworthy worried that the “Canadian
peacekeeping reputation [was] at risk and at jeopardy,” and believed that “the department
and the minister have also clearly failed to train and prepare our forces for that very
difficult assignment.”

136

The question of training came to the fore in these debates, as

did the CF’s “soldier’s first” stance. Axworthy was skeptical of witnesses such as
General Lewis Mackenzie who appeared before the House to argue against the need for
training beyond combat training. The Member of Parliament was critical of the position
in DND “that we do not need any changes in peacekeeping training, that we have these
wonderful peacekeepers who have done a good job for the last 40 years and we do not
137

have to change and try to understand in a new way what training should be.”

He was

clearly swayed by witnesses like Retired Brigadier-General Clayton Beattie, who argued
for a new approach to training that went beyond basic combat training.
Axworthy went on to point out that, when senior officers testified before the
House, they did not seem to have a good grasp of training requirements, and in the
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context of the mission to Somalia, “[t]hey did not understand the idea of working with the
development assistance workers who have been in the field to give them some serious
idea of what needs to meet.”

138

Given that the mission to Somalia, in all its iterations,

was supposed to be primarily a humanitarian mission, the prospect of working with aid
workers and non-governmental organizations in-theatre is a prospect for which
peacekeepers should have been prepared.
The broadening scope of peacekeeping is seen in increased civil-military
cooperation, and a rise in the involvement of non-governmental organizations (NGO) in
peacekeeping missions. Responsibility for ensuring human rights and the safety of
civilians in peacekeeping missions is not a new concept but the extent to which
peacekeeping missions became humanitarian relief missions signified a new role for the
military and required a greater degree of interaction between the CF and NGOs. The
roots of this new role may lie in the idea that Western nations had a responsibility to
maintain peace and stability in other areas of the world. As Dallaire, then deputy
commander of the Canadian Army, stated in 1995, “we have a human, legal and moral
obligation to prevent murder, crimes against humanity and certainly genocide,” as well as
to respond to humanitarian disasters.139
Canadian peacekeepers had to learn to cooperate with NGOs in-theatre. The
training for this role had been virtually non-existent, as Colonel Gordon Grant explains,
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one of my roles as an area commander [in the Velika Kladusa section of Bosnia]
was that I was ultimately responsible for all liaison with the twenty-nine nongovernment agencies and offices that operated within my area…When we entered
Bosnia there were a number of agencies that we had never dealt with
before…There were the United Church agencies, the Medecins Sans Frontiers,
and a number of others. Our relation to the NGOs was to first and foremost
provide protection to them. Secondly to facilitate the good work, the
humanitarian work that they were doing as long as it was not in conflict with our
own priorities, which was largely to ensure that the Dayton Accords were being
adhered to…I had no training of how to deal with NGOs [so] I had weekly
meetings with them and they were an interesting group because when you have
twenty-nine agencies you find first and foremost that there are whole areas of
humanitarian aid that none of them are addressing, and then there are other areas
where they’re all addressing it. They have their own mandates, their own visions,
they have their own views and just like a family they have their own rivalries.140
Eric Hoskins, a former Senior Policy Advisor to Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd
Axworthy, was able to give the non-governmental organization (NGO) perspective,
having served for many years providing emergency medical relief in war-torn areas. He
pointed out that there was often reciprocal suspicion in NGOs and the military, and that
closer cooperation brought benefits and risks. Cooperation often facilitated the
completion of the task at hand. One problem identified by Hoskins was that, although
NGO workers could benefit from the protection offered by the presence of a UN force,
taking advantage of the UN military presence could be dangerous for aid workers. Their
impartial status could be jeopardized if they were too closely identified with
peacekeeping forces, and they could then face the same risks that threaten the safety of
peacekeepers.141 Peacekeepers have often performed humanitarian acts, but the
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implementation of humanitarian aid as a part of the responsibilities of peacekeeping
clearly carried with it new dangers and difficulties for peacekeepers.142 They needed to be
trained to possess the “extra” skills to function successfully in multi-faceted peace
support operations.
Other MPs echoed Axworthy’s alarm at the changing nature of peacekeeping and
the resistance to conduct peacekeeping training. NDP MP Dan Heap argued that “events
in Bosnia and Somalia in particular have changed the need. Peacekeeping is not what it
used to be. The question arises particularly because of attempts to deal with situations
that peacekeeping did not have to deal with on previous occasions and which do not seem
to have been envisaged by the late Prime Minister Pearson, who initiated this. … We do
not have the clear boundary line between peacekeeping and war that we thought we had
for several decades.”

143

The Conservative response, provided by Ken James, the

Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, refuted what he
saw as the “false impression … that we can simply walk in off the street and become
144

peacekeepers by donning berets. Of course this is not possible.”

But if it was not

possible, then how was it done? James went on to state that the training of the CF was
appropriate to the task, and his evidence was that, during the over forty years that Canada
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had been peacekeeping, over 90,000 CF members had been involved in peacekeeping but
145

only ninety had lost their lives.

What James did not consider, however, was other lives lost during peacekeeping
missions. Sherene Razack argues, in her book Dark Threats and White Nights: The
Somalia Affair, Peacekeeping, and the New Imperialism, that “the official story that
emerged from the spectacle of the Somalia Affair – a spectacle that began with photos of
the violent death of a Black man in custody and Black children bound and humiliated –
was that of a gentle, peacekeeping nation betrayed by a few unscrupulous men. Violence
transformed into gold.”

146

Razack’s excellent exploration of racism, the Somalia Affair,

modern peacekeeping, and the Canadian peacekeeping mythology undermines the idea
that the events in Somalia were caused by a “few bad apples” in the Airborne Regiment.
There is no doubt that, as with previous peacekeeping and peace support operations,
situations change in-theatre, and even the best training can be found wanting. However,
the failings of the CARBG pointed to systemic problems within the Canadian Airborne
Regiment and the Canadian Forces more generally, a failure of leadership, the existence
of a ‘rogue’ culture of aggressiveness within the Regiment, and ultimately, a training
failure of catastrophic proportions. The identification of these problems led to the
creation of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to
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Somalia, which was tasked with reviewing the mission itself and its context, and
providing recommendations for the future. Certainly the public inquiry, which operated
from April 1995 to April 1997, determined that the Regiment had contained “rogue
147

soldiers, weak junior officers, and apathetic senior NCOs,”

but it went further and

identified systemic problems in the CF and made far-reaching recommendations for
change.
It is difficult to dismiss the need for “extra” training for peacekeeping duty above
and beyond traditional military training in light of the conclusions of the Commission of
Inquiry. In Somalia and the Changing Nature of Peacekeeping: The Implications for
Canada. A study prepared for the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of
Canadian Forces to Somalia, Allen G. Sens reached several conclusions about the
changing nature of UN peacekeeping and its implications for Canada, and in regard to
training, concluded that, “although military training provides the essential foundation, or
prerequisite, for effective peacekeepers, the expanding range of threats and tasks and the
localized nature of contemporary conflicts require that peacekeeping training and
mission-specific training be enhanced.”
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The Commission’s 1997 report, Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia
Affair. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to
Somalia, highlighted pre-deployment and in-theatre training as key aspects of preparing
CF personnel for peacekeeping. Several of its preparatory documents, such as the Report
and Recommendations on Non-Traditional Training for Canadian Military in
Preparation for Peacekeeping, which was prepared in December 1995 specifically for the
149

Commission,

provided thorough information about the state of training in the 1990s

and suggestions for improvement. The Somalia Commission of Inquiry’s final
conclusion on the matter of the training that the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle
Group received in the change from Operation CORDON (a fairly typical UN Charter
Chapter VI peacekeeping mission) to Operation DELIVERANCE (a Chapter VII peace
enforcement mission with new use-of-force policies) was that
there was no plan developed for in-theatre training, notwithstanding the numerous
shortcomings during pre-deployment preparations – most notably on the ROE –
which had been, or should have been, identified. There was a failure to provide
training – as opposed to instructions or orders – in theatre on ROE, on new SOPs,
and on local customs, traditions, politics and security. Insufficient measures were
taken to ensure an understanding on the part of soldiers of the meaning and
importance of issues related to the Law of Armed Conflict, cultural differences,
and use of force. This amounts to an inexcusable failure of leadership.150
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This statement is evidence of the “black eye” the Canadian Forces received over the
Somalia incident. The Commission of Inquiry thought training would have made a
difference to the behaviour of the Airborne Regiment in Somalia, serving to underline the
perception that adequate training is vitally important to the success of peacekeeping
missions and to the ability of soldiers to be good peacekeepers.
In its section on “Training,” the 1997 Report of the Somalia Commission of
Inquiry states that “fundamental to a unit’s operational readiness are troops well trained
to perform all aspects of the mission to which the unit is being committed.”

151

The

Commission was created to investigate the chain of command system, the leadership,
discipline, actions and decisions of the Canadian Forces, and the actions and decisions of
the Department of National Defence, in relation to the Canadian Forces’ participation in
152

the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Somalia in 1992-93,

and it was deeply

critical of the state of the Canadian Forces in the 1990s.
The report expressed surprise that, prior to 1992, “there was no formalized or
standardized training system for peace operations, despite almost 40 years of intensive
Canadian participation in international peace operations. No comprehensive training
policy, based on changing requirements, had been developed, and there was an absence
of doctrine, standards, and performance evaluation mechanisms respecting the training of
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units deploying on peace operations.”

153

As this study shows, even a superficial survey of

Canadian Forces training policy and practices throughout the Cold War period reveals an
almost complete lack of standardized training for peacekeeping. It is not that missionspecific or peacekeeping-specific training was never done, but rather it was not
implemented from the top down in a CF-wide approach, but on an ad hoc basis as
commanders saw fit.
Policies can be written, but whether or not they are carried out is often difficult to
determine. The responses of the 108 survey respondents to questions about their
peacekeeping training can be useful in determining if mission-specific training was
carried out, as a majority of them served on peacekeeping operations in the 1990s. To the
question “If you participated in more than one peacekeeping mission, did the type and/or
quality of peacekeeping training change over the course of your career?” only nine
responded “no.” The rest of the respondents indicated that training for the peacekeeping
missions on which they had served changed over time. Several indicated that the
duration and depth of training was different from one mission to another. As one
respondent stated, “For the mission in Rwanda, I received no training. I was called to
replace someone else on very short notice (one week). For the mission in Bosnia, it was
the other extreme! 7 months of training. There ought to be a middle ground because 7
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months training for a 6 month mission is more than a year away from your family.”

154

There was certainly no peacekeeping doctrine in the CF as it existed by the turn of the
century, and any suggestion that Canadian soldiers deployed on peacekeeping missions
required skills or knowledge beyond general-purpose combat training was often met with
open skepticism. This general-purpose combat training was often supplemented with
mission-specific training during the pre-deployment phase, but not in a truly standardized
manner.
It seemed that, with the report of the Commission of Inquiry and the earlier
establishment of the PPC and PSTC, specialized training for peacekeeping had finally
come into its own. A little over a year after the Commission released its report, a 1998
DCDS “Instruction” that discussed training for peacekeeping, the DCDS Direction to
Commanders of Operational Deployments, was disseminated. It reiterated the necessity
of pre-deployment training which includes refresher training for general-purpose military
training and mission-specific training. In addition, it addressed the need for predeployment stress training and post-deployment debriefings. This Instruction specifies
categories that are almost identical to the ones listed in 1996. Refresher Training
consisted of weapons handling, NBCD, first aid, physical fitness, driving, and the added
category of communications. The mission-specific topics were basically the same,
except that this Direction included four annexes that detailed the requirements for varying
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levels of specifications for peace support operations, and the mission-specific criteria for
each one was listed.155 This organization reflected the efforts of the Peace Support
Training Centre, which organizes and controls the requirements for certification in peace
support operations.156
While the CF worked to incorporate peacekeeping training into its standard
training procedures, the UN continued its work to standardize the training of national
contingents for its peacekeeping and peace support operations. In 2003 it published a
Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations, a primer on
the many facets of peacekeeping in the new millennia. It contained sections on the
Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Political Affairs, Civil Affairs, Public
Information, the Military, Mine Action Assistance, Police, Judiciary and Corrections
Aspects of the Rule of Law; Human Rights; Gender Mainstreaming; Administration and
Support; Security and Safety of Staff; Electoral Assistance; Humanitarian Assistance;
Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons; the World Bank and Post-Conflict
Reconstruction; and Recovery, Development and Sustainable Peace.

157

The section on

the military’s role repeats what had, by 2003, become conventional wisdom; namely that
the tasks of the UN military components have become increasingly complex
because conflicts in which they intervene no longer involve national armies alone
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but irregular forces, guerilla factions and even armed criminal gangs.
Consequently, the military capability under UN command has also changed and is
no longer the lightly armed intervention that was typical during the
158
Organization’s first 40 years of peacekeeping.
The handbook focused on two key areas in regard to the military: basic principles for
military activity, and military tasks in peacekeeping operations. The basic principles that
were to guide military forces in peacekeeping were impartiality and even-handedness in
the execution of the mandate; consent and cooperation of the parties to the conflict; the
appropriate use of force, usually only in self-defence, which the UN defined as “the right
to protect oneself, other UN personnel, UN property and any other persons under UN
protection; unity and international character, which was defined as “reflecting the will
and presence of the international community as a whole”; respect for the principles of
international humanitarian law; and respect for local law and customs.

159

Military tasks

in peacekeeping included support to peacemaking and political negotiations; providing a
secure environment; observation and monitoring; interposition between conflicting
parties; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), at least for the
disarmament and demobilization stage for former combatants; demining; enforcement of
sanctions; security sector reform and training; restoration of the maintenance of law and
order; human rights monitoring; support to humanitarian activities; and protection of
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160

civilians.

The protection of civilians, which was such a sensitive topic in relation to

the missions in the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, was qualified by the need for
inclusion of this responsibility in the mandate of the mission, and only in the case of
“imminent attack,” and if the military has the “capacity” to do so.

161

In discussing the issue of timely deployment, the handbook outlined that the
General Assembly had endorsed a requirement that traditional peacekeeping operations
should be established within thirty days, and more complex missions within ninety days
of the authorization of their mandates. To this end, the UN created the United Nations
Stand-by Arrangements System (UNSAS) in 1994 to track conditional pledges of
military units, equipment and individuals by Member States. “UNSAS allows DPKO to
know ahead of time what types of contributions countries are willing to make on short
notice.”

162

It was a measure meant to mitigate what Lester B. Pearson called

“improvising in haste.”
Complementing the creation of UNSAS was the formation of the Standby High
Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) in 1996. The desire to create a pool of standby, rapid
reaction forces for UN operations grew out of a recognition that
the only feasible alternative to time-consuming and inefficient ad-hoc
mechanisms of assembling peacekeeping forces from scratch from mission to
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mission, is the option of a pre-pledged and pre-earmarked pool of troops on
‘standby’ and on a level of ‘high readiness’, deployable at a short notice request
163
by the Security Council.
The SHIRBRIG concept, first introduced at the Ottawa Conference in 1964, was only
realized in 1996, and the organization itself lasted a mere thirteen years. Growing out of
a Danish initiative, SHIRBRIG came into being in 1995 with eleven members, including
Canada. SHIRBRIG was operational by January 2000, and deployed to Ethiopia/Eritrea
in November 2000 as part of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
(UNMEE). It provided ninety-five officers to the force headquarters as well as a
Canadian-Dutch infantry battalion and a Danish headquarters company.

164

SHIRBRIG

continued to be “heavily involved” in operations in Africa until it closed down in 2009.
The SHIRBRIG Lessons Learned Report, commissioned when the decision to end
SHIRBRIG was taken in 2008, blamed its “cumbersome decision-making process as well
as the persistent absence of resources and political will” for undermining its effectiveness
and causing its demise.

165

Although it did not survive, SHIRBRIG is another example of

Canada’s long-term commitment to improving the conditions under which its soldiers
serve international organizations on peacekeeping missions.
Canada’s army, as the branch of the armed forces most commonly tasked with
peacekeeping duty, experienced a comparatively high operational tempo in the 1990s. In
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166

the 2001 document Training Canada’s Army

, DND sought to “state the philosophy,

principles and processes that guide the new approach to Army training.” It asserted that
“[a]part from operations, training is the most important activity of an army. Success or
failure in operations is largely dependent upon the way an army plans and conducts its
training.”

167

It judged that, at the time, the Canadian military was training for two

distinct requirements: ongoing operations and future wars. It provided this assessment of
the current state of training in the Canadian Army:
Over the course of the 1990s the training focus of Canada’s Army has narrowed
steadily toward current operations. Skills at brigade and combined arms battle
group level have eroded, and collective training as a whole has centred around
pre-deployment training events. There have been no commonly applied
standards, and few training events have caused the Army to reconsider or change
its doctrine. The Army has failed to make maximum use of training to facilitate
learning. At the same time, our individual training system – while delivering
168
excellent training – has become very inefficient and unstable.
It appeared that the high operational tempo of the 1990s resulted in a focus, at least by
2001, on pre-deployment training at the expense of routinely scheduled military training.
Two major themes of this document were that training is command-driven, and training
must be systematic. These issues were challenging for an Army still in the shadow of the
Somalia Affair, which was judged to be in part a failure of leadership, and one that had
by this time a great deal of experience with ad hoc pre-deployment training.
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The challenge for the turn-of-the-century Canadian army was that it was required
to be prepared for operations that spanned the “Spectrum of Conflict” from operations
other than war (OOTW) such as UN or NATO peacekeeping, to war fighting, but
“violence and the requirements for combat capabilities are real throughout the
Spectrum.”

169

Training Canada’s Army puts forth the argument that,

[i]f the Army lacks the capability to operate throughout the Spectrum of Conflict,
it will not be able to satisfy the demands of national policy. Hence, the Army
must be multi-purpose. Also, if Canadian soldiers are not trained and equipped to
engage in combat, they will have limited operational utility. … Therefore
Canadian units must be combat capable. … Consequently, the Army trains
Canadian soldiers, leaders and units for … multi-purpose, war-fighting skills, and
170
adds to this training the theatre and mission-specific training (TMST).
This document outlines the varying levels of capabilities, training, and operational
readiness based on core competencies. Theater and mission-specific training is specific
mission requirements not covered as part of training for war-fighting. Areas that are
included are combat tasks such as ROEs, environmental survival skills and non-combat
skills such as negotiation techniques and languages. “The mission and the environment
dictate the TMST.”

171

This training

may take place before deployment, in-theatre or both. TMST will normally focus
upon acclimatization, tasks prevalent in a particular theatre of operations
(including inter-agency work) and cultural familiarization to enhance
understanding of the environmental, political and social conditions there. TMST
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is conducted after general-purpose, war-fighting BTS [battle task standard]
172
training occurs to the assigned level.
Although the foundation in combat training has not changed, the approach to missionspecific training is a significant departure for a military that, for many years, decried the
need for any mission-specific, and particularly peacekeeping-mission specific, training.
The 1990s was a period of drastic change in the way governments and
international organizations approached the job of preparing for peacekeeping.
Peacekeeping training centres were created, guidelines for peacekeeping training were
developed, and systems to manage standby forces for UN operations were stood-up.
These efforts were undertaken by individuals, government bodies, and the Canadian
Forces in the expectation that an operational training standard could be established that
would allow a Canadian peacekeeper to enter a theatre of operations fully confident that
he or she was capable of performing assigned duties. Possessing a strong basis in general
military training made up a good deal of this requirement, but as recent history had
shown, it was no longer enough, and perhaps it never was.
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In Conclusion

Since Canada made its first peacekeeping commitment, the nature of the obligations and
demands that peacekeeping places on Canadian military personnel have changed
drastically. The Canadian Forces has held fast to its conviction that the soundest
foundation for peacekeeping duties is general military training with an emphasis on
combat and occupational skills, and that the forces should not be trained solely for
peacekeeping.1 In the post-Cold War era, the CF has gradually developed a program of
specific training levels that must be met by soldiers before they can be deployed on a
peacekeeping mission. These additional skills include negotiation and mediation
techniques, general knowledge of the workings and mandate of the United Nations, a
thorough knowledge of the Rules of Engagement, civil-military cooperation,
humanitarian aid issues, stress management training and mission-specific training in local
customs, culture, and language.2 These training standards have been created following

1

Others feel differently. Michael Harbottle, in his study, New Roles for the Military. Humanitarian and
Environmental Security, identifies three specific roles for the armed forces, one of which is that of
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create security patterns and models which are founded on co-operation, not confrontation.” Harbottle’s idea
is interesting, especially given his emphasis on training requirements that focus on cultural awareness. Yet
Harbottle’s ideas effectively neutralize the armed forces; there is no defensive aspect left, and military
skills, aside from when they can be used for the purposes of the civilian population, are dismissed as
virtually unnecessary. With the advent of peacekeeping operations that are exceedingly dangerous, military
and combat skills have a definite place in the training of any peacekeeper.
2

An article in the New York Times titled “War Colleges Now Training Soldiers in the Art of Peace”
discusses the initiatives undertaken by American military colleges to teach skills other than traditional
military skills to achieve the goal of “hav[ing] trained forces who can fight if necessary but who are also
skilled at working with the local population, international organizations, aid groups and the former warring
armies. They end up knowing not only how to set up and operate road blocks but also how to act like
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decades of practice in the art of peacekeeping, and Canada has had a long history in
international peacekeeping from which to glean lessons learned. The first forty years of
peacekeeping, however, were marked with a reluctance to adapt training to meet the
specific needs of peacekeeping, and led to the creation of a national myth of the Canadian
peacekeeper that likely hampered progress in the area of peacekeeping training.
Canada’s participation in international peacekeeping has been mythologized in
literature and public perception for decades. A Canadian, Lester B. Pearson, is
considered the father of United Nations peacekeeping and won the Nobel Prize for his
efforts. During the Cold War, Canada earned a reputation as a troop-contributing nation
of unequalled consistency and dedication. The creation of the Canadian Peacekeeping
Service Medal in 1988, the dedication of the Peacekeeping Monument in Ottawa in 1992,
and the prominent featuring of Pearson’s image and words in teachings related to
peacekeeping, such as the instruction that takes place at the Lester B. Pearson Canadian
International Peacekeeping Training Centre and the information promulgated by the
United Nations Association in Canada, all served to cement peacekeeping’s place in
Canadian national identity well past the end of the Cold War. For decades this reputation
went largely unchallenged and persisted despite disasters in Canada’s peacekeeping

practical small-town mayors.” This multiplicity of roles aptly describes the range of hats peacekeepers have
been asked to put on when they wear the blue beret. Elizabeth Becker, “War Colleges Now Training
Soldiers in the Art of Peace,” The New York Times (6 August 1999).
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record, but little explanation can be found in scholarship to explain how Canadian
military personnel seemingly filled the role of peacekeeper so well.
National character was often cited as one feature that made Canadian soldiers
eminently suitable to wear the blue beret. Canadians were neutral, diplomatic by nature,
and did not hail from a former colonial power. They embodied a ‘can do’ attitude that
was well-suited to the unpredictable and ad hoc nature of peacekeeping operations. This
essential argument can be distilled as “Canadians make good peacekeepers because they
are Canadian,” and former peacekeepers themselves, in some cases, internalized this
rationale. However, this optimistic line of thinking glossed over the real challenges faced
by Canadian soldiers deployed to peacekeeping operations, and did not address the
specific preparation received by those soldiers to carry out their duties in international
theatres of operation. Consideration of this problem revealed that, at the heart of
preparation and suitability for peacekeeping operations, was the issue of training. The
Canadian Forces has long placed an emphasis on its training program to ensure that its
soldiers have a solid foundation of combat and occupational skills. If training for
military personnel was central to war-fighting, then it must also have been central to
peacekeeping. However, there is little treatment of training in the literature about the
Canadian role in international peacekeeping, and any attempt to address how Canadian
soldiers have been trained for peacekeeping duty since the 1950s often falls back on the
issue of national identity.
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An examination of the evolution of training in the Canadian Forces promised to
address these questions and possibly clarify not only why Canadians were thought to be
good peacekeepers, but whether, in fact, they were well-prepared to do the job tasked to
them at various times in the history of Canadian peacekeeping. Through an examination
of documentary evidence and secondary sources related to peacekeeping-specific training
in the Canadian Forces, as well as the testimony of CF members who have served on
peacekeeping operations, it has been demonstrated that the CF maintained its “soldiers
first” stance in regard to peacekeeping, but has, over time, incorporated add-on training
for peacekeeping into its pre-deployment training to enhance its soldiers’ abilities in
peacekeeping situations.
Early, active participation in the UN positioned Canada to take advantage of its
“middle power” status to play a key role in the birth of peacekeeping, an activity that
provided the country with a high profile on the international stage that it would not have
had otherwise. Participation in the UN’s earliest military observer missions, UNTSO and
UNMOGIP, positioned Canada to play a significant role in the creation of the UNEF.
Canada’s leading role in UNEF, both politically and militarily, led to a sustained
commitment to peacekeeping throughout the 1960s with Canada participating in every
mission created in these decades, including noteworthy commitments to ONUC and
UNFICYP. For these early missions of the late 1950s and 1960s, soldiers relied on their
combat and occupations skills to carry out their duties, and for the most part these skill
sets seemed appropriate to the military-style operations they undertook. By the 1960s,
however, Canadian planners started to think about how to effectively train armed forces
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for peacekeeping as UN peacekeeping presented planners and practitioners with some
challenges outside the normal purview of military activity.
The central problem that arose was that peacekeeping was an ‘unmilitary task’
that could only be carried out by military forces, or, according to a popular saying, it was
“not a soldier’s job but one only a soldier can do.” The ad hoc nature of peacekeeping
was also problematic, and so studies were commissioned and national and international
meetings held to try to find a sensible way to counteract this influence. For example, the
1963 World Veterans Federation Report The Functioning of Ad Hoc United Nations
Emergency Forces, which included the opinions of Canadian General E.L.M. Burns,
sought to address planning, organization, and information-sharing, which were believed
to be obstacles to effective peacekeeping. With the inclusion of peacekeeping as a
priority in the 1964 White Paper on Defence, peacekeeping was cemented as a touchstone
of Canada’s defence policy. Concurrently, the Canadian Army issued the April 1964
Central Command Operation Instruction 64/1 United Nations Standby Battalion Group,
an instruction aimed to set out clear guidelines for a Canadian military contingent being
deployed as part of a UN peacekeeping force, and particularly to ensure that the
designated UN Standby Battalion was maintained in a state of readiness for short-notice
deployments. Training in matters such as local customs, culture, and language were
mentioned, but it was left up to commanders whether such training would be carried out,
as the emphasis was on the phases of deployment that got the contingent to the theatre of
operations with all their necessary equipment in a reasonable amount of time. A number
of Canadian initiatives in the 1960s signaled a growing interest in the standardization of
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pre-deployment arrangements and a growing unease with the ad hoc nature of the
preparation and training for peacekeeping. These initiatives included the November 1964
conference “The Meeting of Military Experts to Consider the Technical Aspects of UN
Peacekeeping Operations,” which was held in Ottawa; the 1966 document Canadian
Operations in Support of the United Nations: Organization and Training of Canadian
Military Forces Earmarked for Service with the United Nations; the 1967 Kingston
Conference that resulted in the 1968 publication of Peacekeeping: International
Challenge and Canadian Response; a series of Defence Research Board meetings; and
finally R.J. Hill’s April 1968 report Command and Control Problems of UN and Similar
Peacekeeping Forces.
The result of this interest was some revision of Canadian training standards, the
creation of clear instructions for the UN Standby Battalion, and an effort to have the UN
improve its own standby arrangements and organizational capacity for peacekeeping
operations. Yet, if peacekeeping training did occur during the Cold War, it remained
sporadic and varied from unit to unit. Problematically, this introspection took place at a
time when operational tempo was increasing at such a pace that it was difficult to
implement change while committed to deployments in Africa, the Middle East, and
Europe. And even when this tempo slowed, this approach to peacekeeping persisted
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, during a time when few new missions were created and
the status quo was maintained. Canadian military personnel sometimes received
peacekeeping-specific training but mainly relied on their “soldiers first” training to carry
them through Cold War-era peacekeeping deployments.
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The end of Cold War re-wrote Canada’s, and the world’s, peacekeeping playbook.
The emergence of intra-state conflict in Africa and Europe, in the absence of Cold War
superpowers to control them, meant that the UN was busier than ever sending multinational forces to war-torn countries. Missions quickly became increasingly multifaceted
and more dangerous, and often involved engagement an intra-state conflict, a large
humanitarian component, and more challenging ROEs. Traditional peacekeeping
definitions quickly became outdated, and national militaries struggled to adapt to new
demands for international intervention in scenarios that too often included gross human
rights violations and ongoing violence. Operational tempo was a concern as never
before, as twenty-three new operations were created between 1990 and 1996 alone.
In the post-1990 era of peacekeeping, the peacekeeping ethic of the Canadian
Forces changed, and as peacekeeping missions became ever-more demanding, the forces
put more emphasis on peacekeeping training. This seems to have stemmed in part from
concern about the strain that these post-Cold War, multi-dimensional peace support
operations were putting on the personnel of the Canadian Forces, and in part from the
public scrutiny that the Canadian Forces endured in this decade. Two Senate Committee
reports, the March 1993 Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Meeting
New Challenges: Canada’s Response to a New Generation of Peacekeeping, and the June
1993 report of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs The
Dilemmas of a Committed Peacekeeper: Canada and the Renewal of Peacekeeping,
raised difficult questions about the nature of Canada’s peacekeeping commitment. They
both also expressed frustration with the “soldiers first” attitude among military leadership
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when it came to the preparation of Canadian military personnel for deployment on
peacekeeping operations. The Chief of Defence Staff also commissioned studies in the
mid-1990s to address training for peacekeeping, and more attention began to be paid to
the opinions of soldiers who had served on peacekeeping operations by academics.
Additionally, the Canadian Forces instituted a program to standardize the
3

transmission of lessons learned with the creation of the Peace Support Training Centre
in Kingston, Ontario, the creation of the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International
Peacekeeping Training Centre in Cornwallis, Nova Scotia, and the implementation of
training standards as part of peacekeeping doctrine and DCDS directions. This training
was different from basic military training, although the CF has never wavered in its
conviction that the general-purpose combat-capable soldier is the best material with
which to make a peacekeeper, and the best method through which to achieve this was to
adhere to a “soldiers first” approach to training. However there was finally a recognition
that additional skills such as negotiation and mediation techniques as well as education in

3

There is also a Canadian Army Lessons Learned Centre (ALLC) whose job it is to “collect observations
and actionable lessons from operations at the tactical level,” but its activities are not restricted to
peacekeeping operations. Canadian Army Lessons Learned Centre, “Mission, Mandate and
Responsibilities” (Kingston: Land Force Doctrine and Training System, 24 May 2012),
http://armyapp.forces.gc.ca/ALLC-CLRA/mmr-eng.asp. The ALLC produces a publication, Dispatches,
that engages thematic topics of relevance to CF members, such as expeditionary operations, human
intelligence (HUMINT) during peace support operations, the law of armed conflict, and negotiation, for
example. Canadian Army Lessons Learned Centre, Dispatches: Operations in the Former Republic of
Yugoslavia, Volume 4, No 1 (Canada: The Army Lessons Learned Centre, September 1996); Canadian
Army Lessons Learned Centre, Dispatches: The Law of Armed Conflict. Peace Support Operations and
You, Volume 4, No 2 (Canada: The Army Lessons Learned Centre, March 1997); Canadian Army Lessons
Learned Centre, Dispatches: Lessons Learned for Soldiers. Humint During Peace Support Operations,
Volume 8, No 1 (Canada: The Army Lessons Learned Centre, June 2001); and Canadian Army Lessons
Learned Centre, Dispatches: Lessons Learned for Soldiers. Negotiations During Peace Support
Operations, Volume 8, No 2 (Canada: The Army Lessons Learned Centre, October 2001).
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humanitarian relief and civil-military cooperation would be useful, and in some cases
critical to safety, on peacekeeping operations.
Ironically, the decade that saw the greatest improvement in standards for
peacekeeping-specific training also held the largest challenges for Canadian personnel
with UN operations. Missions in the Former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda tested
the mettle of Canadian soldiers to the breaking point. Ongoing violence and human
rights violations in these countries meant that UN peacekeepers were faced with
professional and personal dilemmas on a frequent basis, and this was compounded in
many cases by unclear ROEs, bureaucratic problems with the UN, funding and
equipment issues, and a local population that was not always supportive of the UN’s
presence. As one CF soldier in Somalia wrote, “[w]e settled down to wait out the night,
peering into the darkness and the crowd. We watched for the kid with the grenade
instead of a rock, or the sniper in the shadows. You never know when it will happen.
4

You must always be on guard.” Amidst these challenges, Canadian military personnel
displayed their best and worst behaviour. The worst was undoubtedly the actions of the
CARB in Somalia, and this resulted in the damning report of the Somalia Commission of
Inquiry.
The report of the Commission of Inquiry was a condemnation of past practices
that went far beyond the mission in Somalia, and a warning for the future of the CF.

4

Robert Prouse, “The Canadian Regiment in Somalia, 1993,” J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, eds.
Battle Lines: Eyewitness Accounts from Canada’s Military History (Toronto: Thomas Allen Publishers,
2004), 426.
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The conflicts in the Balkans, Somalia, and Rwanda are the missions that seem to have
had the greatest impact on peacekeeping training in the CF. The report’s conclusion
stated that:
Training is the bedrock of discipline and the foundation for the professional image
of the armed forces. Fundamental to the operational readiness of a unit is the
question of whether troops are well trained to perform all aspects of the specific
mission for which the unit was being deployed. In this report, we have striven to
answer the question of whether the soldiers who were deployed to Somalia were
properly trained for their mission. This involved an assessment of the nature and
adequacy of the actual training received and the policies underlying the training,
together with an examination of whether the performance of our soldiers could
have been improved or enhanced if they had been exposed to additional, more
focused and sophisticated training. Our conclusion regarding mission-specific
training is that on almost every count the Somalia mission must rate as a
significant failure.5
The rhetoric of shame was employed throughout this report, and it made several
recommendations for improvement. The CF has adapted to these recommendations for
change by further underlining the “soldiers first” attitude, while also stressing the need
for peacekeeping- and mission-specific skills.
In 1994, retired Brigadier General Clay Beattie wrote that, in view of Canada’s
leading contribution to international peacekeeping,
as the UN is calling for greater international inter-operability, including
cooperative training between military and civilian elements, our Government is
responding with a token approach which will not ensure the required coordination
and cooperation. Ideally forces and agencies that plan to work together as
peacekeepers should train together as much as possible, outside theatres of

5

Somalia Commission of Inquiry, “Conclusion,” Report of the Commission of Inquiry..
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operations, and at all levels of responsibility from that of the private soldier to the
6
civilian election-monitor and aid worker to the military commander.
He argued that, the “unfortunate incidents in Somalia confirm the need for specialized
and comprehensive peacekeeping training which goes beyond advanced combat
training,” and, contrary to the beliefs of some government officials, peacekeeping was
not the “flavour of the month.” Beattie believed that peacekeeping “is an enduring diet or
regimen for peace which Canada has adhered to since Lester Pearson launched the
concept during the 1956 Suez Crisis.”

7

This variety of peacekeeping includes

participation in Provincial Reconstruction Teams, civilian, military, and police
components, and the integration of peacekeeping and peacemaking actions into an overall
“3D” strategy that integrates diplomacy, development, and defence into an over-arching
approach to international conflict resolution and long-term, sustained post-conflict
peacebuilding. “We can readily endorse the need for combat-capable forces,” Beattie
claimed, “not only because they are essential for national security but because such
forces, when trained in special techniques of peacekeeping, complement our goals in the
8

realm of international peace and security.” The security environment demanded that
Canada’s soldiers maintain their combat skills to a high state of readiness, but the

6

BGen (ret’d) C.E. Beattie, “Privatized Training for Peacekeeping: a Retrograde Operation,” Peace and
Environment News (April 1994), http://207.112.105.217/PEN/1994-04/s-beattie.html.
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peacekeeping expertise that has been built up needs to be nurtured and maintained, so as
not to squander the lessons of the previous half-century.
The examination of peacekeeping by the Canadian government did not slow at the
turn of the century. In 2000, the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs tabled a
study titled The New NATO and the Evolution of Peacekeeping: Implications for Canada,
which examined all aspects of peacekeeping carried out under NATO, including
training.9 The key emphasis here was on the divergence between the “old” and “new”
NATO, and the significance of “new peacekeeping” and the human security agenda
championed by former Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy as early as 1990.10 The
Department of National Defence also sought to improve all aspects of training through
the dissemination of Training Canada’s Army, which recognized the strain that the high
operational tempo of the 1990s had put on the core training of the Canadian Army. In
addition, various United Nations documents and peacekeeping-training related
documents published by nations involved in peacekeeping11 were promulgated. The
Report of the Panel on UN Peacekeeping Operations, commonly known as the Brahimi
Panel Report, which was the result of a widespread re-evaluation of peacekeeping at the
UN level, is an important pre-September 11, 2001 document that summarizes the
condition of UN Peacekeeping at the turn of the twenty-first century, and highlights areas

9

The Senate of Canada, The New NATO and the Evolution of Peacekeeping: Implications for Canada.
Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs (Canada: The Senate of Canada, April 2000).
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For example, the Italian Defence General Staff’s Joint Handbook for Peace Operations, Document No.
SMD-G-015 (Rome: Italian Defence General Staff, 1994).
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that needed improvement.12 With the Brahimi Panel Report, the reinvention of
peacekeeping and peacekeeping training that had begun in the 1990s promised to
continue into the new century, but this process was somewhat cut short by the events of
11 September 2001. The War on Terror caused the CF to rededicate a great deal of its
resources to the mission in Afghanistan, which only came to an end in March 2014. With
the end of this mission, it is uncertain whether the government of Canada will choose to
reinvest in its peacekeeping heritage. It can be argued in any case that the peacekeeping
experience accumulated by the Canadian Forces, the lessons it learned, and any
peacekeeping-specific training its personnel received, has been useful in maintaining
combat readiness and instilling a sense of flexibility in a military corps that has had to
fight a “War on Terror” against a sometimes amorphous enemy in an unfamiliar terrain.
The line between peacekeeping, peace-making and war-fighting became
increasingly blurred in the 1990s, and the following recollections of one Canadian soldier
demonstrates this blurring, and its aftermath, rather vividly: “My first week in Rwanda
was spent sleeping in an abandoned building in downtown Kigali amongst hundreds of
Rwandan refugees, injured people, corpses, dead rats and across the street from where the
battle for Kigali was taking place.”13 When asked for help by a local Rwandan man he
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Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations.
United Nations document A/55/305–S/2000/809 (New York: United Nations, 21 August 2000),
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knew, he followed the man into a yard to assist with the removal of the body of a boy
who had been killed by a landmine.
I then realized that he had brought both of us into a heavily mined field. We
screamed for help but no one came. After standing still for what seemed like 15
to 20 minutes, I decided to simply walk out of the minefield. Later that day, I
returned to the scene with Canadian engineers. … The engineers uncovered a
dozen TS-50 antipersonnel land mines in the 50-metre-long trail I had walked
earlier that day. 14
He also recounted how he began to experience symptoms of PTSD upon return to Canada
such as nightmares, an inability to concentrate, flashbacks, impatience, and anger, and
how, after contemplating suicide, he tried to get help. “I met twice with a psychiatrist,
but did not feel like he understood or believed the stories I was telling him.” It took him
over five years to get help, and
I have now lived with my condition for over four years. Living with PTSD is not
as obvious as living with a missing arm or another part of one’s body. PTSD
affects one’s soul, it drains you, it prevents you from enjoying life the way you
used to enjoy it and in my opinion cannot be measured in an accurate, quantifiable
way. … It also feels like you have lost your taste buds for life. You know how
you should feel and how life should taste, but there is no flavour any more. .. One
thing is certain, I am not the same person who departed for Rwanda in 1994.15
The unexpected conditions encountered on peacekeeping operations, and the increased
incidence of PTSD in the 1990s was a by-product of a high operational tempo,
increasingly challenging missions, and at times insufficient mission-specific training.
Circumstances aligned in the decade after the Cold War to throw in sharp relief the
shortcomings of the Canadian way of preparing its soldiers to be peacekeepers.

14
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Peacekeeping as conceptualized by Lester B. Pearson involved a military
intervention force composed of multi-national forces, designed to separate combatants
until a diplomatic solution could be arrived at. The members of such a force would be
mainly required to carry out soldierly duties. Peacekeeping, as it very soon was
practiced, was a new hybrid activity that was not soldiering but required a firm
foundation in military skills, something that was not a soldier’s job but one only a soldier
could do. As peacekeeping and the warfare it was intended to quell evolved in response
to developments on the international level, it became clear that peacekeepers must be
“soldiers plus.” When dealing with belligerents and local populations in a peacekeeping
theatre they must separate and negotiate, defend and engage, adhere to their ROEs, carry
out their mandate, and often work on the “hearts and minds” of local populations by
carrying out humanitarian work. This resulted in a reorientation in the Canadian Forces’
training program to include peacekeeping, and in the process raised much concern but
little chance that the Canadian Forces would abandon traditional military training in
favour of creating an exclusive “peacekeeping force” that dealt exclusively with peace
support operations and humanitarian interventions. The results of the DND survey
conducted for this study revealed a concern among the CF personnel surveyed that this
would happen. Several responses relayed the idea that, although they believed
peacekeeping should be done and they were glad to do it, it should not become the sole
task of the CF.16 This concern over the possible erosion of war-fighting skills stemmed
from a desire to preserve the CF’s traditional purpose as a force dedicated to defending
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Canada, working with the US to protect North America, honour its international security
commitments, and only fourthly participate in international missions to preserve peace on
a global scale, as twentieth century defence White Papers indicated. Yet there was an
incorporation of peacekeeping into the CF’s military ethos, and perhaps this acceptance
grew out of a belief that Canada’s soldiers should be out in the world engaging in
activities that preserve peace, or the more pragmatic view that peacekeeping afforded the
CF operational experience they would otherwise lack.
The implication of this study, which was carried out using secondary,
documentary, and oral history sources, is that the pre-deployment training offered by the
Canadian Forces for peacekeeping operations was insufficient to deal with many aspects
of peacekeeping for many years, and the acceptance that additional training was
necessary for peacekeeping only came after the challenging missions in the early 1990s.
Since its first foray into peacekeeping in the Suez in 1956, the Canadian Forces have
displayed a reluctant willingness to adapt and change in response to new demands placed
upon the organization for more and better peacekeepers. Several decades of experience
and lessons learned, and the critical changes to the peacekeeping training scheme that
took place in the 1990s, will continue to contribute to the professionalism and state of
readiness of the Canadian Forces. At the heart of training in the Canadian Forces is the
intention to produce capable, professional soldiers who will be protected from harm, both
physical and psychological, by that training, and whom can therefore carry out their
mandate, whether it is to protect civilians, monitor a cease-fire, or hunt down terrorists.
While this process has not always been perfect, the evolution of peacekeeping training in
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the Canadian Forces has contributed to this process and made a certain degree of
flexibility possible, by shoring up “soldiers first” training with add-on skills to produce
combat-capable, multi-purpose armed forces for Canada.
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Appendix A: UWO Ethics Review
Office of Research Ethics
The University of Western Ontario

Trista Grant

September 2005

Re: Ethics Review # 9581S, project title “Policy, Training and Performance: Canada’s
Peacekeepers from Suez to Sarajevo.”
To Whom It May Concern:
I received full approval from the Office of Ethics Research to conduct interviews
and distribute surveys as part of my Ph.D. dissertation research in May 2003, and am now
submitting this letter to confirm that the survey and interview portion of my dissertation
research has been concluded. In total, I interviewed 11 people and collected 112 survey
responses. They have been analyzed and the results are being incorporated into my
dissertation. This work has been carried out in full accordance with the guidelines and
regulations set out by the Ethics Committee and the process outlined in my proposal to
the Committee.
Should you require any further information, do not hesitate to contact me.
Thank you,
Trista Grant
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Appendix B: DHRRE Approval
Director Human Resources Research and Evaluation
National Defence Headquarters
DHRRE RESEARCH REVIEW BOARD DECISION
Serial Number: 262/03
Title: Policy, Training and Performance: Canada’s Peacekeepers from Suez to Sarajevo.
Researcher: Trista Grant
Organization: University of Western Ontario
Review and Discussion:
1.
The general idea of any research on individuals is to provide a product respecting
the rules of the scientific approach and following the deontological code of behavioural
sciences. Your research proposal satisfies these two requirements and is therefore
approved.
2.
Your project is assigned survey coordination number: 262/03. The following
text shall be displayed on the front page of your survey(s) and consent form(s):
DHRRE authorizes the administration of this survey within DND/CF in
accordance with CANFORGEN 145/02 ADMHRMIL 079 UNCLASS 131028Z
DEC 02. Authorization number: 262/03.
DRERH autorise l’administration de ce sondage dans le MDN/FC en accord vec
CANFORGEN 145/02 ADMHRMIL 079 UNCLASS 131028Z DEC 02. Numéro
d’autorisation : 262/03.
3.
You are reminded that any changes to the approved protocol or any untoward
incidents or injuries arising as a result of any subject’s participation in the study shall be
brought to the attention of the Committee Chairperson in writing immediately.
4.
This approval is valid for the period of 18 months from the date of this meeting.
Subject involvement must be complete by this date; otherwise, the protocol will require
further review.
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5.
To ensure that the survey co-ordination function primarily serves practical rather
than research interests, DHRRE requires an electronic copy of any research reports
arising out of this request/project.
6.
The following disclaimer shall be presented as the first page of the research
report.
“The opinions expressed in this document are those of the author and are not necessarily
those of the Department of National Defence or the Canadian Forces”
7.
You are required to contact the Level 1 authorities prior to the administration of
your survey in order to coordinate appropriate timings and locations. Failure to do so
will result in revocation of this authorization.
8.
Please accept our acknowledgements for your contribution to research within the
Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence.
(original signed by)
Director Human Resources Research and Evaluation

(Forwarded 5 July 2004)
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Appendix C: Survey Cover Letter (English)
Trista L. Grant
Ottawa, Ontario
Dear Sir or Madam,
Enclosed is a 24-question survey on your experience as a Canadian peacekeeper,
and more specifically the training you received for your peacekeeping duties. This study
is being conducted as part of my research for the Ph.D. program in History at the
University of Western Ontario. The results of this study will be used in my doctoral
thesis, which is currently titled “Policy, Training and Performance: Canada’s
Peacekeepers from Suez to Sarajevo.” The purpose of my research is to study the history
of training for peacekeeping operations conducted by the Canadian Forces from 1956 to
the present.
DHRRE authorizes the administration of this survey within DND/CF in
accordance with CANFORGEN 145/02 ADMHRMIL 079 UNCLASS 131028Z DEC 02.
Authorization number: 262/03. This survey was approved by departmental staff before
the Department of National Defence provided your name for my survey sample, and a
final copy of my dissertation will be provided to the Department, however DND will not
have access to individual questionnaires, and this work is not being done on the
Department’s behalf. While some serving members may feel that they will be placed in a
difficult position if they express negative opinions about their employer (the Canadian
Forces), participation in this survey is purely voluntary. You may refuse to participate,
refuse to answer any questions or withdraw from the study at any time. You are not
asked for identifying information (i.e. your name or service number) on the survey, but
you will be asked for some demographic information (age, gender, rank, etc.). The
researcher will make every effort to safeguard your identity.
A possible risk in completing this questionnaire would be the recollection of
experiences that incur psychological or emotional discomfort. Should you chose to fill
out the survey, you may refuse to answer any individual question, without prejudice, due
to the sensitive nature of some of the information addressed on the questionnaire. You
should not participate if it is likely that the discussion of memories of past events will
induce stress, fear, anxiety, or cause you other significant risk. A list of health contacts is
enclosed for your use. No compensation will be given for participation in this project.
If you participate in this study, please complete the survey and return your
handwritten or typed responses to the address below. Feel free to attach additional pages,
should you require additional space for your responses. Should you prefer to receive this
survey by e-mail, please contact me and I would be happy to send you an electronic copy,
which can be returned to the same e-mail address. The length of time it takes to complete
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the survey will be determined by the length of your responses to the questions, but will
likely take approximately one hour.
Completion and return of the questionnaire indicates your consent to participate in
the study. This means that your responses can be used by the principal investigator
(Trista Grant) in a thesis or any other resulting academic work. The investigator may
quote from the survey or use the information provided in the survey in other accepted
forms in historical research. The surveys will be kept by the researcher, under lock,
during the course of this study, as well as after the completion of the dissertation. The
retention of these documents is for the purpose of preserving this testimony, as well as to
make it available to the researcher for future scholarly work that may result from the
production of the dissertation (for example, an article in a scholarly journal). Only the
investigator and the thesis advisor will have access to the survey responses.
The survey asks questions concerning your experiences with peacekeeping,
whether it be first-hand (in the field) or at an administrative level. If you have
participated in peacekeeping missions, you will be asked directly about the training you
received for said missions, and your opinions about the adequacy of such training to
prepare you for situations experienced in the field. Please be as detailed and specific as
you can, and, if possible, avoid “yes” and “no” answers.
If you have any questions about the conduct of this study or your rights as a
research subject you may contact the Director, Office of Research Ethics, The University
of Western Ontario.
Should you wish to verify the details of this project, you can contact my thesis
advisor, Dr. Jonathan Vance, at the History Department of the University of Western
Ontario. If you have any other questions about this study, you may contact Trista Grant.
Should you choose to participate in this study, please complete and return the survey to
the researcher within thirty days of receiving it. This letter is yours to keep. The survey
should be returned to the following address:
Ms. Trista Grant,
c/o Professor Jonathan Vance
Department of History, The University of Western Ontario
Thank you for your time,
Trista L. Grant
CCHS Fellow, CSDS Research Fellow
Ph.D. Candidate, History Department
The University of Western Ontario
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Appendix D – Survey Health Contacts (English)
Should you experience any psychological or emotional discomfort as a result of your
participation in this study, there are a number of organizations that can provide you with
information and direction in managing these responses. Please note that these resources
are not a substitute for medical care. Please consult your physician if you have any
concerns about your mental health.
Department of National Defence
Canadian Forces Health Services
http://www.forces.ca/health/engraph/home_e.asp
-Stress Management
http://www.forces.gc.ca/health/information/health_issues/Engraph/StressManagement_e.
asp
This webpage contains information on stress management, including definitions of
stressors, methods of identifying stress, and methods of managing stress related to
deployments. It also discusses Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and Acute Stress
Disorder (ASD). Contact information for resource persons is provided, and reading
material is recommended.
The Subject Matter Expert for “Stress Management” is the Deputy Chief of Staff Forces
Health Protection (DCOS FHP).
The staff-level contact at NDHQ for “Stress Management” is:
Social Wellness Policy/Programs/Education
Office of the Ombudsman
http://www.ombudsman.forces.gc.ca
Veterans Affairs Canada
http://www.vac-acc.gc.ca/
This site is dedicated to promoting the health and well-being of Canadian veterans, to
providing information on programs and services for those veterans, Canadian Forces
members, qualified civilians and their families.
Canadian Health Network
http://www.canadian-health-network.ca/customtools/homee.html
This site is a clearinghouse for health information. It is a useful resource in searching for
information, resources, and contacts on specific health-related issues.
http://www.canadian-health-network.ca/1mental_health.html
Health Canada Online
http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/

Canadian Network for Mood and Anxiety Treatments
http://www.canmat.org/

Canadian Psychiatric Association
http://www.cpa-apc.org/

Canadian Mental Health Association
http://www.cmha.ca
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Appendix E: Survey Questionnaire
DHRRE authorizes the administration of this survey within DND/CF in accordance with
CANFORGEN 145/02 ADMHRMIL 079 UNCLASS 131028Z DEC 02. Authorization
number: 262/03.
Questionnaire on Training for Peacekeeping in the Canadian Forces
Demographic Section
Current Rank:







Pte-MCpl
Sgt-CWO
Officer Cadet – 2 Lt
Lt-Capt
Maj-Col
General Officer

Age:
 18-24
 25-29
 30-35
 36-40
 41-45
 46-50

 51-55
 56-60

MOC:
Element:
First Language:
Gender:
1. Describe the peacekeeping mission(s) in which you participated as a member of the
Canadian Forces (CF), the time period of that mission, and your military rank and
military occupation classification (MOC) at that time. Please detail your specific
duties for each mission.
2. If you participated in more than one peacekeeping mission, did the type and/or quality
of peacekeeping training change over the course of your career?
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3. What type of training, if any, did you receive prior to deployment on a peacekeeping
mission? What topics did this training cover, and did it include mission-specific
training, such as training in local customs and culture?
4. If you did receive extra training for peacekeeping duty, did this training differ from
basic military training? If so, in your opinion did it differ from training to be a
“soldier”? Be specific if you can.
5. How long was your pre-deployment training? Was there a long delay between predeployment training and your actual deployment?
6. Did you receive instructions regarding the use of force or the use of your weapons
that was different from a typical combat situation?
7. In your opinion, were your orders regarding the use of force appropriate to the
situation? Why or why not?
8. Were you able to obey these orders at all times?
9. Did you at any time have to discharge your weapon or engage in direct confrontation
with one or more of the belligerents? If so, please discuss.
10. Did you feel any personal conflict regarding your dual roles as a member of the
Canadian Forces, and therefore a soldier, and your designation as a peacekeeper
under the authority of an international organization? Why or why not?
11. Do you feel that your role in the peacekeeping mission could be described as having
fulfilled military or police duties? Was a military presence necessary in the host
country? Why or why not?
12. Was your military training an asset in peacekeeping duties, and if so, why? If not,
why not?
13. Were you provided with all the necessary equipment for your peacekeeping tour?
(Ex. your personal kit, as well as the appropriate vehicles, equipment, tools, etc. to
fulfill your duties).
14. Were you trained in the use of this equipment prior to deployment?
15. Do you feel that you were adequately prepared for the conditions in the host country
(climatic, geographic, social, living) prior to your arrival? Was the additional training
for peacekeeping what prepared you for these conditions? If not, how could your
preparation been improved?
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16. Did you have any interaction with non-governmental organizations (ex. humanitarian
aid organizations)?
17. Did peacekeepers have any obligations regarding the personnel of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), and if any, was this an expected obligation?
18. Discuss the challenges of working in a multinational force. Were there common
standards among the militaries of different nations to allow for smoother operation intheatre? Did problems arise from the presence of international military personnel
who were required to work together to achieve mission objectives? Were there
obvious differences in the types of training the personnel of other militaries received
for peacekeeping duty, compared to yours?
19. Upon your return from peacekeeping duty, what topics were covered in your reintegration briefings? Did this help you resume your daily life in Canadian society?
20. Were you emotionally prepared for the things you saw and did on your peacekeeping
tour? Was there a period of adjustment for you upon your return? If so, how long was
it?
21. If you experienced any duty-related or combat-related stress, did you feel that the
Canadian Forces had resources in place to help you cope with this? Did you receive
pre-deployment training in stress management and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder?
Did you find it useful? Why or why not?
22. In your opinion, is peacekeeping a valid use of the resources and personnel of the
Canadian Forces?
23. Do Canadian soldiers make good peacekeepers? Why or why not?
24. Are there any additional comments you would like to make in regard to your
experience as a peacekeeper, and specifically about the training you received to
prepare you for deployment to a peacekeeping mission?

370

Appendix F: Survey Cover Letter (French)
Trista L. Grant
Ottawa (Ontario)

Madame, Monsieur,
Vous trouverez ci-joint un sondage de 24 questions portant sur votre expérience en
qualité de Casque bleu canadien, et plus précisément sur l’entraînement que vous avez
reçu en vue de vos fonctions de maintien de la paix. Cette étude s’inscrit dans mes
recherches dans le cadre du programme de doctorat en histoire, à l’Université de Western
Ontario. Les conclusions de l’étude serviront à ma thèse de doctorat, laquelle s’intitule
« Policy, Training and Performance: Canada’s Peacekeepers from Suez to Sarajevo »
(Politique, entraînement et rendement – Les Casques bleus canadiens de Suez à
Sarajevo). Le but de mes recherches est d’étudier l’histoire de l’entraînement en vue
d’opérations de maintien de la paix chez les Forces canadiennes, de 1956 à aujourd’hui.
DRERH autorise l’administration de ce sondage dans le MDN/FC en accord vec
CANFORGEN 145/02 ADMHRMIL 079 UNCLASS 131028Z DEC 02. Numéro
d’autorisation : 262/03. Le sondage a été approuvé par la haute direction du ministère de
la Défense nationale avant qu'on me donne votre nom afin que je vous inclue dans mon
échantillonnage. Une copie de mon mémoire sera transmise au Ministère. Cependant, le
MDN n’aura pas accès aux questionnaires comme tels. Vu que certains militaires
pourraient avoir l’impression qu’ils seront dans une position hasardeuse s’ils expriment
des opinions négatives par rapport à leur employeur (les Forces canadiennes), la
participation au sondage est entièrement libre. Vous pouvez refuser d’y prendre part,
refuser de répondre à certaines questions ou choisir de vous retirer de l’étude à n’importe
quel moment. Vous n’avez pas à inscrire de renseignements permettant de vous identifier
(c.-à-d. votre nom ou votre numéro matricule), mais l’on vous demandera certains
renseignements de nature démographique (âge, sexe, grade, etc.). La chercheuse prendra
soin de protéger votre identité.
Il est possible que vous couriez le risque, en remplissant le questionnaire, de vous
souvenir d’expériences qui entraîneraient une gêne psychologique ou affective. Si vous
choisissez de remplir le sondage, vous pouvez refuser de répondre à n’importe quelle
question, sans préjudice, en raison de la nature délicate de certains renseignements
abordés par le questionnaire. Vous ne devriez pas participer s’il est probable que les
souvenirs d’événements passés provoquent du stress, de la peur, de l’anxiété ou vous
fassent courir un risque important. Une liste de personnes-ressources est jointe à votre
usage personnel. Aucune rémunération ne vous sera accordée par suite de votre
participation au projet.
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Si vous prenez part à l’étude, veuillez remplir le sondage et retourner vos réponses écrites
à la main ou à l’ordinateur à l’adresse indiquée plus loin. Si vous préférez recevoir le
sondage par courriel, veuillez communiquer avec moi et je me ferai un plaisir de vous
envoyer une version électroniqueque vous pourrez renvoyer à la même adresse. Le temps
qu’il faudra pour remplir le sondage dépendra de la longueur de vos réponses, mais vous
pouvez compter environ une heure.
Le fait de remplir le questionnaire et de le retourner indique votre consentement à
participer à l’étude. Cela signifie que vos réponses peuvent être utilisées par la
chercheuse (Trista Grant) dans le cadre d’une thèse ou de tout autre travail universitaire
qui en découle. La chercheuse peut tirer des citations du sondage ou utiliser l’information
fournie aux fins du sondage sous d’autres formes acceptées en recherche historique. Les
questionnaires seront conservés par la chercheuse, dans un endroit verrouillé, pendant la
durée de l’étude, de même qu’après l’achèvement du mémoire. Ces documents sont
conservés aux fins de témoignage et pour servir à la chercheuse dans le cadre d’autres
travaux universitaires pouvant découler du mémoire (par exemple, la publication d’un
article dans une revue spécialisée). Seule la chercheuse et son directeur de thèse auront
accès aux réponses du sondage.
On vous posera des questions concernant vos expériences en matière de maintien de la
paix, que ce soit de première main (en campagne) ou au niveau administratif. Si vous
avez participé à des missions de maintien de la paix, l’on vous posera des questions
directes sur l’entraînement reçu en vue de ces missions et l’on vous demandera votre
opinion sur la pertinence de cet entraînement relativement aux situations vécues sur le
terrain. Veuillez fournir le plus de détails et de précisions que vous pouvez et, dans la
mesure du possible, évitez de répondre par un simple « oui » ou « non ».
Si vous avez des questions concernant le déroulement de l’étude ou vos droits à titre de
sujet de recherche, vous pouvez communiquer avec le Directeur du bureau des recherches
en éthique (Office of Research Ethics) de l’Université de Western Ontario.
Si vous souhaitez vérifier les détails du projet, vous pouvez communiquer avec mon
directeur de thèse, M. Jonathan Vance, au département d’histoire de l’Université de
Western Ontario.
Si vous avec des questions concernant l’étude, vous pouvez communiquer avec moimême, Trista Grant.
Si vous choisissez de participer à l’étude, veuillez remplir le questionnaire et le retourner
à la chercheuse dans les trente jours suivant la réception. Le sondage devra être posté à
l’adresse suivante :
Mme Trista Grant,
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A/S Professeur Jonathan Vance
Department of History, The University of Western Ontario
Vous pouvez conserver la présente lettre.
Je vous remercie du temps que vous m’avez accordé et vous prie de recevoir, Madame ou
Monsieur, l’expression de mes meilleurs sentiments.

Trista L. Grant
Boursière CCSH, Boursière CSDS
Candidate au doctorat
Département d’histoire
Université Western Ontario
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Appendix G : Survey Health Contacts (French)
Si vous éprouvez un inconfort psychologique ou émotif par suite de votre participation à
cette étude, vous pouvez communiquer avec certaines organisations qui peuvent vous
fournir des renseignements et des conseils sur la gestion de ces réactions. À noter que ces
ressources ne remplacent pas les soins médicaux. Veuillez consulter votre médecin si
vous avez des inquiétudes à propos de votre santé mentale.
Ministère de la Défense nationale
Services de santé des Forces canadiennes
http://www.forces.ca/health/engraph/home_f.asp
-Gestion du stress
http://www.forces.gc.ca/health/information/health_issues/Engraph/StressManagement_f.a
sp
Ce site Web renferme des renseignements sur la gestion du stress, y compris des
définitions de facteurs de stress, et il offre des moyens de reconnaître le stress et de gérer
le stress lié aux déploiements. Il traite également du syndrome de stress post-traumatique
(SSPT) et du trouble de stress aigu (TSA). On y trouve les coordonnées de
personnes-ressources ainsi que des suggestions de lecture.
L’expert en la matière pour la « gestion du stress » est le Sous-chef d’état-major –
Protection de la santé de la Force (SCEM PSF).
L’officier d’état-major qui, au QGDN, s’occupe du dossier « Gestion du stress » à titre de
personne-ressource est :
Titre de poste : Politiques et programmes – Mieux-être social
Bureau de l’Ombudsman
http://www.ombudsman.forces.gc.ca
Anciens Combattants Canada
http://www.vac-acc.gc.ca/
Ce site vise à promouvoir la santé et le mieux-être des anciens combattants canadiens
ainsi qu’à fournir des renseignements sur les programmes et services offerts à ces
derniers, aux membres des Forces canadiennes, aux employés civils admissibles et à leurs
familles.
Réseau canadien de la santé
http://www.canadian-health-network.ca/customtools/homef.html
Ce site est un carrefour d’information sur la santé. Il s’agit d’un outil efficace qui permet
de trouver des renseignements, des ressources et des personnes-ressources concernant
certaines questions relatives à la santé.
-La page Santé mentale
http://www.canadian-health-network.ca/1mental_health.html
Santé Canada En direct
http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/

Canadian Network for Mood and Anxiety Treatments
http://www.canmat.org/
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Association des psychiatres du Canada
http://www.cpa-apc.org/

Association canadienne pour la santé
mentale
http://www.cmha.ca
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Appendix H: Survey Questionnaire (French)
DRERH autorise l’administration de ce sondage dans le MDN/FC en accord vec
CANFORGEN 145/02 ADMHRMIL 079 UNCLASS 131028Z DEC 02. Numéro
d’autorisation : 262/03.
Questionnaire sur la formation en maintien de la paix au sein des Forces
canadiennes
Section démographique
Grade actuel
 Sdt - cplc
 Sgt - adjuc
 Élof – slt
 Lt - capt
 Maj - col
 Officier général
Âge









18-24
25-29
30-35
36-40
41-45
46-50

51-55
56-60

GPM :
Élément :
Langue maternelle :
Sexe :
1.
Décrivez les missions de maintien de la paix auxquelles vous avez participé à
titre de membre des Forces canadiennes (FC) et indiquez la durée de ces missions ainsi
que votre grade et votre groupe professionnel militaire (GPM) à l’époque. Veuillez
décrire en détail les fonctions que vous avez remplies dans le cadre de chaque mission.
2.
Si vous avez pris part à plus d’une mission de maintien de la paix, avez-vous
remarqué un changement en ce qui concerne le type et/ou la qualité de la formation en la
matière que vous avez reçue tout au long de votre carrière?
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3.
Quel genre de formation, le cas échéant, avez-vous reçue avant votre déploiement
dans le cadre d’une mission de maintien de la paix? Quels étaient les sujets abordés
durant l’instruction? Avez-vous reçu une formation propre à la mission, par exemple,
une formation sur les coutumes et la culture locales?
4.
Si vous avez reçu une formation supplémentaire en vue de vos fonctions de
maintien de la paix, celle-ci était-elle différente de l’instruction militaire de base? Si oui,
était-elle différente de la formation de « soldat »? Soyez précis, si vous le pouvez.
5.
Combien de temps votre formation préalable au déploiement a-t-elle duré? La
période entre la formation préalable au déploiement et le déploiement était-elle longue?
6.
Avez-vous reçu, concernant l’emploi de la force ou l’emploi de vos armes, des
instructions qui étaient différentes d’une situation de combat typique?
7.
Selon vous, les ordres que vous avez reçus concernant l’emploi de la force
étaient-ils adaptés à la situation? Si oui pourquoi? Sinon, pourquoi?
8.

Étiez-vous en mesure d’y obéir en tout temps?

9.
Avez-vous eu, à quelque moment que ce soit, à utiliser votre arme ou à vous
engager dans une confrontation directe avec au moins un des belligérants? Si oui,
veuillez élaborer.
10.
Vous êtes-vous senti en situation de conflit personnel concernant votre double
rôle de membre des Forces canadiennes, et donc de soldat, et de casque bleu relevant
d’une organisation internationale? Si oui, pourquoi? Sinon, pourquoi?
11.
D’après vous, votre rôle dans la mission de maintien de la paix consistait-il à
remplir des fonctions militaires ou policières? Une présence militaire était-elle
nécessaire dans le pays hôte? Si oui, pourquoi? Sinon, pourquoi?
12.
Votre instruction militaire représentait-elle un atout pour les fonctions de
maintien de la paix? Si oui, pourquoi? Sinon, pourquoi?
13.
Vous a-t-on fourni tout l’équipement nécessaire pour votre mission de maintien
de la paix (p. ex., votre trousse personnelle ainsi que les véhicules, l’équipement et les
outils dont vous avez besoin pour remplir vos fonctions)?
14.
Avez-vous reçu la formation voulue, avant le déploiement, pour utiliser cet
équipement?
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15.
D’après vous, avez-vous été bien préparé, avant le départ, à faire face aux
conditions qui prévalaient dans le pays hôte (conditions climatiques, géographiques,
sociales et conditions de vie)? Est-ce la formation supplémentaire en maintien de la paix
qui vous a permis de vous y préparer? Sinon, comment auriez-vous pu être mieux
préparé?
16.
Avez-vous eu des contacts avec des organisations non gouvernementales (p. ex.,
des organisations d’aide humanitaire)?
17.
Les casques bleus avaient-ils des obligations à l’égard du personnel
d’organisations non gouvernementales (ONG)? Si oui, ces obligations étaient-elles
prévues?
18.
Parlez-nous des défis que présente le travail au sein d’une force multinationale.
Les militaires de différents pays étaient-ils assujettis à des normes communes de façon à
faciliter les opérations dans le théâtre? La présence de membres du personnel militaire
international, qui sont tenus de collaborer pour atteindre les objectifs de la mission,
a-t-elle posé des problèmes? Y avait-il des différences évidentes entre l’instruction que
les autres militaires ont reçue en vue des fonctions de maintien de la paix et la vôtre?
19.
À votre retour de la mission de maintien de la paix, quels sujets ont-ils été
abordés dans vos séances d’information sur la réintégration? Ces séances vous ont-elles
aidé à reprendre votre vie dans la société canadienne?
20.
Étiez-vous prêt, sur le plan émotif, à faire face aux choses que vous avez vues ou
faites durant votre mission de maintien de la paix? Avez-vous eu besoin d’une période
d’ajustement quand vous êtes revenu au pays? Si oui, combien de temps cette période
a-t-elle duré?
21.
Si vous avez subi un stress lié au service ou au combat, selon vous, les Forces
canadiennes avaient-elles les ressources nécessaires pour vous aider à composer avec
cette situation? Avant votre déploiement, avez-vous reçu une formation sur la gestion du
stress ou le syndrome de stress post-traumatique? Si oui, pourquoi? Sinon, pourquoi?
22.
Selon vous, le maintien de la paix constitue-t-il un usage valable des ressources
et du personnel des Forces canadiennes?
23.
Les soldats canadiens sont-ils des casques bleus compétents? Si oui, pourquoi?
Sinon, pourquoi?
24.
Avez-vous d’autres observations à formuler concernant votre expérience en tant
que casque bleu, et tout particulièrement au sujet de la formation que vous avez reçue en
prévision de votre déploiement dans le cadre d’une mission de maintien de la paix?
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